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FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 502
"The inadvertent production of a privileged document is a specter that
haunts every document intensive case."'
"It is hard to imagine a greater waste of money than paying a lawyer $250
an hour to look at recipes, notices of the holiday Rarty, and NCAA Final
Four pool entries while doing a privilege review."
L Introduction
For more than ten years, practitioners, courts, and the federal rulemakers
have struggled with the problems posed by discovery of electronic information.
The proliferation of email and electronic documents has substantially increased
the volume of information that attorneys must cull through to meet their
discovery obligations in even the simplest case. In 2006, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure were amended to address the cost and burden of e-discovery.
3
One issue that these e-discovery amendments did not address, however, was the
cost and burden incurred by attorneys to review documents before producing
them in discovery to ensure that they do not contain attorney-client privileged
communications or attorney work product protected information. Federal Rule
of Evidence 502 is the last piece of the e-discovery puzzle. This new rule
quietly takes the first steps toward federalization of two areas of law that have
traditionally been subject to state regulation: the law governing waiver of the
attorney-client privilege and the law governing an attorney's duties of
professional conduct.
The two quotes above highlight the difficult choice faced by every party
and attorney involved in document intensive litigation-to review or not to
review. Rule 502 was enacted to reduce the risk of forfeiting the attorney-client
privilege or the attorney work product protection during discovery.4 The rule
1. FDIC v. Marine Midland Realty Credit Corp., 138 F.R.D. 479, 479-80 (E.D. Va.
1991).
2. John M. Facciola, Sailing on Confused Seas: Privilege Waiver and the New Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 2 FED. CTS. L. REV. 57,64 (2007). The Honorable John M. Facciola
is a United States Magistrate Judge in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia.
3. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b) (covering the details of a scheduling order that includes
provisions for handling electronic discovery); see also AMENDMENTs TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE at 3, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/EDiscovrywNotes.pdf
(discussing the need to address issues involved in electronic discovery).
4. See SEPTEMBER 2007 SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
COMMTTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 31 [hereinafter SEPTEMBER 2007 RULES
COMMITrEE REPORT], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/ST09-2007.pdf ("The
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relieves the parties of the cost and burden of conducting an exhaustive review
of information that will be produced in discovery by protecting them against
waiver by inadvertent disclosure of privileged information.5 Rule 502 contains
four principal provisions.6 The first provision codifies the view of the majority
of courts that inadvertent disclosure of privileged or protected information
ordinarily does not waive the privilege or protection.7 The second provision
limits the scope of a privilege waiver in most instances to the disclosed
document, rather than to all documents dealing with the same subject matter as
the disclosed document.8 The fourth provision permits parties in a federal
proceeding to enter into an agreement that disclosure of privileged or protected
information by one party to another shall not constitute a waiver for purposes of
that proceeding.9
proposed new rule is intended to reduce the risk of forfeiting the privilege or protection so that
parties need not scrutinize information produced in discovery as much as they now do.").
Although this Article uses the term "waiver," I use that term to encompass both a waiver of the
privilege and a forfeiture of the privilege. A waiver involves a known privilege that a party
intentionally relinquishes. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) ("A waiver is
ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."). A
privilege is forfeited when a party fails to assert it in circumstances that require the assertion of
the privilege. See United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317, 323 (1992) (discussing when a
privilege may be forfeited); see also Dellwood Farms, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 128 F.3d 1122, 1126
(7th Cir. 1997) ("We assume that like other privileges, the investigatory privilege can be
'waived' not only in the sense of a voluntary surrender, but also in the sense of forfeiture."); 1
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 93 (5th ed. 2003 Supp.) ("Finding waiver ... where the forfeiture
of the privilege was not subjectively intended.., is consistent with the view ... that the
essential function of the privilege is to protect a confidence which, once revealed by any means,
leaves the privilege with no legitimate function to perform.").
5. See FED. R. EVID. 502(b) (describing how inadvertent disclosure may not operate as a
waiver); see also S. REP. No. 110-264, at 1-2 (2008), available at http://www.uscourts.
gov/rules/SRepl 10-264.pdf (explaining the costs and risks involved in extensive discovery,
exhaustive review, and inadvertent production of privileged documents).
6. See generally FED. R. EVID. 502; SEPTEMBER 2007 RULES COMMITTEE REPORT, supra
note 4, at 31 ("Proposed new Rule 502 contains four main provisions."). The full text of FRE
502 is set out in the Appendix, infra.
7. See FED. R. EvID. 502(b) (describing how inadvertent disclosure may not operate as a
waiver); see also SEPTEMBER 2007 RULES COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 31 ("The first
[provision] codifies the majority view and protects a party from waiving a privilege if privileged
or protected information is disclosed inadvertently.").
8. See FED. R. EvD. 502(a) (describing the scope of waiver); see also SEPTEMBER 2007
RULES COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 31 ("The second [provision] protects a party from
waiving a privilege covering all documents dealing with the same subject matter as a document
that was disclosed.").
9. See FED. R. EvID. 502(e) (detailing the controlling effect of a party agreement); see
also SEPTEMBER 2007 RULES COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 31 ("The fourth [provision]
provides that parties in a federal proceedings can enter into a confidentiality agreement
providing for mutual protection against waiver in that proceedings, binding only the parties.").
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This Article focuses on the third principal provision, which "is the heart of
the new rule." 10 Rule 502(d) provides:
(d) Controlling effect of a court order. A federal court may order that the
privilege or protection is not waived by disclosure connected with the
litigation pending before the court-in which event the disclosure is also
not a waiver in any other federal or state proceeding.'
This new rule of evidence permits a federal court to issue an order that protects
against waiver of the attorney-client privilege or the work product protection
despite a party's voluntary, and even intentional, disclosure of such protected or
privileged information. This is a radical change in the law of privilege. If
Congress and the rulemakers are correct, production of documents without
reviewing them for privilege may soon become the dominant practice in large
commercial litigation.
In order to be effective, however, entry of an order must relieve the
Producing Party's attorneys of their state-imposed professional responsibility
obligation to review their client's confidential information before production.12
Rule 502(d) also must normalize the ethical obligations of the attorney who is
the recipient of such a production. This Article identifies and considers the
significant (and unforeseen) practical consequences of breaching the protective
zone that has previously existed surrounding the states' operation of their own
court systems, state rules of procedure, and state rules of professional
responsibility.
Part II assesses prior attempts to federalize the law of privilege and notes
that these attempts were rejected out of concern for comity, issues of
federalism, and the autonomous operation of state courts and state litigation
systems. 13 Part II then considers the history and purpose of Rule 502 and the
related e-discovery amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
10. MINUTES OF THE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE MEETING OF
JUNE 11-12, 2007 at 44 [hereinafter JUNE 11-12 RULES COMMITTEE MINUTES], available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/ST06-2007-min.pdf (statement of Professor Daniel
Capra, Reporter for the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules); see also Kristine L. Roberts,
President Signs Bill Creating New Evidence Rule, LITIGATION NEWS ONLINE (Sept. 2008),
available at http://www.abanet.org/litigation/litigationnews/2008/september/article-legisla
tion.html ("Rule 502(d) 'is the lynchpin for making the rule function"); id ("Gregory P.
Joseph... past chair of the Section, says [502(d) is] the 'most critical piece' of the
legislation.").
11. FED. R. EviD. 502(d).
12. For ease of reference, I refer to the party who produces documents or otherwise
discloses information in a federal proceeding as the "Producing Party" and the party who
receives such documents or information as the "Receiving Party."
13. See 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 501 App. 101[l][b], at 501 App. 23 (Joseph M. Mclaughlin & Matthew Bender eds., 1997)
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The history of Rule 502 reveals that Congress enacted Rule 502 as an
exercise of its Commerce Clause authority.14 Part III concludes that Rule 502 is
not a permissible exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause authority because it
regulates activity that is not "economic in nature." Rather, Rule 502 regulates
the States' and the state courts' ability to govern their own proceedings-for
example, to determine what evidence is admissible in a state court proceeding
on a state law cause of action between litigants who are residents of the forum
state. 15 This regulation of noneconomic, intrastate activity is not a necessary
part of some larger regulatory scheme by which Congress regulates interstate
economic activity, and it is therefore outside the scope of Congress's
Commerce Clause power. The operation of state courts, the rules of privilege
governing state law causes of action, and the rules of professional responsibility
are traditional areas of state sovereignty. 16 Part IV concludes that Rule 502 is
constitutional only if it is a valid exercise of Congress's Article III authority to
ordain and establish the "inferior" courts, bolstered by the Necessary and
Proper Clause.'
7
Part V considers whether Rule 502 violates the Due Process Clause18 by
making federal court orders binding on the whole world. This Article
concludes that entry of a Rule 502(d) order violates the Due Process Clause in
certain instances because the order will bind nonparties without giving these
nonparties notice and an opportunity to be heard. 19 It also raises significant
constitutional questions regarding the authority of a federal court to enter a
(discussing the criticism and resistance resulting from the perceived refusal to honor the state
system of privileges and how that goes against the principles of federalism).
14. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power... [t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.").
15. See FED R. EviD. 502(d) (describing how a federal court may order that the privilege
not be waived and that a disclosure is not a waiver in any other federal or state proceeding).
16. See Matthew T. Rollins, Examination of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
Pertaining to the Marketing ofLegal Services in Cyberspace, 22 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 113, 127 (2003) ("It is well established that the responsibility of regulating the practice
of law is an important governmental function that has historically been reserved to the sovereign
states.").
17. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish."); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 ("The Congress shall have Power... [t]o make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers,
and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States.").
18. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (setting forth the right to due process of law).
19. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) ("An essential
principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property 'be preceded by notice
and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case."') (citations omitted).
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discretionary order that controls state courts by precluding them, in state court
actions brought by strangers to the federal court litigation, from applying state
law to determine what evidence is relevant and admissible in their search for
truth.
Part VI identifies several significant questions and problems raised by
application of Rule 502(d) that are not resolved by reference to the Rule, the
Advisory Committee Notes, the rulemaking history, or the legislative history
surrounding the rule. Does Rule 502(d) preempt state rules of professional
responsibility that require an attorney to guard a client's secrets at all costs?
What limits are there on use of information that is disclosed pursuant to a Rule
502(d) order? Does Rule 502(d) simply shift responsibility for conducting
privilege review (and the cost and burden of that review) from the Producing
Party to the Receiving Party? May a federal court enter an order with
retroactive effect-to put the waiver genie back in the privilege bottle? In
analyzing these issues, this Article concludes that Rule 502(d) may be
worthless because clients (and attorneys) will be so fearful of the adverse
consequences of disclosing clients' private information (even if the privilege is
maintained) that they will refuse to disclose documents without first doing a
full review of the documents for information that is privileged, protected,
confidential, or nonresponsive. Altematively, if Rule 502(d) preempts state
rules of professional responsibility governing client confidences, it will
significantly diminish the importance of confidential communications between
attorney and client because such information will be regularly disclosed during
discovery.
II. The History and Purpose of Federal Rule of Evidence 502
A. Prior Attempts to Federalize the Law of Privilege
Federalization of state privilege law has been considered numerous
times-both during enactment of the original Federal Rules of Evidence and
since the rules were enacted-but always rejected.20 At each stage in the
process, Congress and the rulemakers expressed concern for the relationship
between state courts and federal courts and the states' interest in establishing
20. See infra notes 36-41 and accompanying text (discussing the multiple attempts to
federalize state privilege law and how federalism issues repeatedly led to the rejection of such
attempts).
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and controlling both the substance and procedure of their respective courts,
particularly the introduction of evidence. 2'
The Federal Rules of Evidence were first adopted in 1975.22 The work
that led to adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence was the result of many
years of inquiry and investigation and a number of fits and starts. In 1958, the
Judicial Conference of the United States approved the creation of the
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure and its five advisory rules
committees.23 After initial study and input from practitioners, the Special
Committee on Evidence recommended to the Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure in 1963 that the Standing Committee form an advisory
committee tasked with drafting formal Rules of Evidence that would be
uniform throughout the federal court system. 24 The Advisory Committee on
Rules of Evidence was appointed in 1965 and began its work that year.25 The
very first meeting of the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules was "devoted
to considering the manner in which the Committee should go about its task,
plus the dimensions of the task itself, particularly as it may be affected by
problems arising out of the state-federal relationship.
2 6
The Advisory Committee's work led to the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence, which were released as a "Preliminary Draft" in 1969,27 revised in
21. See infra notes 36-41 and accompanying text (discussing how Congress and the
rulemakers frequently showed deference to the state courts when it came to establishing the
rules for such courts, particularly evidentiary rules).
22. See generally Act to Establish Rules of Evidence for Certain Courts and Proceedings,
Pub. L. No. 93-595, § 1, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
23. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES HELD AT WASHINGTON, D.C. SEPTEMBER 17-19, 1958, at 6-7, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/ Minutes/1958-09-ST-JC approvesST CommAdvCommLpdf
("After a full discussion the Conference approved the following recommendations of the
Committees: (1) That a standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure be created....
(2) That five advisory committees be created .... ").
24. See FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE TO THE STANDING
COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES 2-3 (Jan. 1963), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/EV01-
1963.pdf("[A]n advisory committee [is] to be formed to go forward with the tasks of drafting
such rules [of evidence] . . . , which would be uniform throughout the Federal court system.").
25. See Letter from Edward Cleary, Reporter, to the Honorable Albert B. Maris,
Chairman, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 1 (Aug. 30, 1966), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/EV08-1966.pdf ("The Committee was appointed in the
spring of 1965 and held its first meeting in June.").
26. Id. (emphasis added); see also 1 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE:
EvIDENTiARY PRIVILEGES § 4.2.1 .c, at 155 (2002) (considering the extent to which federal courts
ought to apply state privilege law).
27. See generally Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for United States
District Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161 (1969). This Preliminary Draft included rules
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1971,28 then approved by the Supreme Court.29 In Article V of the Proposed
Rules, the Advisory Committee recommended codifying the law of privilege.3°
Article V would have established nine express (and exclusive) privileges.
31
Article V also would have included specific rules addressing "Waiver of
Privilege by Voluntary Disclosure 32 and "Privileged Matter Disclosed Under
Compulsion or Without Opportunity to Claim Privilege." 33 Article V was
intended to apply in all federal cases, including those in which the federal court
was sitting in diversity jurisdiction and therefore applying substantive state
law.
34
The Supreme Court transmitted the Proposed Rules of Evidence to
Congress on February 5, 1973. The Supreme Court's submission of the
Proposed Rules of Evidence to Congress was very controversial, with most of
the controversy surrounding the testimonial privileges in Article V.36 The
governing "Waiver of Privilege By Voluntary Disclosure" and "Privileged Matter Disclosed
Under Compulsion or Without Opportunity to Claim Privilege." Id. at 280-81. Preliminary
Draft Rule 5-11 provided: "A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against
disclosure of a confidential matter waives the privilege if he or his predecessor while holder of
the privilege voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant part of the matter."
Id. And Preliminary Draft Rule 5-12 provided: "Evidence of a statement or other disclosure of
privileged matter is inadmissible against the holder of the privilege if the disclosure was
(a) compelled erroneously or (b) made without opportunity to claim the privilege." Id.
28. See generally Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for United States Courts
and Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315 (1971).
29. See generally Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D.
183 (1972).
30. See id. at 230-61 (providing proposed rules 501-513, which, if adopted, would have
codified the law of privilege).
31. See id. at 234-58 (providing proposed rules 502-510, which, if adopted, would have
expressly established nine federal privileges).
32. See id. at 258-59 (providing proposed rule 511, which stated that privilege is waived
if"the holder of the privilege voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant
part of the matter or communication").
33. See id at 259-60 (providing proposed rule 512, which stated that "[e]vidence of a
statement or other disclosure of privileged matter is not admissible against the holder of the
privilege if the disclosure was (a) compelled erroneously or (b) made without opportunity to
claim the privilege").
34. See id. at 194 (providing proposed rule 101, which set forth the scope and
applicability of the proposed rules); id. at 347-54 (providing proposed rule 1101, which further
defined the scope and applicability of the proposed rules); IMWINKELRIED, supra note 26,
§ 4.2.1 .c (discussing the applicability of state privilege law in federal court).
35. See 21 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, EVIDENCE § 5006, at 193-94 (1977) ("Supreme Court's order of promulgation
authorized transmission to Congress... [on] February 5, 1973.").
36. See Kenneth S. Broun, Giving Codification a Second Chance-Testimonial Privileges
and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 769, 773-79 (2002) ("'[Fifty] percent of
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proposal "triggered a veritable 'crisis' in the rulemaking process, straining
relations between the federal judiciary and Congress."37 In a rare move,
Congress rejected Article V in its entirety. 38 Among the substantial objections
raised by members of Congress were the following: the proposed rules
impinged on state-created substantive rights,3 ' the proposed rules should
require federal courts to apply state law on privilege when sitting in diversity
jurisdiction because the law on privilege affects substantive state policy, 40 and
the proposed rules should require federal courts to apply state law on privilege
even in federal question cases because "failure to recognize the existence of a
[state-created] privilege could have an adverse impact on a relationship
privileged under state policy and law.,
41
In place of Article V, Congress enacted Federal Rule of Evidence 501.42
Rule 501 provides that federal courts should develop and recognize testimonial
privileges "governed by the principles of [federal] common law as they may be
interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and
experience., 43 This federal law of privilege governs in federal criminal cases
and in federal civil cases in which there are federal question claims.44 State law
the complaints.., related to the section on privileges.' .... [T]he arguments against the
privilege rules were more frequent and more vehement.") (citations omitted).
37. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Draft Article V of the Federal Rules of Evidence on
Privileges, One of the Most Influential Pieces of Legislation Never Enacted: The Strength of
the Ingroup Loyalty of the Federal Judiciary, 58 ALA. L. REV. 41, 48 (2006).
38. See id. at 47-52 ("As enacted, the [Federal Rules of Evidence] ... omitted all the
specific privileges rules proposed by the judiciary in draft Article V."); Timothy P. Glynn,
Federalizing Privilege, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 59, 87-93 (2003) ("Congress ... rejected Article V
in its entirety.").
39. See COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, H.R. REP. No. 93-52, at
3-4 (1974) (describing how the state-created substantive rights were being impinged).
40. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 26, § 4.2.2.b (discussing the "large number of
witnesses [who] took up the theme that.., federal courts ought to apply state privileges, since
privileges affect substantive social policy"); WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 13, § 501 App.
101 [ 1][b] (discussing "expressed concern that Rule 501 ... would 'freeze the law of privilege in
the Federal Court,' eliminating the 'flexibility' the courts previously had") (citations omitted).
41. Broun, supra note 36, at 775-76; see also id. at 776 n.51 (gathering sources
supporting the proposition that federal courts should apply state privilege laws).
42. FED. R. EvID. 501.
43. Id
44. Id; see also H.R. REP. No. 93-1597, at 4 (1974) (Conf. Rep.) (stating that in
"nondiversity jurisdiction civil cases, federal privilege law will generally apply"); 2
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 177, at 280-81 (2d
ed. 1994 & Supp. 2007) (discussing cases holding that federal testimonial privileges govern
even when there are federal and state claims in a single action).
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of privilege governs those cases in which a federal court sits in diversity
jurisdiction and therefore applies substantive state law.45
In late 1998, the Evidence Rules Committee revisited the issue of whether
to codify the various privileges.46 In the light of substantial disagreement on
whether such a proposal would be productive, the Chair appointed a
subcommittee to study the issue.47 The Committee's decision to act was largely
driven by the likelihood that Congress would codify the federal common law of
privilege on a piecemeal, case-by-case basis. 48 The Committee "determined
that an overriding look at the privileges in the context of the rulemaking
process is a far better way of proceeding than is a patchwork legislative
treatment. ' 49  The Committee's overriding look focused on studying the
codification of the federal common law of privilege as applicable in federal
courts. 50 Federalization of state privilege law was not on the table.51
Although the Federal Rules of Evidence address the issue of privilege,
Congress and the rulemakers had always been careful not to impinge on the
substantive state law of privilege. The history of the Federal Rules of Evidence
is marked by an abiding concern with comity, issues of federalism, and respect
for the autonomous operation of state courts and state litigation systems. Rule
502 marks the first step in federalizing the law of privilege.
45. See FED. R. EvID. 501 ("[Where] State law supplies the rule of decision, the
privilege... shall be determined in accordance with State law.").
46. See DECEMBER 1,1998 REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMnTEE ON EVIDENCE RULES 6,
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/EV12-1998.pdf ("The Evidence Rules
Committee once again discussed whether it should attempt to propose a codification of the
privileges.").
47. See id. ("The Chair designated a subcommittee to consider whether a proposed
codification of the privileges would be a worthwhile project.").
48. See id. (noting how the Evidence Rules Committee was discussing an attempt to
propose a codification of the privileges in light of Congressional activity in that area); MAY 1,
1999 REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE RULES 10 [hereinafter MAY 1999
EVID. COMM. REPORT], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/EV05-1999.pdf
("The Committee, not[ed] that Congress has expressed an interest in codifying privileges on a
case-by-case basis.").
49. MAY 1999 EVID. COMM. REPORT, supra note 48, at 10.
50. See DECEMBER 1, 1999 REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMM1ITEE ON EVIDENCE RULES 2,
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/EV12-1999.pdf (describing the goal of
codifying the federal common law of privileges for adoption by the federal courts).
51. See MAY 1, 2001 REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMrITEE ON EVIDENCE RULES 4,
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/EV5-2001.pdf (noting that the proposal
would still require federal courts to "apply the state law of privilege in cases where the state law
provides the rule of decision").
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B. The Cost and Burden of Reviewing Documents for Privilege
Federal Rule of Evidence 502 is largely a reaction to the cost and burden
of large scale discovery in commercial litigation. During the discovery phase of
federal court litigation, the parties often gather and produce large quantities of
documents in response to document requests.5 2 Attorney-client privileged
information is beyond the permissible scope of discovery.53 Attorney work
product is not beyond the scope of permissible discovery, but it is protected
from discovery absent a special and substantial showing.5 4 In order to respond
to these document requests, the attorneys for the Producing Party gather
potentially responsive documents and review them to ensure that they do not
contain privileged or work product protected information. The attorneys for the
Producing Party also will avoid producing documents containing privileged or
work product protected information because disclosure is likely to waive the
privilege and the protection.55 This is true regardless of whether the Receiving
Party agrees not to disclose the documents to anyone else.56
Despite the significant incentives for attorneys to avoid production of
privileged or work product protected information, such disclosures inevitably
(and inadvertently) happen in some cases.57 There are basically three
approaches that state and federal courts take when assessing the effect of
52. See FED. R. Civ. P. 34 (allowing litigants to request a broad variety of materials from
opponents). Documents also may be requested in conjunction with a deposition and pursuant to
a subpoena. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(2), 45(c)(2) (requiring party deponents to produce items
listed in a subpoena duces tecum at the deposition).
53. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) ("Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense.").
54. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) (stating that attorney work product includes "documents
and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another
party or its representative (including the other party's attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor,
insurer, or agent)"). Such information may be discovered if the requesting party establishes that
the information is otherwise discoverable and makes a showing that "it has substantial need for
the materials to prepare its case and cannot, without undue hardship, obtain their substantial
equivalent by other means." Id.
55. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Phil., 951 F.2d 1414, 1424 (3d Cir.
1991) (stating that voluntary disclosure of purportedly privileged material to a third party has
long been held to amount to a waiver of the privilege).
56. See id. at 1427-28 (declaring that disclosure of privileged material to a third party
waives the privilege, even if the third party assures confidentiality); see also Bowne of N.Y.
City, Inc. v. AmBase Corp., 150 F.R.D. 465,478-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding that a nonwaiver
agreement was not binding on a third party in another civil action).
57. See, e.g., Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 251,267-68 (D. Md.
2008) (holding that attorney client privilege was waived by inadvertent disclosure of privileged
documents despite Producing Party's attorney's use of keyword searches to locate and remove
potentially privileged documents).
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inadvertent disclosure of privileged or protected material: (1) an "intent
required" approach whereby the inadvertent disclosure does not constitute a
waiver-even with respect to the disclosed information-absent the Producing
Party's intent to make a disclosure; (2) a strict liability approach whereby
inadvertent disclosure waives the privilege regardless of the level of care taken
to protect against disclosure; and (3) a middle road approach whereby
inadvertent disclosure may waive the privilege depending upon the
circumstances, primarily considering (a) the level of care taken to protect
against disclosure and (b) the promptness of efforts to provide notice of the
disclosure and efforts to retrieve the documents. 58 The fear of every attorney is
that inadvertent production of a single privileged document will lead to a
finding of waiver of privilege for that document and for every other privileged
document on the same subject matter.
The review of documents for privileged or protected information has
become increasingly important because the advent of email and electronic
storage of documents has drastically multiplied the number of documents that
are generated by litigants.59 In turn, the need to review these documents to
58. See 8 WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE CIV. 2d § 2016.2 (1994)
(describing the disparate approaches taken by courts regarding waiver by inadvertent
disclosure); see also Memorandum from Ken Broun, Consultant, to Advisory Committee on
Evidence Rules 4-6 (October 12, 2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/
Agenda%2OBooks/EV2005-11 .pdf (collecting and discussing cases that illustrate the three basic
approaches courts have taken with regard to inadvertent disclosure); Julie Cohen, Note, Look
Before You Leap: A Guide to the Law of Inadvertent Disclosure of Privileged Information in
the Era of E-Discovery, 93 IOWA L. REv. 627, 633-41 (2008) (discussing the three principal
approaches to dealing with inadvertent disclosure). See generally John T. Hundley, Annotation,
Waiver of Privilege by Inadvertent Disclosure-Federal Law, 159 A.L.R. FED. 153 (2005)
(analyzing the approaches taken by federal courts regarding inadvertent disclosure and waiver of
privilege); John T. Hundley, Annotation, Waiver of Privilege By Inadvertent Disclosure-
Federal Law, 51 A.L.R.5th 603 (1997) (discussing the approaches taken by state courts
regarding inadvertent disclosure and waiver of privilege). Even those courts that are the
strongest proponents of the strict accountability doctrine of privilege waiver leave the door open
to avoid a finding of waiver when the disclosure is compelled by court order. See Transamerica
Computer Co. v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 573 F.2d 646, 650-51 (9th Cir. 1978) (finding an
inadvertent production of a limited number of privileged documents was not a waiver of
privilege because the production was "compelled" as a result of the extraordinary circumstances
of the accelerated discovery proceedings); see also Hopson v. Mayor of Balt., 232 F.R.D. 228,
244-46 (D. Md. 2005) (declaring that in situations where less than a full privilege review is
possible given the extent of the requested material, compliance with a court order compelling
production will not result in a waiver of privilege or work product claim).
59. See S. REP. No. 110-264, at 1 (2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/
S_RepI 10-264.pdf (describing the dramatic increase in the cost of discovery due to the
increased use of e-mail and electronic record keeping); SEPTEMBER 2005 SUMMARY OF THE
REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITrEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 22-
23 [hereinafter SEPTEMBER 2005 RULES COMM. REPORT], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
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protect against the waiver of the attorney-client privilege and attorney work
product protection has dramatically increased litigation costs.6° If even a single
privileged document is inadvertently produced during discovery, the Producing
Party may have waived the privilege for that document and any other
61documents that relate to the same subject matter.
Take a very simple case with 10,000 pages of documents that are
responsive to a reasonable set of document requests. Those documents must be
reviewed by an attorney to ensure that they do not contain any privileged or
work product protected information. Assume that the first year associate who
will conduct the document review is billed out at $150 per hour. If the average
document takes five seconds to review, the document review will take the
associate approximately fourteen hours to complete. Putting aside any knotty
privilege issues that will need to be run up the chain to more senior (and
therefore higher billing) attorneys and the creation of a privilege log, by a very
conservative estimate the document review will cost the responding party at
least $2,100. If the number of documents is 1,000,000 pages, 62 the document
review would cost the responding party at least $210,000.63 These "simple"
rules/Reports/ST09-2005.pdf (discussing the need for changes to discovery rules because of the
increased volume of electronically stored information). The Rules Committee report states:
Electronically stored information is characterized by exponentially greater volume
than hard-copy documents. Commonly cited current examples of such volume
include the capacity of large organizations' computer networks to store information
in terabytes, each of which represents the equivalent of 500 million typewritten
pages of plain text, and to receive 250 to 300 million e-mail messages monthly.
Id.
60. See S. REP. No. 110-264, at 1-2 (2008) (highlighting the danger of inadvertent
disclosure to litigants).
61. See id. at 2 (stating that a court may find that inadvertent production of a single
document amounts to a waiver, not only of that document, but also of all other material relating
to the same subject).
62. A standard box holds approximately 5,000 pages of printer paper. A document
production of 1,000,000 pages of documents involves about 200 boxes. This is not considered
an unusually large document production in commercial litigation. "Even relatively small cases
can potentially implicate hundreds of thousands of pages of electronically stored information
residing on business information systems that plausibly could be viewed as relevant for
discovery purposes under Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ...." Kristine L.
Roberts & Mary S. Diemer, Rule of Evidence 502: Impact on Protective Orders and Subject
Matter Waiver, LmG. NEWS (American Bar Ass'n, Chi., I1.), Winter 2009, at 10 (quoting Kent
A. Lambert, co-chair of the American Bar Association Litigation Section's Pretrial Practice and
Discovery Committee).
63. A recent case involved the use of search terms to narrow the "unmanageable" universe
of electronically stored information ("ESI") to a more manageable total document production of
1,400,000 pages. See generally Spieker v. Quest Cherokee, L.L.C., No. 07-1225-EFM, 2008
WL 4758604 (D. Kan. Oct. 30, 2008). The court noted that a "reputable third-party vendor"
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scenarios assume that the only information contained in a document is visible
when reviewed in hard copy. The reality is that most electronic documents
contain metadata and other invisible, but very valuable information. If a
significant percentage of the production consists of such electronically stored
information, the document review might take two or three times as long, with a
corresponding increase in cost.
Once the document review is complete, the Producing Party will produce
the responsive, nonprivileged, nonprotected documents. Because the risk of
waiving the privilege or protection is so great, this encourages the Producing
Party to assert "extravagant claims of privilege. '"64 These dubious assertions of
privilege and protection often lead to significant attorney time being spent by
the producing and the receiving attorneys meeting and conferring regarding the
privileged documents and, in many cases, engaging in motion practice to
resolve these disputes. Thus, the overall costs incurred to maintain the
privilege or work product protection are "often wholly disproportionate to the
overall costs of the case.,
65
C. Nonwaiver Agreements
In response to the increasing costs of privilege review and the risks of
failing to conduct a thorough privilege review, it has become common for
parties to enter into nonwaiver agreements.66 A typical nonwaiver agreement
would charge $82,500 to process the ESI for review and an estimate of an additional $38,500 to
copy the ESI information in TIFF format so that it could be reviewed and coded. Id. at *1.
Defendant's counsel estimated that the cost to conduct "privilege and relevance" review would
be at least $250,000. Id.
64. 154 CONG. REc. H7819 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2008) (statement of Rep. King) ("The fear
of waiver also leads to extravagant claims of privilege."); MINUTES OF THE NOVEMBER 14,2005
MEETING OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE RULES 2, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/ rules/Agenda%20Books/EV2006-04.pdf ("Committee members also
expressed the view that the fear of waiver leads to extravagant claims of privilege.").
65. S. REP. No. 110-264, at 2 (2008).
66. See Memorandum from Rick Marcus to Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 42-43
(Sept. 15, 2003) [hereinafter 2003 Marcus Memo], available at http://www.kenwithers.coml
rulemaking/civilrules/marcus09l5O3a.pdf (citing Walsh v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 184 F.R.D. 494,
495 (D. Conn. 1999) as an example of a case in which the parties entered into a take-back
arrangement without the court's imprimatur). Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
expressly approves agreements that modify the usual rules of discovery. FED. R. Crv. P. 29.
Other agreements that modify the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are generally enforceable as
between the parties to the agreement. See generally Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)Build It, They
Will Come: Contracts to Remake the Rules ofLitigation in Arbitration's Image, 30 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 579 (2007).
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would allow the Producing Party "to 'take back' inadvertently produced
privileged materials if discovered within a reasonable period" without having
waived the attorney-client privilege or the attorney work product protection.
67
The parties to this type of nonwaiver agreement often submit their agreement to
the court and request that the court enter it as an order.
Providing for non-waiver of attorney-client privilege and work product
protection, both in agreements among the parties, and then in court orders
is a fact of life in large litigations today-particularly commercial
litigations. Such provisions are commonly found in confidentiality
agreements that are submitted to the court that I regularly approve, and so
ordered, they occur in cases involving substantial discovery. Indeed it
would be uncommon in large cases not to see such a provision in a
confidentiality order.68
Most courts honor and approve agreements between the parties to a litigation
that production of privileged and/or work product protected information would
not waive the privilege or work product protection as between those parties.
69
67. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg L.L.C., 216 F.R.D. 280, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
("[M]any parties to document-intensive litigation enter into so-called 'claw-back' agreements
that allow the parties to forego privilege review altogether in favor of an agreement to return
inadvertently produced privileged documents."); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION
(FOURTH) § 11.446, at 81 (2004) (describing the use of take-back agreements to protect
producing parties from the most serious consequences of inadvertent disclosure); THE
SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES (SECOND EDITION): BEST PRACTICES
RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION,
Comment 10.a (June 2007), available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/misc
Files/TSC PRINCP 2nd ed 607.pdf (describing the use of "claw-back" agreements); id.
Comment 10.d (describing the use of "quick peek" agreements).
68. Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules: Hearing on Proposal 502, at 2 (Apr. 24,
2006) [hereinafter Hearing on Proposal 502] (testimony of the Honorable John G. Koeltl),
available at http://www.lexisnexis.com/applieddiscovery/lawlibrary/EV Hearing April_2006.
pdf; see also Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 251, 261 (D. Md. 2008)
(finding that attorney client privilege and attorney work product protection was waived where
party initially sought nonwaiver agreement, then abandoned that request and voluntarily
produced the documents in discovery despite awareness of possibility of inadvertent disclosure
of privileged and protected information).
69. See Hopson v. Mayor of Bait., 232 F.R.D. 228, 234-35 (D. Md. 2005) (collecting
cases in which courts have approved nonwaiver agreements between parties, but cautioning of
the dangers inherent in this practice); In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 2d 1207,
1219 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (declaring that in the event a privileged document is inadvertently
produced, the Producing Party may request that it be returned and such disclosure will not be
deemed a waiver of privilege). But see Koch Materials Co. v. Shore Slurry Seal, Inc., 208
F.R.D. 109, 118 (D.N.J. 2002) (refusing to give effect to an agreement that production of
privileged information would not waive privilege because such an agreement may "lead to
sloppy attorney review and improper disclosures that could jeopardize clients' cases"); In re
Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 192 F.R.D. 575, 577-78 (M.D. Tenn. 2000) (holding that an
agreement to produce documents without waiving privilege is invalid); Ciba-Geigy Corp. v.
688
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Where the agreement purports to limit waivers as to third parties,
however, courts have been reticent to honor such agreements. 70 Even
when entered as an order of the court, the legal effect of a nonwaiver
agreement is uncertain.7' Courts are not permitted to selectively apply
the law of evidence or to alter it by local rule, thus "it is hard to justify a
discovery order that purports to have the effect of altering the law of
waiver.
,, 2
Sandoz Ltd., 916 F. Supp. 404, 411-12 (D.N.J. 1995) (finding that the Producing Party had
failed to take reasonable precautions to protect against inadvertent disclosure and therefore
waived privilege, notwithstanding an agreement between parties).
70. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Phil., 951 F.2d 1414, 1426-27 (3d
Cir. 1991) (holding that an agreement between litigant and the Department of Justice that
documents produced in response to DOJ investigation would not waive privilege does not
preserve the privilege against a different entity in an unrelated civil action); In re Chrysler
Motors Corp. Overnight Evaluation Program Litig., 860 F.2d 844, 847 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding
that disclosure of protected material to an adversary undermined its confidentiality, waiving the
privilege with regard to third parties, despite an agreement between the original litigants);
Griffith v. Davis, 161 F.R.D. 687, 699-700 (C.D. Cal. 1995) ("[W]aiver occurs despite any
agreement by the parties that the information disclosed will remain confidential as against the
rest of the world."); Atari Corp. v. Sega of Am., 161 F.R.D. 417, 420 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (stating
that voluntary disclosure of privileged material to an adverse party waives that privilege as to
third parties, despite confidentiality agreements between the parties); Bowne of N.Y. City, Inc.
v. AmBase Corp., 150 F.R.D. 465,480 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding that a nonwaiver agreement
between parties in one case was not applicable to a third party in another case).
71. See Victor Stanley, 250 F.R.D. at 255 n.3 (discussing the dangers inherent in using
nonwaiver agreements); Mitchell v. Exide Techs., No. 04-2303-GTV-DJW, 2004 WL 2823230,
at * 1 (D. Kan. Dec. 8, 2004) (refusing to enter a stipulated protective order and noting that "the
parties are reminded that orders of a court are binding on parties to the case and cannot bind
non-parties; thus, any provision within a proposed protective order stating otherwise is
inaccurate"); Navajo Nation v. Peabody Holding Co., 209 F. Supp. 2d 269, 287-88 (D.D.C.
2002) (holding that attorney work product protection was waived where documents were
disclosed to adversaries in prior litigation notwithstanding that such documents were subject to
a confidentiality and protective order that provided that the production of such documents
would not constitute a waiver of any privilege or protection); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Guide
Corp., 206 F.R.D. 249, 259 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (refusing to enter the parties' stipulated protective
order that purported to protect against the waiver of privilege because parties could not bind
third parties nor restrict their ability to challenge the terms of the order); CIVIL RULES ADVISORY
COMMITTEE FALL 1999 MEETING AGENDA MATERIALS, reprinted in 2003 Marcus Memo, supra
note 66, at 42-43 ("The law is presently murky on whether such agreements do the job, and
whether a court order makes a difference in effectuating such agreements.").
72. 24 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 5507, at 579 (1986); see also Hearing on Proposal 502, supra note 68, at 6-7
(testimony of the Honorable John G. Koeltl) (expressing the need for a change in the rules to
provide parties with the ability to agree to nonwaiver and to provide the courts with the ability
to adopt controlling orders); Clvii RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE FALL 1999 MEETING AGENDA
MATERIALS, reprinted in 2003 Marcus Memo, supra note 66, at 42-43 (commenting on the
desirability of rule changes in the discussion of inadvertent production and waiver of privilege).
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The issues raised by inadvertent disclosure of privileged and
protected information (and the use of these nonwaiver agreements) are
among the most common litigation issues faced by lawyers, judges, and
parties who must conduct or respond to significant discovery.
7 3
D. Proposal to Amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
The U.S. Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (the
"Civil Rules Advisory Committee") proposed language to amend Rule 26(b) to
address the burden and costs associated with attorney review of documents
produced in discovery to protect against inadvertent production of attorney-
client privileged communications or attorney work product protected
information. 4 Although these changes were first proposed in 2004, the
"privilege waiver problem ha[d] been on the [Discovery] Subcommittee's agenda
for a long time .... The significant cost and burden of conducting a
73. See Hopson, 232 F.R.D. at 244-46 (discussing the unresolved issues relating to
privilege review and nonwaiver agreements). The court stated:
[T]his case highlights significant unresolved issues relating to the nature of
privilege review that must be performed by a party producing electronically stored
information, whether non-waiver agreements entered into by counsel to permit
post-production assertion of privilege are permissible, as well as the application of
principles of substantive evidence law related to the waiver of privilege by
inadvertent production. These issues, among the most talked about by lawyers,
judges, and the parties who are affected by their resolution, have yet to be fully
developed by the courts.
Id. at 231-32.
74. See Memorandum from Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Advisory Committee on Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, to the Honorable David F. Levi, Chair, Standing Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure 1 (Aug. 3, 2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/
comment2005/CVAug04.pdf (describing the meetings and recommendations of the Advisory
Committee, including proposed amendments to several rules regarding the discovery of
electronically stored information); COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11 (Aug. 3, 2004), [hereinafter PROPOSED E-DISCOVERY AMENDMENTS],
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/comment2005/CVAugO4.pdf (discussing the
distinctive features of electronically stored material that give rise to the need for the proposed
amendment).
75. CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMrITEE FALL 1999 MEETING AGENDA MATERIALS,
reprinted in 2003 Marcus Memo, supra note 66, at 24; see also MAY 21, 2003 REPORT OF THE
CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE 10, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/
CV5-2003.pdf (describing work on e-discovery issues and stating that the Discovery
Subcommittee was "[rieviving a long-simmering and more general project to consider
protection against inadvertent privilege waiver-the risks of inadvertent waiver may be
multiplied by some forms of computer-based discovery").
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full privilege review was first raised with the Discovery Subcommittee of the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules in January 1997.76 The Discovery
Subcommittee solicited comments and opinions on the subject at various
meetings and, in January 1998, it developed two alternative proposals to amend
Rule 34(b). 7  The Discovery Subcommittee offered the following two
proposals (both of which would have added new language to Rule 34(b)) to the
Civil Rules Advisory Committee in March 1998:
On agreement of the parties, a court may order that the party producing
documents may preserve all privilege objections despite allowing initial
examination of the documents, providing any such objection is interposed
as required by Rule 26(b)(5) before copying. When such an order is
entered, it may provide that such initial examination is not a waiver of any
privilege.
On agreement of the parties, a court may order that a party may respond to
a request to produce documents by providing the documents for initial
examination. Providing documents for initial examination does not waive
any privilege. The party requesting the documents may, after initial
examination, designate the documents it wishes produced; this designation
operates as the request under this paragraph (b).7s
These proposals typify the two main types of agreements used by litigants to
head off the problem of privilege waiver: "claw-back" agreements and "quick
peek" agreements.79 Under the quick peek agreement, the parties agree that the
76. See CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE FALL 1999 MEETING AGENDA MATERIALS,
reprinted in 2003 Marcus Memo, supra note 66, at 36 (stating that the problem of wasting time
reviewing enormous amounts of documents to look for privileged material was first brought
before the Subcommittee in 1997).
77. See id. at 36-38 (citing the significant interest in the privilege waiver as justification
for the Committee to take up the issue).
78. Id. at 39.
79. See BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., MANAGING DISCOVERY OF ELECTRONIC
INFORMATION: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES 14-15 (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 2007), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/eldscpkt.pdf (stating that parties enter into quick-peek and claw-
back agreements to minimize the risk of waiver, and describing what those agreements entail);
Laura Catherine Daniel, Note, The Dubious Origins and Dangers of Clawbackand Quick-Peek
Agreements: An Argument Against Their Codification In The FederalRules of Civil Procedure,
47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 663,666 (2005) ("Parties are increasingly entering into clawback and
quick-peek arrangements, which denecessitate a traditional privilege review."); THE SEDONA
CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR
ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION, Comment I0.d (Jan. 2004), available at
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/SedonaPrinciples200401 .pdf (describing
claw-back and quick-peek agreements and their increased use); THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE
SEDONA CONFERENCE GLOSSARY: E-DISCOVERY & DIGITAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 42
(Dec. 2007), available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/TSC
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Producing Party may produce responsive documents without first reviewing
them for privileged or protected information, but specifically reserves and
preserves the right to assert the privilege. 80 The Receiving Party then reviews
the documents and selects the documents it wishes to have copied.8' At this
point, the Producing Party carefully reviews this (much narrower) universe of
documents that will be formally copied and produced and withholds any
documents that are privileged or protected.82 Under the claw-back agreement,
the Producing Party reviews the documents for privileged or protected
information, but the parties "agree to a procedure for the return of privileged or
protected information that is inadvertently produced within a reasonable time of
its discovery.
83
The Civil Rules Advisory Committee studied the problem for an
additional five years and considered whether to address, in a rule, the issues
that litigants had been addressing with nonwaiver agreements. The Committee
expressed particular concern for problems with privilege review in cases
involving discovery of electronically stored information.
84
In August 2004, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee ultimately published
for public comment a package of "e-discovery amendments" that did not
address the issue of nonwaiver agreements.85 Nor did the proposal address the
issue of nonwaiver orders.86 Instead, the Advisory Committee's proposal
would have permitted a party who produced privileged information without
intending to waive the privilege to request its return by the other party.87
Glossary_l 2_07.pdf (defining "quick-peek").




84. See SEPTEMBER 2005 RULES COMM. REPORT, supra note 59, at 27 ("The volume of the
information and the forms in which it is stored may make privilege determinations more difficult
and privilege review correspondingly more expensive and time-consuming, yet less likely to
detect all privileged information. Inadvertent production is increasingly likely to occur.").
Compare Henry S. Noyes, Is E-Discovery so Different that it Requires New Discovery Rules?
An Analysis of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 71 TENN. L.
REV. 585, 617 (2005) (suggesting that electronically stored information may be easier to search
and to identify authors and recipients of the information), with Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative
Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 251,257 (D. Md. 2008) (stating that keyword searches may be both over-
and under-inclusive).
85. See PROPOSED E-DISCOVERY AMENDMENTS, supra note 74, at 8-10, 12-14
(commenting on a package of "e-discovery amendments" without addressing nonwaiver
agreements).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 7-8; see also Noyes, supra note 84, at 646-47 (describing how the proposed
amendments addressed belated assertions of privilege).
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Among other issues, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee was concerned that it
lacked power to enact changes to the rules that would affect privilege law and
the federalism issues raised by rule changes that would govern privilege law,
which has historically been left to the states to address.88
The e-discovery amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure took
effect on December 1, 2006.89 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 was
amended to specify a procedure for resolving disputes regarding privileged or
protected information that is produced during discovery. 90 The amended rule
requires that the information be returned to the Producing Party, sequestered, or
destroyed until a court can resolve the dispute. 9' The Advisory Committee
Notes make clear, however, that the amended rule does not address whether
production during discovery waives the privilege or protection.92 That decision
has been made-and must continue to be made-by courts applying established
principles.93
E. Proposal to Amend the Federal Rules of Evidence
In 2006, Representative Jim Sensenbrenner (then Chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee) requested that the Judicial Conference study and propose
a new federal rule of evidence that would address the problem of privilege
waiver and the related rise in discovery costs. 9 4  The Evidence Rules
Committee prepared a draft Rule 502 and related Committee Note and
circulated these proposals to various federal judges, state and federal officials,
88. See DRAFT MINUTES OF JUNE 17-18, 2004 MEETING OF COMMrrTEE ON RULES OF
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 25, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Agenda%20Books/
EV2005-01.pdf ("[P]rivilege issues implicate fundamental questions of federalism that rules
committees should approach with hesitancy.").
89. See Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Apr. 12, 2006), available
at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/courtorders/frcv06p.pdf (ordering the electronic
discovery amendments to Rules 16,26, 33, 34, 37, and 45 to take effect on December 1, 2006).
90. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(B) (prescribing the procedure for dealing with production
of purportedly privileged and otherwise protected material during discovery).
91. See id. ("After being notified, a party must promptly return, sequester, or destroy the
specified information and any copies it has; must not use or disclose the information until the
claim is resolved.").
92. See id. advisory committee's note (stating that the rule does not address whether
privilege or protection is waived by production).
93. See id. ("The courts have developed principles to determine whether, and under what
circumstances, waiver results from inadvertent production of privileged or protected
information.").
94. See S. REP. No. 110-264, at 4 (2008) (discussing the history of the proposed rule to
protect privilege in the face of rising discovery costs).
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practicing attorneys, and academics for comment. 95 The Evidence Rules
Committee then held a "mini-hearing" on proposed Rule 502 at the Fordham
University School of Law.96 After making minor modifications, the Evidence
Rules Committee unanimously approved proposed Rule 502 and released it for
public comment on August 10, 2006.9'
The Evidence Rules Committee received seventy-three written comments
on proposed Rule 50298 and held two public hearings at which the Committee
heard from more than twenty witnesses. 99 After making minor amendments,
the Evidence Rules Committee voted unanimously in favor of proposed Rule
502, as amended. 100 The Evidence Rules Committee's decision was driven by
its conclusion that the review of documents for privileged and protected
material was too expensive and too time-consuming. The Committee found
that the current federal common law governing waiver of attorney-client
privilege and work product protection was problematic because "significant
amounts of time and effort are expended during litigation to preserve the
privilege, even when many of the documents are of no concern to the
95. See MAY 15,2007 REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE RULES TO THE
STANDING COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 3 [hereinafter MAY 2007
EVIDENCE RULES COMM. REPORT], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/2007-05-
CommitteeReport-Evidence.pdf(describing the comment and drafting process for the proposed
draft Rule 502).
96. See generally Hearing on Proposal 502, supra note 68. The transcript of the mini-
hearing and related materials are also available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/advcomm-
miniconference.html.
97. MAY 15, 2006 REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE RULES TO THE
STANDING COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 3 [hereinafter MAY 2006
EVIDENCE RULES COMM. REPORT], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/ExcerptEV_
ReportPub.pdf; see also Memorandum from the Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure to
the Bench, Bar, and Public 1 (Aug. 10, 2006), available at http://www.uscourts.
gov/rules/Memo_ BenchBar andPublic_2006.pdf (notifying the public and the profession
that proposed Rule 502 is available for comment).
98. See 2006 Evidence Rules Comment Chart, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/2006_
EvidenceRulesCommentsChart.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2009) (compiling the comments
received by the Evidence Rules Committee in 2006) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
99. The Evidence Rules Committee held hearings in Scottsdale, Arizona, on January 12,
2007 and New York City on January 29, 2007. Transcripts for both hearings are available
online. See http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/EVHearingTranscript_011207.pdf (providing a
transcript of the Scottsdale hearing); http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/2007-01-29-Evidence-
Minutes-Transcript.pdf (providing a transcript of the New York hearing).
100. See MAY 2007 EVIDENCE RULES COMM. REPORT, supra note 95, at 5 ("After
considering and approving these changes, the Evidence Rules Committee voted unanimously in
favor of... Proposed Rule 502 as amended from the version issued for public comment.").
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Producing Party."''° When responding to document requests, the Producing
Party must review all of the documents carefully to ensure that none of the
documents contain privileged or protected information. The Committee
therefore concluded that a rule that protected against waiver of the privilege or
protection would make discovery "more efficient and less costly." 1
02
Early drafts provided that Rule 502 would apply uniformly in state and
federal proceedings, regardless of where the initial disclosure was made.
0 3
Thus, the rule would protect against a disclosure of attorney-client
communications first made in a state court proceeding, even when the
communication or information was then subsequently offered in a state
proceeding and even if the state would otherwise have found a waiver °4 The
Judicial Conference's Committee on Federal-State Jurisdiction raised concerns
that such a rule would constitute a "substantial limitation on the authority of
state courts to govern their own proceedings."' 5 Likewise, the Conference of
101. Id. at 2.
102. Id.; see also Draft Cover Letter from the Judicial Conference to the U.S. Congress on
Proposed Rule 502, at 5 [hereinafter Draft Cover Letter], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
rules/Reports/2007-05-CommitteeReport-Evidence.pdf ("Proposed Rule 502 is respectfully
submitted for consideration by Congress as a rule that will effectively limit the skyrocketing
costs of discovery.").
103. See Memorandum from Dan Capra, Reporter, and Ken Broun, Consultant, to the
Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules 17 (Mar. 22, 2006) [hereinafter Broun & Capra 2006
Memo], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Agenda%20Books/EV2006-04.pdf (noting
that the success of a rule governing inadvertent waiver depends on its applicability in both state
and federal proceedings, and stating that the rule, as then proposed, was intended to be binding
in all courts); see also DRAFT MINUTES OF COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
MEETING OF JUNE 22-23, 2006, at 38 [hereinafter 2006 DRAFT RULES COMM. MEETING
MINUTES], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Agenda%20Books/EV2006-1 1.pdf
(noting that the original version of proposed FRE 502 "had a greater effect on state court
activity and sought to control state law and state rules on waiver").
104. See Draft Cover Letter, supra note 102, at 3 ("The first draft of Rule 502 provided for
uniform waiver rules in federal and state proceedings, regardless of where the initial disclosure
was made.").
105. Kenneth S. Broun & Daniel J. Capra, Getting Control of Waiver of Privilege in the
Federal Courts: A Proposalfor a Federal Rule of Evidence 502, 58 S.C. L. REV. 211,262-63
(2006) (quoting Letter from the Honorable Howard D. McKibben, Chair, Comm. on Fed.-State
Jurisdiction of the Judicial Conf. of the U.S., to the Honorable David F. Levi, Chair, Judicial
Conf. Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure [hereinafter McKibben Letter]
(June 21, 2006) (on file with author)); see also 2006 DRAFT RULES Comm. MEETING MINUTES,
supra note 103, at 38 (discussing the Committee on Federal-State Jurisdiction's complaint that
the proposed rule's effect on state courts was "too broad" and noting that the rule was
subsequently amended to cover "only activity occurring in federal court"). The Committee on
Federal-State Jurisdiction is charged with analyzing proposed statutory and rule changes that
might affect state courts and to "[s]erve as the conduit for communication on matters of mutual
concern between the federal judiciary and state courts and their support organizations such as
the National Center for State Courts, the Conference of Chief Justices, and the State Justice
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State Chief Justices objected "that the Rule as drafted offended principles of
federalism and comity, by superseding state law of privilege waiver, even for
disclosures that are initially made in state proceedings-and even where the
disclosed material is then offered in a state proceeding (the so-called 'state to
state' problem)." 106
In response to these concerns, the Advisory Committee narrowed proposed
Rule 502. The resulting rule regulated disclosures that were first made at the
federal level-whether subsequently offered in state or federal proceedings-
but did not regulate disclosures that initially occurred in state court.107 The
Advisory Committee's narrowing of Rule 502 did not, however, negate all
federalism concerns.10 8 As enacted, Rule 502(d) permits a federal court to issue
an order permitting intentional disclosure of privileged information in a federal
proceeding without waiving the privilege and makes that order binding on
nonparties involved in state court actions, as well as the state courts
themselves.109
[T]he [Judicial Conference's] Federal-State Jurisdiction Committee
ultimately reserved judgment even on the pared down version of Rule 502
Institute." Jurisdictional Statements: Jurisdiction of Committees of the Judicial Conference of
the United States, http://www.uscourts.gov/judconfjurisdictions.htm#FederalState (last visited
Jan. 30, 2009) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The Chair has stated:
[The Committee is] involved in that part of the doctrine of 'federalism' that
considers the proper role of the federal courts relative to the states and, particularly,
the state courts. Our Committee proceeds from the premise that state courts play an
essential role in our justice system ably handling questions of both state and federal
law.
Committee Protects Federal Courts, Recognizes Unique Nature of State Courts, Interview of
The Honorable Frederick P. Stamp, Jr., http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/oct02ttb/interview.html
(last visited Jan. 30, 2009) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
106. Draft Cover Letter, supra note 102, at 3; see also S. REP. No. 110-264, at 4 (2008)
(noting that the Advisory Committee had to address the federalism concerns expressed by the
Conference of State Chief Justices).
107. See S. REP. No. 110-264, at 3-4 (stating that the narrowed version of the rule applied
only to disclosures first made at the federal level, whether subsequently offered at either state or
federal proceedings).
108. See N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N COMMERCIAL & FED. LMG. SECTION, REPORT ON
PROPOSED FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 502, at 21-22 (Feb. 13, 2007), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/EV%20Comments%202006-EV-069.pdf (concluding that the
rule is constitutional, but stating "[t]hat the Rule may be constitutional, however, does not make
it good policy. As detailed below, federalism concerns remain .... ").
109. See Resolution 1 Regarding Waiver Of Attorney Client Privilege and Work Product,
Conference of Chief Justices (Aug. 2, 2006), available at http://ccj.ncsc.dni.us/Federalism
Resolutions/resollWaiverAttomey-ClientPrivilege.html ("[P]roposed Rule 502 may conflict
with principles of federalism by providing that confidentiality orders by federal courts would
bind persons or entities in state proceedings.").
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as released for public comment. Some members of the Federal-State
Jurisdiction Committee expressed concern that "requiring all states to
adhere to a uniform rule based upon the treatment of disclosures in the
course of federal litigation may undermine the traditional control that state
courts have exercised over the application of waiver rules."i 0
The Advisory Committee also heard significant complaint during the
public comment period that the purpose of the rule would be frustrated "if
states were not bound by a uniform federal rule on privilege waiver.""' Parties
and their attorneys would be afraid that a state court would determine that the
privilege had been waived under state law, even though the Federal Rules
would find no waiver. 1 2 The Advisory Committee concluded that the failure to
include "state to state" protection raised valid concerns, but it decided not to act
on them, instead suggesting that Congress should consider whether to
legislatively extend the rule to cover the "state to state" problem." 
3
Ultimately, both the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules and the
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure "recommended that
proposed Rule 502 be transmitted directly by the Judicial Conference to
Congress for its consideration with a recommendation that it adopt the rule."
' ' " 4
In recommending enactment of Rule 502, the Standing Committee referred
explicitly to concern over reducing the costs of litigation: "The proposed new
rule facilitates discovery and reduces privilege-review costs by limiting the
circumstances under which the privilege or protection is forfeited, which may
happen if the privileged or protected information or material is produced in
discovery."115
110. Broun & Capra, supra note 105, at 264 n.309 (quoting McKibben Letter, supra note
105, at 3). Some members of the Committee "took the position that state courts should be free
to determine what constitutes a waiver, even when the waiver occurred in an earlier federal
proceeding." McKibben Letter, supra note 105, at 3.
111. Draft Cover Letter, supra note 102, at 4.
112. See id. ("[P]arties and their lawyers might not be able to rely on the protections of the
Rule, for fear that a state law would find a waiver even though the Federal Rule would not.").
113. See id. (noting that the comments "raised a legitimate concern," but ultimately
deciding to leave their resolution to Congress).
114. SEPTEMBER 2007 RULEs COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 32. Professor Kenneth
Broun, who serves as a consultant on privileges to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee
on Evidence Rules, and Professor Daniel J. Capra, who serves as Reporter to that Committee,
published an article supporting the enactment and adoption of proposed Rule 502. See
generally Broun & Capra, supra note 105. The article represents, of course, the views of
Professors Broun and Capra, not the views of the Standing Committee or the Advisory
Committee.
115. SEPTEMBER 2007 RuLES COMMIrEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 31.
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F. Congressional Action on Federal Rule of Evidence 502
Because Rule 502 alters the substantive law of evidentiary privilege, it
must be approved by Act of Congress.1 6 The Evidence Rules Committee
"anticipated that Congress must enact this rule directly, through its authority
under the Commerce Clause."' 17 On behalf of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, the Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair of the Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure, submitted proposed Rule 502 to the Judiciary
Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives and recommended
that Congress adopt and enact the proposed rule."
8
On December 11, 2007, Senator Patrick Leahy, Chair of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, introduced Senate Bill 2450, which sought to add Rule
502 to the Federal Rules of Evidence.' 19 The Senate Judiciary Committee
reported favorably on the bill, approved it by unanimous consent and
recommended its passage.12 On February 27, 2008, Senate Bill 2450 passed
the Senate without amendment by unanimous consent.121
In his remarks before the Senate introducing the bill, Senator Leahy stated:
Mr. President, today I hope we pass a bipartisan bill that will go a long way
in reducing the costs of litigating disputes in our civil justice system. This
bill creates a new Federal Rule of Evidence regarding electronic disclosure
of privileged material that would limit the consequences of inadvertent
116. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b) (2006) ("Any such rule creating, abolishing, or modifying an
evidentiary privilege shall have no force or effect unless approved by Act of Congress."); Letter
from Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, to the Honorable
Patrick J. Leahy and the Honorable Arlen Specter 1 (Sept. 26, 2007) [hereinafter 2007
Rosenthal Letter], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Hill_ Letter reEV_502.pdf
("[R]ules governing evidentiary privileges must be approved by an Act of Congress."). "[A]
privilege rule proposed through the rulemaking process cannot bind state courts ...." FED. R.
EvrD. 502 advisory committee's note.
117. MAY 15,2006 REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITrEE ON EVIDENCE RULES app. at 5,
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/EV05-2006.pdf.
118. See 2007 Rosenthal Letter, supra note 116 (submitting proposed Rule 502 to the
Senate Judiciary Committee with the recommendation that Congress adopt it); Letter from Lee
H. Rosenthal, Chair, Committee On Rules of Practice and Procedure, to The Honorable John
Conyers, Jr. and the Honorable Lamar Smith 1 (Sept. 26, 2007), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/HillLetter re EV 502.pdf(submitting proposed Rule 502 to
the House Judiciary Committee with the recommendation that Congress adopt it).
119. See S. REP. No. 110-264, at 4 (2008) ("On December 11, 2007, Chairman Leahy
introduced S. 2450.").
120. See id. at 5 ("[T]he Judiciary Committee considered the legislation [and] approved it
by unanimous consent. The Committee reported the bill to the full Senate without
amendment.").
121. See 154 CONG. REc. S1317-19 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 2008) (recording the Senate's
debate regarding and passage of Senate Bill 2450).
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disclosure. The new rule would provide predictability and uniformity in a
discovery process that has been made increasingly difficult with the
growing use of e-mail and other electronic media. This legislation contains
the full text of Judicial Conference recommendations and is supported by
all sectors of the legal community.
122
The Senate Report accompanying Senate Bill 2540 noted: "Importantly, the
bill respects federal-state comity .... [I]t does not apply to any disclosure
made in a state proceeding that is later introduced in a subsequent state
proceeding."
123
Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 502 then awaited action before the
House of Representatives. Numerous constituencies contacted the House
Judiciary Committee to express their support for the rule and to urge Congress
to act. 124 On July 24, 2008, Representative Sheila Jackson-Lee introduced
House Bill 6610, a bill adding Rule 502 to the Federal Rules of Evidence.
125
The House of Representatives suspended its rules and passed Senate Bill 2450
on September 8, 2008.126 In her introductory remarks, Representative Jackson-
Lee emphasized that the legislation was necessary "to address a growing
122. Id. at S1317 (statement of Sen. Leahy).
123. S. REP. No. 110-264, at 3 (2008).
124. Letters of support came, for example, from the American Bar Association Committee
on Governmental Affairs, the American Bar Association Section of Litigation, and the
Association of Corporate Counsel. See Letter from Denise A. Cardman, Acting Director, Am.
Bar Ass'n Gov't Affairs Office, to Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives
(Mar. 21, 2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/ietters/attyclient/2008mar21_
fre502govtaffh I.pdf (expressing the ABA Governmental Affairs Office's support for proposed
Rule 502); Letter from Judith A. Miller, Chair, Am. Bar Ass'n Section of Litigation, to Comm.
on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives (Mar. 21, 2008), available at http://www.
abanet.org/poladv/letters/attyclient/2008mar2 1_fre502litsechbl.pdf (expressing the ABA
Section of Litigation's support for proposed Rule 502); Letter from Susan Hackett, Senior Vice
President and General Counsel, Ass'n of Corp. Counsel, to Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. House
of Representatives (Dec. 10, 2007), available at http://www.acc.com/vl/public/ACCPolicy
Statement/loader.cfrn?csModule=security/getfile&pageid=16197 (stating the ACC's "strong
support of legislation that would enact Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 502").
125. H.R. 6610, 110th Cong. (2008). During its consideration in the House Judiciary
Committee, the committee members raised a number of questions regarding interpretation of
proposed Rule 502. See 154 CONG. REc. H7818 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2008) (statement of Rep.
Jackson-Lee) (noting that the House Judiciary Committee raised "questions... regarding the
scope and contours of the effect of the proposed rule"). The Judicial Conference answered these
questions satisfactorily, without having to revise the language of proposed Rule 502. Id. Upon
the request of the House Judiciary Committee, the Judicial Conference "agreed to augment the
explanatory note" in order to clarify the Rule's application and interpretation. Id.; see also id. at
H7818-19 (providing the full text of the revised "Statement of Congressional Intent Regarding
Rule 502 of the Federal Rules of Evidence").
126. See 154 CONG. REc. H7820 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2008) ("[T]he rules were suspended
and the Senate Bill was passed.").
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problem that is adding inordinate and unnecessary burden, expense,
uncertainty, and inefficiency to litigation.'
27
President Bush signed Senate Bill 2450 into law on September 19,
2008.128 Federal Rule of Evidence 502 applies to "all proceedings commenced
after [September 19, 2008] and, insofar as is just and practicable, in all
proceedings pending on such date of enactment.'
29
111. Commerce Clause Power
The Evidence Rules Committee anticipated that Congress's power to enact
Rule 502 would derive, if at all, from its authority under the Commerce
Clause. 130 Congress may exercise its Commerce Clause authority to regulate
three categories of activity:
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate
commerce. Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate
commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities.
Finally, Congress'[s] commerce authority includes the power to regulate
those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e.,
those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.1
31
127. Id. at H7817 (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee).
128. See Act of Sept. 19, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-322, 122 Stat. 3537 (2008) (enacting
Federal Rule of Evidence 502).
129. FED. R. EviD. 502.
130. See MAY 2006 EVIDENCE RULES COMM. REPORT, supra note 97, at 9 ("It is...
anticipated that Congress must enact this rule directly, through its authority under the
Commerce Clause."). Professors Spencer and Bellia have each written that Congress's authority
to regulate the operation of state courts must derive, if at all, from the Commerce Clause. See
Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Federal Regulation of State Court Procedures, 110 YALE L.J. 947, 951
(2001) (noting that Congress has tried to justify its regulation of state courts by invoking "its
power to regulate commerce"); A. Benjamin Spencer, Anti-Federalist Procedure, 64 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 233, 265-73 (2007) (discussing the various ways in which Congress oversteps its
authority in regulating the procedures of state courts). In a 2003 article, Professor Glynn argued
that federalizing the entirety of the law of attorney-client privilege was permissible pursuant to
Congress's Commerce Clause power. See Glynn, supra note 38, at 65 (stating that Congress
can preempt state law with a federalized attorney-client privilege pursuant to its authority under
the Commerce and Supremacy Clauses). During the Rules Committee hearings on proposed
Rule 502, Professor Glynn testified that "Congress's power to enact Rule 502, as a preemptive
statute, would require that Congress act under its Commerce Clause power, rather than just
under its Article 3 power, bolstered by the necessary and proper clause." Hearing on Proposal
502, supra note 68, at 69.
131. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995) (citations omitted).
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This Part concludes that Congress likely exceeded its Commerce Clause
authority when it enacted Rule 502. Rule 502 does not regulate either of the
first two categories of activity. Rule 502 pertains to neither the channels of
interstate commerce nor the instrumentalities of commerce or persons or things
in commerce.1 32 Therefore, in order for Congress to have proper authority
under the Commerce Clause, Rule 502 must regulate the third category of
activity-that which substantially affects interstate commerce. Rather than
regulating permissible economic activity, however, Rule 502 intrudes upon the
exercise of state sovereignty in an area of the law that is traditionally subject to
state regulation and is not part of a larger commercial activity that is regulated
by Congress. 1
33
Rule 502 does not regulate economic activity-it regulates the states'
ability to determine what evidence is discoverable and what evidence is
admissible. 134  Rule 502 is a federal directive that removes from state
legislatures and state courts the power to determine the proper balance between
the discoverability and admissibility of concededly relevant evidence, on the
one hand, and the need to protect certain privileged relationships despite the
need for such evidence, on the other.135  The Federal Rules of Evidence
provide that state law on privilege applies in federal cases based on diversity
jurisdiction. 136 Rule 502 does not replace state law with federal law in this
regard. Federal courts will continue to look to state law to determine whether a
privilege attaches. Rule 502 leaves up to the state courts the determination
whether information is attorney-client privileged or work product protected
when its use is relevant in a state court action involving a state law cause of
action. 137 Yet in some cases, Rule 502 removes from the states the ability to
132. See infra Part III.A (arguing that neither of the first two categories of activity that can
be commercially regulated by Congress are implicated by Rule 502).
133. See infra Part III.B (arguing that Rule 502 is not a commercial regulation falling
within Lopez's third category of commercial activity that can be constitutionally regulated by
Congress pursuant to its Commerce Clause power).
134. See infra Part III.B (describing why the regulation of evidentiary rules and privileges
is not a regulation of economic activity and arguing that Rule 502 impedes on the right of states
to set their own evidentiary rules).
135. See infra notes 283-89 and accompanying text (noting the ways in which Rule 502
infringes upon state sovereignty, including by precluding states from making localized "value
judgments" that form the basis for their laws on privileges).
136. See FED. R. EviD. 501 ("[Iln civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element
of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege.., shall
be determined in accordance with State law.").
137. See FED. R. EvlD. 502 advisory committee's note ("The rule makes no attempt to alter
federal or state law on whether a communication or information is protected under the attorney-
client privilege or work-product immunity.").
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determine when the privilege or protection has been waived by disclosure and
the evidence is therefore admissible in a state court action involving a state law
cause of action.
138
A. Rule 502 Does Not Regulate "The Use of the Channels of Interstate
Commerce" nor Does It Regulate "The Instrumentalities of Interstate
Commerce, or Persons and Things in Interstate Commerce"
In Pierce County v. Guillen,139 the Supreme Court approved Congress's
exercise of its Commerce Clause power to regulate the admission of evidence
in state court actions involving state law causes of action. 40 At first glance,
Guillen appears to support the constitutionality of Rule 502. On closer
examination, however, Guillen's lessons are inapplicable. The Supreme Court
upheld the statute at issue in Guillen because it was enacted by Congress to
improve safety in the channels of commerce and to increase protection for the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce-concerns reasonably within the first
two categories of regulable activity.14' Rule 502, on the other hand, has
nothing to do with the channels of commerce, the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce or persons and things in commerce. Guillen involved the Hazard
Elimination Program, a federal program that requires state and local
governments, as a condition on the receipt of federal highway funds, to
periodically conduct detailed evaluations of the safety of their roads. 142 More
specifically, 23 U.S.C. § 152 requires states and municipalities to "undertake
thorough evaluation[s] of [their] public roads" in order to compile information
regarding existing hazards and recommend potential safety enhancements. 43
138. See FED. R. EviD. 502(d) ("A federal court may order that the privilege or protection is
not waived by disclosure connected with litigation pending before the court-in which event the
disclosure is also not a waiver in any other federal or state proceeding.") (emphasis added).
139. See Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 146-47 (2003) (upholding, as a proper
exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause authority, a federal statute that protected certain
highway safety information from evidentiary discovery and admission).
140. Id.; see also Lynn A. Baker, Lochner's Legacy for Modem Federalism: Pierce
County v. Guillen as a Case Study, 85 B.U. L. REV. 727, 738 (2005) (discussing Guillen in
detail); Mitchell N. Berman, Guillen and Gullibility: Piercing the Surface of Commerce Clause
Doctrine, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1487, 1501-02 (2004) (same).
141. See Guillen, 537 U.S. at 132-33 (defining the issue as whether it was "a valid exercise
of Congress'[s] authority under the Constitution" to protect from discovery and admission
certain evidence derived from "federal highway safety programs").
142. Id. at 133.
143. Id. Under the statute, state or local governments are required to:
[C]onduct and systematically maintain an engineering survey of all public roads to
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Shortly after enactment of the Hazard Elimination Program, the Secretary of
Transportation reported to Congress that states were concerned about the
program's lack of confidentiality protections. 44 In particular, states feared an
increased risk of liability, arguing that their reports would be discovered and
used against them in litigation to establish their awareness of hazardous
conditions at accident sites.145 Given the States' concerns, the United States
Department of Transportation worried that states would not be "forthcoming
and thorough in their data collection efforts," and "recommended the adoption
of legislation prohibiting the disclosure of information compiled in connection
with the [Hazard Elimination] Program."'146
In response to these concerns, Congress enacted 23 U.S.C. § 409, which
protects from discovery or admission into evidence the accident reports and
traffic safety information compiled by state and local govemments.' 47 Congress
subsequently amended the statute in 1991 and 1995 to clarify that the
protection extended to pretrial discovery 48 and that it included information
"collected," as well as information "compiled," pursuant to the Hazard
Elimination Program. 149  These limitations on the discoverability and
evidentiary use of such information were intended to apply even where a
lawsuit was filed in a state court, involved only parties who were residents of
that state, and was based entirely on a state law cause of action.
150
The underlying action at issue in Guillen was a state law tort action
brought in Washington state courts by the wife of Ignacio Guillen (who died in
identify hazardous locations, sections, and elements, including roadside obstacles
and unmarked or poorly marked roads, which may constitute a danger to motorists,
bicyclists, and pedestrians, assign priorities for the correction of such locations,
sections, and elements, and establish and implement a schedule of projects for their
improvement.
Id. (quoting 23 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1) (2006)).
144. Id. (citing H.R. Doc. No. 94-366, at 36 (1976)).
145. Id. at 134.
146. Id.
147. See id. at 134-36 (describing the initial meaning and subsequent amendment of 23
U.S.C. § 409).
148. See id. at 134 (citing the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991,
§ 1035(a), 105 Stat.1978, which expressly made the statute applicable to pretrial discovery).
See generally Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, 23 U.S.C. § 409
(2006).
149. See Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 134 (2003) (citing the National Highway
System Designation Act of 1995, § 323, 109 Stat. 591, which added the phrase "or collected"
after the word "compiled" in the statute). See generally National Highway System Designation
Act of 1995, 23 U.S.C. § 409 (2006).
150. See Guillen, 537 U.S. at 143-46 (embracing a broad interpretation of§ 409).
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an automobile accident) against defendant County of Pierce for negligence in
failing to install proper traffic controls at an intersection. 5' Plaintiff had
challenged the constitutionality of the federal attempts to regulate admission of
evidence in state court actions. The Washington Supreme Court held that the
§ 409 privilege was unconstitutional because it exceeded Congress's authority
under the Commerce Clause. 52 Specifically, that court "concluded that § 409
was not an 'integral part' of the regulation of the federal-aid highway system
and, thus, could not be upheld under Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314
[(1981)]." 153 The Washington Supreme Court noted that recent U.S. Supreme
Court decisions recognized a "fundamental respect for state sovereignty' 54 and
concluded that the Constitution did not grant Congress "power to intrude upon
the exercise of state sovereignty in so fundamental an area of the law as the
determination by state and local courts of the discoverability and admissibility
of state and local materials and data relating to traffic and accidents on state and
local roads."'1
55
The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed and held that Congress acted properly
in regulating "the use of the channels of interstate commerce" and "the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons and things in interstate
commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities."'
56
The Court's analysis of the specific facts at issue consisted of a single
paragraph in which the Court concluded:
Congress could reasonably believe that adopting a measure eliminating an
unforeseen side effect of the information-gathering requirement of § 152
[here, increasing the states and local governments' risk of liability,] would
result in more diligent efforts to collect the relevant information, more
candid discussions of hazardous locations, better informed decisionmaking,
and ultimately, greater safety on our Nation's roads. Consequently, both
the original § 409 and the 1995 amendment can be viewed as legislation
aimed at improving safety in the channels of commerce and increasing
151. Id. at 137.
152. Id. at 139.
153. Id. The Washington Supreme Court also found that the statute was not a proper
exercise of Congress's authority under the Spending and the Necessary and Proper Clauses of
Article I of the United States Constitution. Id. Because the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately held
that Congress had authority to enact § 409 under the Commerce Clause, it did not decide
whether it "could also be a proper exercise of Congress's authority under the Spending Clause
or the Necessary and Proper Clause." Id. at 147 n.9.
154. Guillen v. Pierce County, 31 P.3d 628, 653 (Wash. 2001).
155. Id. at 655.
156. Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 146-47 (2003). In Guillen, the Court cited
and quoted its decision in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995). Id. Lopez is
discussed infra Part III.B.2.
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protection for the instrumentalities of interstate commerce. As such, they
fall within Congress'[s] Commerce Clause power.'
57
The Supreme Court did not address the question of whether the discoverability
and evidentiary use of certain information was economic activity or some sort
of economic endeavor. 158 Nor did the Supreme Court address whether the
Hazard Elimination Program was a valid exercise of Congress's Commerce
Clause power to regulate activity that substantially affects interstate
commerce. 1
59
Rule 502 is unlike the statutes at issue in Guillen because Rule 502 plainly
does not regulate the use of "the channels of interstate commerce" nor does it
regulate the "instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons and things in
interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate
activities.' 60 Guillen addressed statutes that protect the collection of safety
data that is used to help keep the roadways open and safe and to permit the
states and the federal government to make informed decisions about (and
thereby increase protection for) roads and highways. 16' Therefore, the Court
reasonably concluded that the federal statute improved safety in the channels of
commerce and increased protection for the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce.1 62 Rule 502 can only be sustained as an exercise of Congress's
Commerce Clause powers if it regulates activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce.
157. Guillen, 537 U.S. at 147.
158. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611 (2000) (stating that for Congress to
regulate an activity under the Commerce Clause, it must be some sort of economic activity or
endeavor).
159. See supra note 157 and accompanying text (explaining the Court's reasoning in
Guillen); see also supra note 131 and accompanying text (discussing the three categories of
activity that Congress can properly regulate under the Commerce Clause-one being activity
that substantially affects interstate commerce).
160. Guillen, 537 U.S. at 146-47.
161. Id. at 147. "Congress could reasonably believe that adopting [the statutes] would
result in more diligent efforts to collect the relevant information, more candid discussions of
hazardous locations, better informed decisionmaking, and, ultimately, greater safety on our
Nation's roads." Id.
162. See id. (concluding that the statutes would lead to better safety on the roads-
channels of interstate commerce-upon which the instrumentalities of interstate commerce are
used).
66 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 673 (2009)
B. Rule 502 Does Not Regulate Activity that Substantially Affects
Interstate Commerce
1. Congress Sought to Enact Rule 502 Pursuant to Its Authority to
Regulate Activity that Substantially Affects Interstate Commerce
Rule 502(d) focuses on disclosure of attorney-client privileged or attorney
work product protected information of any type, wherever it occurs. It is not
limited to privileged or protected information that relates to instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, interstate markets, or things or persons in interstate
commerce. 163 The statements in the rulemaking record and in the legislative
record support a conclusion that Congress understood that Rule 502 must be
sustained (if it all) as an exercise of Congress's authority to regulate activity
that substantially affects interstate commerce.164
The Evidence Rules Committee took up the issues covered by Rule 502 at
the behest of Congress 165 and considered whether Congress had the power
under the Commerce Clause to effect changes in the rules of evidence in state
courts.
16 6 The Committee Note to proposed Rule 502 actually contained an
explicit reference to the Commerce Clause as the source of legislative authority
163. Cf Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608 ("[The government] seek[s] to sustain § 13981 as a
regulation of activity that substantially affects interstate commerce. Given § 13981 's focus on
gender-motivated violence wherever it occurs (rather than violence directed at the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, interstate markets, or things or persons in interstate
commerce), we agree that this is the proper inquiry."); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
559 (1995) ("Thus, if § 922(q) is to be sustained, it must be under the third category as a
regulation of an activity that substantially affects interstate commerce."); see generally FED. R.
EviD. 502.
164. See infra notes 168-71 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's need to
convince those who would review the rule during the public comment period that Rule 502 was
a proper exercise of its commerce clause power).
165. See S. REP. No. 110-264, at 4 (2008) (noting that the Judicial Conference referred the
task of drafting a proposed rule and deciding its scope to the Advisory Committee on Evidence
Rules).
166. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE RULES, MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF APRIL
24-25, 2006, at 54, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Agenda%2OBooks/EV2006-
1 .pdf (stating that the committee had an expert testify about his opinion on Congress's power
to enact Rule 502 under the commerce clause).
There may be situations in which state proceedings are so localized that they do not
affect interstate commerce, and in those cases a "federalized" waiver rule may be
problematic. We chose, however, not to carve out those proceedings in the rule, for
at least two reasons: 1) They may not exist; you don't have to go far to affect
interstate commerce in a litigation; and 2) If they do exist, they are hard to describe.
Broun & Capra 2006 Memo, supra note 103, at 23.
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for the rule.167 The Committee included the reference to provide notice to those
who reviewed the rule during the public comment period to explain why
Congress "could possibly believe it had the authority to promulgate not only a
rule of privilege but also a rule that binds state as well as federal courts."
168
The Committee Note compared Rule 502 to the recently enacted Class Action
Fairness Act ("CAFA"). 169 Congress enacted CAFA pursuant to its authority to
regulate activity that substantially affects interstate commerce and Congress
made specific findings that abuse of the class action device substantially and
negatively affected commerce.
1 70
Statements in the Senate Report that accompanied Rule 502 reveal
Congress's reasoning that making the discovery process more efficient and
cost-effective was the motivating factor behind the Rule. 171 In contrast to the
167. See MAY 2006 EVIDENCE RuLEs CoMM. REPORT, supra note 97, at 9 (discussing Rule
502's enactment). The Report states:
The Committee is well aware that a privilege rule proposed through the rulemaking
process cannot bind state courts, and indeed that a rule of privilege cannot take
effect through the ordinary rulemaking process. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b). It is
therefore anticipated that Congress must enact this rule directly, through its
authority under the Commerce Clause.
Id. The Committee Note reference to the Commerce Clause was subsequently removed and the
final version of the Rule and the accompanying Committee Note does not specify the source of
the legislative authority. See FED. R. EvID. 502 (stating nothing about the Commerce Clause or
the source of legislative authority to enact Rule 502); see also Broun & Capra 2006 Memo,
supra note 103, at 34-35 ("[T]he above paragraph in the Committee Note is intended to serve a
(perhaps temporary) notice function that arguably is necessary given the unique provenance of
the rule.").
168. Broun & Capra 2006 Memo, supra note 103, at 34-35. Professor Timothy Glynn
argued in a 2002 Article that federalizing the entirety of the law of attorney client privilege was
permissible pursuant to Congress's Commerce Clause power. See generally Glynn, supra note
38. During the hearings on proposed Rule 502, Professor Glynn testified that "Congress's
power to enact Rule 502, as a preemptive statute, would require that Congress act under its
Commerce Clause power, rather than just under its Article 3 power, bolstered by the necessary
and proper clause." Hearing on Proposal 502, supra note 68, at 69. After the period of public
comment, the Committee removed the reference to the Commerce Clause because the
Committee Note was intended as "'a guide for practitioners and the courts' and not an
explication of the authority for promulgating the rule." Broun & Capra 2006 Memo, supra note
103, at 34. The rulemakers believed that Congress must speak for itself on the issue of
Congressional power to enact Rule 502. Id.
169. See Broun & Capra 2006 Memo, supra note 103, at 34-35 (comparing rule 502 to the
Class Action Fairness Act, which relies on the Commerce Clause to regulate state class actions);
see also MAY 2006 EVIDENCE RULES COMM. REPORT, supra note 97, at 9 (same).
170. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 § 2(a)(2), 28 U.S.C. § 1711 (2006) (finding
that abuses of the class action device have "adversely affected interstate commerce" and
undermine "the free flow of interstate commerce").
171. See S. REP. No. 110-264, at 1-2 (2008) ("Outdated law affecting inadvertent
disclosure coupled with the stark increase in discovery materials has led to dramatic litigation
66 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 673 (2009)
specific findings in CAFA, however, neither Rule 502 nor the accompanying
Senate Report mention commerce (interstate or otherwise), and they make no
findings regarding the effects on interstate commerce of waiver of privilege,
disclosure of privileged information, or the burden and cost of privilege
review. 172
2. The Current Analytical Framework for Assessing the Exercise of
Commerce Clause Power over Activity that Substantially
Affects Interstate Commerce
The analytical framework for assessing the exercise of Congress's
Commerce Clause power over activity that substantially affects interstate
commerce derives from three recent Supreme Court decisions: United States v.
Lopez, 173 United States v. Morrison,174 and Gonzales v. Raich.
175
In Lopez, the Supreme Court assessed Congress's power to enact the Gun-
Free School Zones Act of 1990 (GFSZA), which made it a federal criminal
offense "for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the
individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone."' 76 The
Court held that the GFSZA was unconstitutional because it violated the
Commerce Clause. 1
77
In assessing Congress's actions as a regulation of activity that substantially
affects interstate commerce, the Court first noted that the GFSZA contains "no
jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that
the firearm possession in question affects interstate commerce.' 78  Such a
cost increases."); see also id. at 2 ("[T]he costs of privilege review are often wholly
disproportionate to the overall cost of the case.").
172. See generally id. (failing to mention interstate commerce in the report).
173. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,551 (1995) (holding that the Gun Free School
Zones Act was not a constitutional use of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause).
174. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (holding that the Violence
Against Women Act was not a constitutional use of Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause).
175. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1,33 (2005) (holding that the Controlled Substances Act
was a constitutional use of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause).
176. Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (2006).
177. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551 (holding that the statute was not a valid exercise of
Congress's power under the Commerce Clause).
178. Id. at 561; see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611-12 (noting that the statute in Lopez
contained "no express jurisdictional element which might limit its reach to a discrete set of
firearm possessions that additionally have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate
commerce").
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requirement likely would have saved the GFSZA by making proof of the
jurisdictional prerequisite a necessary element of the offense, thus limiting the
scope of the GFSZA. Similarly, the Court noted that Congress had made no
legislative findings (and no congressional committee findings) regarding the
regulated activity's effect on interstate commerce. 79
The Supreme Court then turned to the task of assessing whether the
aggregate impact of possession of firearms in school zones substantially affects
interstate commerce. The Supreme Court described its decision in Wickard v.
Filburn'80 as "perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause
authority over intrastate activity ... .,,l" In Wickard, the Court assessed the
constitutionality of a federal statute that allowed the Secretary of Agriculture to
establish quotas for wheat production so as to "control the volume moving in
interstate and foreign commerce in order to avoid surpluses and shortages and
the consequently abnormally low or high wheat prices and obstructions to
commerce."1 82 The question in Wickard arose because the statute extended
federal regulation to production of wheat that was not intended for sale but was,
instead, intended solely for consumption and use by the farmer who grew the
wheat. 83 The Court noted that the nature of the wheat production at issue was
economic activity because "[h]ome grown wheat ... competes with wheat in
commerce."1 84 Even though any individual farmer's production of wheat for
home consumption may be trivial, this does not put the production out of
Congress's reach because the aggregate impact of many similarly situated
farmers is significant.'
85
In Lopez, the Government urged the Court to assess the aggregate impact
of gun possession on interstate commerce. The Government argued:
[P]ossession of a firearm in a school zone may result in violent crime and
that violent crime can be expected to affect the functioning of the national
economy in two ways. First, the costs of violent crime are substantial, and,
through the mechanism of insurance, those costs are spread throughout the
179. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562-63 (1995) ("[Njeither the statute nor its
legislative history contain[s] express congressional findings regarding the effects upon interstate
commerce of gun possession in a school zone.").
180. Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942) (holding that Congress may
regulate activity that when aggregated has a substantial effect on interstate commerce).
181. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
182. Wickard,317U.S.at 115.
183. See id. at 118 (stating that the statute limited the amount of wheat a farmer could
grow, even when that wheat was consumed on premises).
184. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
185. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-28 (stating that Congress may regulate behavior, that if
aggregated, could significantly affect interstate commerce).
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population. Second, violent crime reduces the willingness of individuals to
travel to areas within the country that are perceived to be unsafe.
18 6
The Supreme Court rejected the Government's reasoning because, if followed
to its fullest extent, it would allow the Government to regulate all human
behavior.' 87 Although Congress's Commerce Clause power is extensive, it
does not permit Congress to "pile inference upon inference" to justify its
conclusion that noneconomic, intrastate activity has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce. 1
88
The Supreme Court also considered and rejected the Government's
argument that "the presence of guns in schools poses a substantial threat to the
educational process by threatening the learning environment. A handicapped
educational process, in turn, will result in a less productive citizenry. That, in
turn, would have an adverse effect on the Nation's economic well-being."' '89
This reasoning, if accepted, would allow the government to regulate all
activities that affect individual citizens. 190 The Government's reasoning also
raised a particular concern because it would permit the exercise of federal
power "even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where
States historically have been sovereign." 191
In United States v. Morrison, the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of a portion of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), 1
92
which provided a federal civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated
violence.' 93  The Court held that sections of 42 U.S.C. § 13981 were
186. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563-64 (1995) (internal citations omitted).
187. See id. at 564 ("The Government admits, under its 'costs of crime' reasoning, that
Congress could regulate not only all violent crime, but all activities that might lead to violent
crime, regardless of how tenuously they relate to interstate commerce.").
188. See id at 567 ("To uphold the Government's contentions here, we would have to pile
inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States.").
189. Id. at 564.
190. See id. ("Similarly, under the Government's 'national productivity' reasoning,
Congress could regulate any activity that it found was related to the economic productivity of
individual citizens: family law (including marriage, divorce, and child custody), for example.").
191. See id (discussing how the Government's arguments could theoretically be extended
to allow Congress to regulate any and all individual activity).
192. See Violence Against Women Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 16, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C. (2000)) (providing
resources for the investigation and prosecution of violent crimes motivated by gender and
establishing civil rights and causes of action for women who are victims of gender motivated
violence).
193. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (2000), invalidated by United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598 (2000) ("A person.., who commits a crime of violence motivated by gender.., shall be
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unconstitutional because they exceeded Congress's authority under the
Commerce Clause. 194
The Court affirmed the analytical framework set forth in the Lopez
opinion. 195 Like the activity at issue in Lopez (possession of a firearm in a
school zone), the Court concluded that gender-motivated crimes of violence are
not, in any sense, economic activity.196 The Court specifically emphasized the
"role that the economic nature of the regulated activity plays in our Commerce
Clause analysis"197 and that where the Court has upheld statutes regulating an
activity "based upon the activity's substantial effects on interstate commerce,
the activity in question has been some sort of economic endeavor.
198
The Court noted that, in contrast to the GFSZA at issue in Lopez,
Congress had, with respect to the VAWA, made specific findings regarding the
impact of gender-motivated violence on interstate commerce. 99 But the Court
held that these findings were not conclusive and were insufficient to sustain the
constitutionality of 42 U.S.C.A. § 13981 pursuant to the Commerce Clause.200
The Court expressly rejected Congress's finding that gender-motivated violence
affects interstate commerce by deterring people from traveling interstate and
from doing business interstate, which, in turn, "diminish[es] national
productivity, increase[es] medical and other costs, and decreas[es] the supply of
and demand for interstate products. " 20 Following such reasoning, the Court
said, "would allow Congress to regulate any crime as long as the nationwide,
liable to the party injured,... for recovery of compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive
and declaratory relief, and such other relief as the court may deem appropriate.").
194. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601 (2000) (concluding that "the
Commerce Clause does not provide Congress with authority to enact § 13981"). The Court also
determined that Congress lacked authority to enact the provision under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 627.
195. See id. at 609-14 (discussing Lopez as "modem Commerce Clause jurisprudence" and
noting that Lopez, as a recent case treating the third category of Commerce Clause regulation,
"provides the proper framework for conducting the required analysis of § 13981").
196. See id. at 607, 617 (rejecting the reasoning that Congress employed to find that




199. See id. at 614 ("In contrast with the lack of Congressional findings that we faced in
Lopez, § 13981 is supported by numerous findings regarding the serious impact that gender-
motivated violence has on victims and their families.").
200. See id. at 614-15 (noting that "Congress'[s] findings are substantially weakened by
the fact that they rely so heavily on a method of reasoning that we have already rejected as
unworkable" and discussing specific problems with accepting Congress's reasoning).
201. Id. at 615 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 103-711, at 385(1994) (Conf. Rep.), as reprintedin
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1803, 1853).
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aggregated impact of that crime has substantial effects on employment,
production, transit, or consumption. "202 It also would permit Congress to
invade other areas traditionally subject to exclusive state regulation. 2°' The
Court held that Congress could not regulate "non-economic, violent criminal
conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate
commerce," as this type of regulation is the province of the states.2 4
In Gonzales v. Raich, the Supreme Court held that Congress had the
authority under the Commerce Clause to prohibit the local cultivation and use
of marijuana, even where that cultivation and use complied with California
law.2°5 Specifically, the Court found that Congress validly exercised its
Commerce Clause power when it enacted the federal Controlled Substances
Act (CSA), °6 which makes it a federal crime to manufacture, distribute or
possess marijuana.207 The Court so found, despite the fact that California and
at least eight other states had subsequently enacted laws authorizing the use of
marijuana for medicinal purposes.20 8
The Court focused its opinion on the economic nature and implications of
production, distribution, and consumption of marijuana. 20 9  The Court
determined that the regulation of the manufacture, distribution, and possession
of marijuana was strikingly similar to the regulation of wheat production in
Wickard v. Filburn.210  "Like the farmer in Wickard, respondents are
202. Id.
203. See id. at 615-16 (discussing how extending Congress's reasoning would allow
Congress to regulate "family law and other areas of traditional state regulation since the
aggregate effect of marriage, divorce, and childbearing on the national economy is undoubtedly
significant").
204. See id. at 617-19 (rejecting the aggregate effects on interstate commerce approach and
noting that "regulation and punishment of intrastate violence that is not directed at the
instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce has always been the
province of the States").
205. See Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 7-9 (2005) (finding that Congress had the power
to enact the Controlled Substances Act, even where it prohibited actions that were legal under
California law).
206. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (2006) (establishing standards for regulating the
manufacture, importation, distribution, and possession of certain controlled substances).
207. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 9 ("The CSA is a valid exercise of federal power .... ). See
generally 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 844(a) (2000).
208. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 5 n.1 (discussing laws in eight states besides California
authorizing medicinal marijuana use and noting possible legislation in additional states).
209. See id. at 18-21 (discussing Congress's findings on the impact that home grown
marijuana will have on supply, demand, consumption, and pricing in the interstate market).
210. See id. at 18 ("The similarities between this case and Wickard are striking."); see also
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942) (finding that Congress had the authority,
under the Commerce Clause, to regulate home grown wheat because of its effects on interstate
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cultivating, for home consumption, a fungible commodity for which there is an
established, albeit illegal, interstate market.",21 1 The Court noted that Congress
does not have to make specific or particularized findings regarding a substantial
effect on interstate commerce in order to legislate, particularly when, as in the
present case, the connection to commerce is "self-evident. '212 The Court found
that the CSA "is a statute that regulates the production, distribution, and
consumption of commodities for which there is an established, and lucrative,
interstate market. 2 1 3 The Court used this finding to support its conclusion that
the CSA is constitutional as "a statute that directly regulates economic
activity.
' ' 14
Although these cases are, in many ways, hard to reconcile, they indicate
that Congress's power to regulate activity that substantially affects interstate
commerce is broad but not unlimited. Congress may include in any regulation
an express jurisdictional element that requires a case-by-case inquiry to
determine whether the subject sought to be regulated actually affects interstate
commerce. 21 In the absence of such a jurisdictional element, the Court looks
to see whether the regulated activity, as a general matter, substantially affects
interstate commerce.216 Congress is not required to make specific legislative
findings or congressional committee findings regarding the regulated activity's
217effect on interstate commerce. Where Congress makes such findings,
however, they are helpful to the Court in "evaluat[ing] the legislative judgment
that the activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce, even
commerce).
211. Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 18 (2005).
212. See id. at 21 (noting that "the absence of particularized findings does not call into
question Congress'[s] authority to legislate").
213. Id. at26.
214. Id.
215. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,612 (2000) ("Such ajurisdictional
element may establish that the enactment is in pursuance of Congress'[s] regulation of interstate
commerce."); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561-62 (1995) (discussing how a
jurisdictional element that requires a case-by-case inquiry can help demonstrate that a statute
has an "explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce").
216. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613-17 (noting that the VAWA did not contain a
jurisdictional element limiting its application and then proceeding to evaluate whether Congress
was correct in concluding that gender-motivated violence, the conduct regulated by the VAWA,
substantially affects interstate commerce); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62 (noting that § 922 "has no
express jurisdictional element" and then undergoing an "independent evaluation of
constitutionality under the Commerce Clause" to consider whether the regulated conduct has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce).
217. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562 ("Congress normally is not required to make formal
findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity has on interstate commerce.").
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though no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye." '218 But
Congressional findings alone are not sufficient to sustain the exercise of the
Commerce Clause power.219 The determination of whether activity, such as
that regulated by Rule 502, substantially affects interstate commerce in a
manner sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Commerce Clause "'is
ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative question, and can be settled finally
only by [the Supreme] Court.' ,220 The key inquiry is whether the regulated
activity is "economic in nature. '221 And the Court looks to the literal dictionary
definition of "economics," which means the "production, distribution and
consumption of commodities. ,
222
In sum, Congress may regulate "purely local activities that are part of an
economic 'class of activities' that have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce." 223  If the class of economic activities is within the reach of
Congress's Commerce Clause power, Congress's reach also may extend to
noneconomic activity that is intrastate in nature if it is an essential part of a
larger regulatory scheme.224 Put another way, Congress may regulate
noneconomic intrastate activity only if it is "part and parcel of some larger
commercial activity regulated by Congress. 2 25 But Congress may notjustify its
218. Id. at 563.
219. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 ("[T]he existence of congressional findings is not
sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce Clause legislation.").
220. Id.
221. See id. at 613 ("While we need not adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the
effects of any noneconomic activity in order to decide these cases, thus far in our Nation's
history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that
activity is economic in nature.") (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559-60 (1995)
and cases cited therein); see also id. at 611 ("[I]n those cases where we have sustained federal
regulation of intrastate activity based upon the activity's substantial effects on interstate
commerce, the activity in question has been some sort of economic endeavor.") (citing Lopez,
514 U.S. at 559-60).
222. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25-26 (2005) (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 720 (1966)).
223. Id. at 17 (citations omitted).
224. See id. at 23-28 (discussing the circumstances when "comprehensive regulatory
statutes may be validly applied to local conduct that does not, when viewed in isolation, have a
significant impact on interstate commerce").
225. Norman R. Williams, The Commerce Clause and the Myth of Dual Federalism, 54
UCLA L. REv. 1847, 1924 (2007). In his concurrence in Raich, Justice Scalia maintains that
the power to regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce "cannot come from
the Commerce Clause alone." Raich, 545 U.S. at 34 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia
argued that Congress's power over "intrastate activities that are not themselves part of interstate
commerce (including activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce) derives
from the Necessary and Proper Clause." Id. (Scalia, J. concurring). Accordingly, in Justice
Scalia's mind, Congress may, consistent with the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and
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regulation of noneconomic, intrastate activity "through a remote chain of
inferences ' 226 or by "pil[ing] inference upon inference" to establish that the
regulation has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.22 7 Additionally, in
recognition of the values of dual sovereignty federalism incorporated in the
Constitution, the Court is particularly concerned with attempts by Congress to
228regulate areas of activity that are traditionally subject to exclusive state regulation.
3. Rule 502(d) Does Not Include a Jurisdictional Element and Congress Made
No Finding that Waiver of Privilege in an Action in State Court Affects
Interstate Commerce
Rule 502(d) does not include a jurisdictional element that would ensure,
through case-by-case inquiry, that waiver of the particular privilege or protection in
question would affect interstate commerce.229 Absent such a limitation in its scope,
this rule must be reviewed to determine whether as a general matter it regulates
activity that substantially affects interstate commerce.23° Congress held no hearings
and made no findings to assist the Court in determining the effect that waiver of the
attomey-client privilege or the work product protection has on interstate
commerce.231
Proper Clause, "regulate even those intrastate activities that do not themselves substantially
affect interstate commerce" where Congress finds that doing so is "necessary to make a
regulation of interstate commerce effective." Id. at 34-35 (Scalia, J. concurring).
226. Raich, 545 U.S. at 36 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566-67).
227. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) ("To uphold the Govemment's
contentions here, we would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid
fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of
the sort retained by the States."); see also Raich, 545 U.S. at 36 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(rejecting the argument that "Congress may regulate noneconomic activity based solely on the
effect that it may have on interstate commerce through a remote chain of inferences") (citing
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564-66; United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000)).
228. See, Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-16 (discussing the Court's concern with the
possibility that "Congress might use the Commerce Clause to completely obliterate the
Constitution's distinction between national and local authority").
229. FED. R. EvtD. 502; see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62 (discussing statutes that have
contained jurisdictional elements requiring a case-by-case inquiry into whether the regulated
conduct affects interstate commerce); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611-12 (discussing how a
jurisdictional element could have limited the reach of the statute to situations where the conduct
in question had an explicit effect on interstate commerce).
230. See supra note 216 and accompanying text (noting that where a statute does not
contain an explicit jurisdictional provision, courts will evaluate whether the statute regulates
activities that have a substantial impact on interstate commerce).
231. See S. REP. No. 110-264, at 3-6 (2008) (discussing the purpose of the bill and the
history of the drafting, introduction, and discussion of the bill in the Senate without discussing
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4. Rule 502(d) Does Not Regulate Activity that Is "Economic in Nature"
Rule 502(d) does not regulate activity that is economic in nature.232 In Raich,
the Court looked to the literal dictionary definition and stated that "'[e]conomics'
refers to 'the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities.'
233
Although the party in question may be producing or possessing a product solely for
personal, intrastate use, the inquiry still focuses on whether the production or
possession might affect economic competition for the product when the product is
generally the type of thing connected with a commercial transaction.234
Rule 502(d) regulates state courts by restricting their ability to apply state law
on waiver of the attorney-client privilege or the attorney work product protection.
Waivers of the attorney-client privilege and the attorney work product protection are
not commodities, and they are not produced, distributed or consumed-they are not
economic activity of individuals.235
Waiver of the attomey-client privilege by disclosure of the privileged
information does not require any "economic activity." Likewise, the protection of
the attorney-client privilege, by reviewing documents before producing them in
discovery, does not require any economic activity. This is because litigation may
involve plaintiffs and defendants who represent themselves and, even when lawyers
are involved, there is no market in privileged information. Lawyers review
documents to avoid waiving the attorney-client privilege because state rules of
professional responsibility require them to do so, not because there is a market in
which lawyers compete specifically for such services.
236
any potential effects that waiving the attorney-client privilege would have on interstate
commerce); SEPTEMBER 2007 RULES COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 32-36 (discussing the
evidence and recommendations from the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules that Congress
considered before proposing changes to FRE Rule 502 without mentioning any specific findings
regarding the impacts that an attorney-client privilege wavier would have on interstate
commerce); cf Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63 (noting the absence of express congressional findings
that the regulated activity had an effect on interstate commerce).
232. See generally FED. R. EviD. 502.
233. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25-26 (2005) (quoting WEBSTER'S TfIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 720 (1966)).
234. See id. at 30 (discussing the impact of personal, intrastate use of marijuana on
interstate commerce).
235. See Bellia, supra note 130, at 966 ("Historically, even the most contested exercises of
the commerce power have operated directly upon the primary economic activity of individuals
rather than upon how disputes arising from that economic activity are litigated.").
236. See infra notes 331-35 and accompanying text (discussing how regulation of attorney
conduct through rules of professional responsibility has traditionally been a field governed by
state law).
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As professor Anthony Bellia points out, the Supreme Court has held that a
state rule of evidence is not a regulation of commerce, and, consequently, such
a rule does not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause.237 In Richmond &
Allegheny R.R. v. R.A. Patterson Tobacco Co.,238 the Court addressed the
constitutionality of a Virginia statute providing that railroads were
presumptively liable for safe delivery of goods to their ultimate destination,
even if that destination was beyond the reach of the railroad's line. This
presumption could be overcome if the railroad produced a written release.239
The railroad challenged the Virginia statute as a regulation of the interstate
commerce by Virginia and, therefore, a violation of the Dormant Commerce
Clause.2 40 The Supreme Court rejected the railroad's argument, finding that the
statute was a rule of evidence.241 The Court stated that "in a latitudinarian
sense, any restriction as to the evidence of a contract, relating to interstate
commerce, may be said to be a limitation on the contract itself.., this remote
effect, resulting from the lawful exercise by a state of its power to determine the
form in which contracts may be proven, does not amount to a regulation of
interstate commerce.
242
Although the Supreme Court's decision in Patterson Tobacco held that a
state rule of evidence was not a regulation of interstate commerce, the same
conclusion should result when assessing a federal rule of evidence enacted by
Congress that controls the admission of evidence in state courts. 243 The
constitutional definition of commerce "'is the same when relied on to strike
237. See Bellia, supra note 130, at 968 ("In 1898, in Richmond& Allegheny Railroad v.
R.A. Patterson Tobacco Co., the Court held that a state rule of evidence did not violate the
dormant Commerce Clause because it was not a regulation of commerce.").
238. See Richmond& Allegheny R.R. v. R.A. Patterson Tobacco Co., 169 U.S. 311,315-
16 (1898) (concluding that a Virginia statute imposing a duty of safe carriage on a common
carrier merely established a rule of evidence and did not violate the Constitution by regulating
interstate commerce).
239. See id. at 316 ("'When a common carrier accepts for transportation anything directed
to a point of destination beyond the termination of his own line or route, he shall... assume an
obligation for its safe carriage .... unless.., such carrier be released or exempted from such
liability by contract in writing.. .. "' (quoting VA. CODE § 1295 (1887))).
240. See id. at 313 ("[Tlhe defendant company... claim[ed] that the statute was a
regulation of interstate commerce, and therefore in conflict with the Constitution of the United
States.").
241. See id. at 316 (affirming that the Virginia statute is constitutional because it simply
establishes a rule of evidence and does not restrict the right of a common carrier to limit its
obligations by contract).
242. Id. at 315.
243. See Bellia, supra note 130, at 968-69 ("Arguably, if a state rule of evidence is not a
regulation of interstate commerce, neither would be the same rule if enacted by Congress.").
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down or restrict state legislation as when relied on to support some exertion of
federal control or regulation.' ,244
State court litigation is not a commodity. 245 For certain, state court
litigation "involves economic transactions at two levels: parties typically pay to
conduct it, and the remedies sought between the parties typically involve the
redistribution of economic values, whether money or something else.', 246 But
this does not make state court litigation "economic" or "commercial" activity
within the meaning of the Commerce Clause.
Even if litigants are themselves pursuing economic activity by litigating,
federal regulation of state court procedures is one step removed-not regulation
of that activity, but regulation of state government regulation of that arguably
commercial activity. "Thus, by making procedural law for state courts,
Congress regulates not the economic aspects of litigation, but instead regulates
the state's regulation of litigation.
2 47
Furthermore, determinations regarding the discoverability and
admissibility of relevant evidence and the intentional (and even inadvertent)
disclosure of privileged information are "quintessential governmental
activit[ies], 248 that fall "squarely within traditional areas of state
sovereignty., 249 "States open their courts to the resolution of disputes not as a
business enterprise, but as a fundamental component of the exercise of their law
enforcement authority within their respective jurisdictions., 250  Any other
conclusion would be inconsistent with multiple lines of decision and reasoning
by the Supreme Court. If state court litigation is "economic activity" then
Congress could step in today and take over all of state criminal law
enforcement based on its Commerce Clause power-activity that the Court has
long held within the exclusive realm of the states' core sovereign power to
244. Id. (quoting Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564,
574 (1997)).
245. See Jenny Miao Jiang, Regulating Litigation Under the Protection of Lawful
Commerce in Arms Act: Economic Activity or Regulatory Nullity?, 70 ALB. L. REv. 537, 554-
56 (2007) (noting that "[m]ost modem dictionaries[] define the term as referring to a good or
product, rather than a service or facet of human behavior"). Jiang further argues that "civil
litigation is an activity that targets the exploitation of human services, not the production,
distribution and consumption of goods. As a result, such litigation does not constitute an
economic activity pursuant to the standard set forth by the majority in Raich." Id.
246. David S. Schwartz, The Federal Arbitration Act and the Power of Congress over
State Courts, 83 OR. L. REv. 541, 593 (2004).
247. Id.
248. Spencer, supra note 130, at 265-66.
249. Berman, supra note 140, at 1501-02.
250. Spencer, supra note 130, at 265-66.
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regulate. 251 Enforcement of criminal law necessarily requires the availability
and use of state courts for prosecution. Prosecution of criminal offenses
necessarily requires the use of lawyers, judges, clerks, and staff, all of whom
are paid. Prosecution of criminal offenses also required the admission of
evidence and the consideration of claims of privilege and work product
protection. Requiring some interstate commerce in order to federalize a
criminal offense would be redundant.
Similarly, the Supreme Court's decisions regarding the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA)252 would make no sense if the process of state court litigation were
itself "economic activity." In Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson,253
the Supreme Court assessed the reach of the FAA. Section 2 of the FAA made
enforceable a written arbitration agreement evidencing a "transaction involving
commerce." 254 The Court held that Congress intended the FAA to apply to the
fullest extent of its Commerce Clause power and that it therefore applied to any
contract that in fact involved interstate commerce.255 The Court later clarified
that "Congress's Commerce Clause power 'may be exercised in individual
cases without showing any effect upon interstate commerce' if in the aggregate
the economic activity in question would represent 'a general practice...
subject to federal control.' '256 If litigation were itself "economic activity"
sufficient to constitute "commerce" or have an aggregate effect on commerce,
then there would be no need for the FAA to be limited to "transactions
involving commerce."
Professor Timothy Glynn, however, reaches a different conclusion on the
issue of whether Rule 502 regulates economic activity. In a 2003 article, he
assessed whether Congress may federalize the whole of privilege law and
concluded that such action would pass constitutional scrutiny.257 In fact, he
251. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,615-16(2000) (holding that Congress's
Commerce Clause power does not allow it to regulate crime); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 561, 561 n.3 (1995) (striking down a federal criminal statute and noting that "[s]tates
possess the primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law").
252. See infra note 323.
253. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 277 (1995)
(concluding that "the word 'involving,' [in Section 2 of the FAA] signals an intent to exercise
Congress' commerce power to the full").
254. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
255. See Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 273-81 (also holding that "involving commerce" would
be interpreted as broadly as "affecting commerce").
256. Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 56-57 (2003) (per curiam) (quoting
Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236, (1948)).
257. See Glynn, supra note 38, at 156-71 (analyzing Congress's power to federalize
privilege and concluding that such federalized privilege would prove constitutional); see also
Nolan Mitchell, Note, Preserving the Privilege: Codification ofSelective Waiver and the Limits
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went further and recommended that Congress should enact preemptive
privilege legislation that provides uniform privilege protection applicable in
both state and federal court proceedings, as well as in arbitrations,
administrative proceedings, and legislative proceedings.258 Professor Glynn
concluded that Congress had the authority to enact such legislation based on its
Commerce Clause power.259
In 2006, Professor Glynn testified before the Advisory Committee on
Evidence Rules regarding the constitutionality of Rule 502.260 He concluded
that Congress has authority to enact Rule 502 under the Commerce Clause,
bolstered by the Necessary and Proper Clause, and that such action would not
offend the Tenth Amendment.26'
Professor Glynn argued that Rule 502 is necessary and appropriate
because it minimizes the burden on interstate commerce imposed by varying
state laws of privilege.262 This same reasoning, of course, would justify the
elimination of all different legal standards imposed by the various states. In
other words, in order to minimize the "disparate approaches" to every legal
concept and standard, Congress could decide to normalize all state laws on all
subjects and mandate that there will be only one law--of contracts, of torts,
etc.-in the United States and Congress shall determine what that law is. This
position, if accepted, would mean that Congress's authority under the
of Federal Power over State Courts, 86 B.U. L. REv. 691, 694 (2006) (addressing the "more
narrow question: may the federal government enact legislation that alters the scope of state
privilege law as applied in state court proceedings?").
258. See Glynn, supra note 38, at 64 ("Congress... should federalize the law of privilege
preemptively, creating uniform protection for client confidences that will apply in every
proceeding in federal and state court, as well as in arbitration proceedings, administrative
hearings, and legislative proceedings.").
259. See id. at 157-60 (discussing Congress's Commerce Clause authority to enact federal
privilege legislation).
260. See Hearing on Proposal 502, supra note 68, at 65-75 (presenting the hearing
testimony of Professor Timothy Glynn).
261. See id. at 69-74 (declaring that Congress has the power to enact Rule 502 pursuant to
its Commerce Clause authority).
262. See Glynn, supra note 38, at 157 ("While the states have a long tradition of regulating
the practice of law, their disparate approaches to the privilege may inhibit and burden the
attorney-client relationship, which is a subject of national interest and commerce."). Glynn
further notes:
[A]ttorneys provide legal services to clients engaged in activities that may subject
them to suit or regulation in different fora, with conflicting privilege rules [that] not
only burden interstate commerce... but.., also threaten to discourage the
communications that facilitate the legal services on which these activities, legal
compliance, and the effective administration of justice depend.
Id. at 159-60.
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Commerce Clause is limitless and the United States would have a completely
centralized government. 63 Unless by serendipity every state happened to have
exactly the same substantive law on every issue, "disparate approaches" would
exist justifying Congress to step in and dictate the substantive law of every
state.
Under this expansive view of the Commerce Clause power, Congress
could step in and dictate the substantive law that would apply in every case in
which there is a diversity of citizenship because there would be a guarantee of
"interstate" (diversity requires citizens of different states, thus all diversity
actions are "interstate") "commerce" (all litigation has a commercial aspect,
thus all litigation "affects commerce"). 264 The Court, however, has never
accepted this view of Congress's reach under the Commerce Clause.265 This
vision of an all-powerful federal government with license to dictate uniformity
of all laws is contrary to the Constitution's principles of dual sovereignty
federalism and would "'obliterate the distinction between what is national and
what is local in the activities of commerce.' ,,
266
Professor Glynn also argued that Rule 502 is a valid regulation of activity
that substantially affects interstate commerce because the Rule regulates, fosters
and protects activity that is economic in nature, "namely commerce between
attorneys and clients., 267 Even if one goes beyond the subject matter of the
dispute and focuses on the "commercial" activity of the practice of law, a
significant amount of litigation is done pro bono or even pro se. Nevertheless,
it cannot be disputed that an attorney-client relationship often involves
economic activity. "Ordinarily, litigants hire lawyers. Often the plaintiff seeks
money damages. The court system employs large numbers of people. There is
no doubt that a law prescribing economic features of the commercial
relationship between attorney and client would be a regulation of economic
263. Cf United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608 (2000) ("[T]he scope of the
interstate commerce power 'must be considered in the light of our dual system of government
and may not be extended.., to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and
remote that to embrace them... would effectually... create a completely centralized
government.'" (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556-57 (1995))).
264. See Huber, Hunt & Nichols, Inc. v. Architectural Stone Co., 625 F.2d 22,25 (1 1th
Cir. 1980) (stating that where parties to a contract are from different states, the performance of
the contract in dispute likely entails interstate commerce).
265. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198,202 (1956) ("Congress does
not have the constitutional authority to make the law that is applicable to controversies in
diversity of citizenship cases.").
266. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (quoting NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)).
267. Hearing on Proposal 502, supra note 68, at 71.
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activity.'' 268 But Congress did not regulate the work of lawyers and the review
of documents with Rule 502. Instead, it acts to interfere with the states' and the
state courts' ability to determine what evidence is admissible in state court
proceedings. The determination of whether information is discoverable,
admissible, privileged, or stripped of its privilege is not economic or
commercial activity. It certainly is not a commodity that is subject to market
competition. It is an inherent and indivisible part of the operation of state
courts in implementing their state-specific view of what evidence the finder of
fact may consider in resolving a dispute based on a state-created cause of
action.
The federal government and the state governments have long recognized
that each state has the right to regulate lawyers practicing within that state
through rules of professional responsibility. 269 The supreme courts of each state
have inherent power to regulate the practice of law in that state.27 ° Such
regulation does not infringe on the "common market" required by the
Commerce Clause.27' Instead, it is an essential attribute of state sovereignty.
Professor Kenneth Broun, Consultant to the Advisory Committee on
Evidence Rules, noted that Congress's Commerce Clause authority likely
would not extend to other evidentiary privileges-for example, the doctor-
patient and the psychotherapist-patient privilege.27 2 But the extension of Rule
502 to protect against waiver of the doctor-patient privilege would rise or fall
based on the same arguments as the attorney-client privilege. Most, but not all,
attorney-client relationships are based on an agreement to pay a fee for services.
Likewise, so are most doctor-patient relationships. But waiver of these
268. Berman, supra note 140, at 1505-06 (citations omitted).
269. See infra notes 331-35 and accompanying text (discussing the tradition of state law
regulating attorney conduct through rules of professional responsibility).
270. See Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 789 n.18 (1975) (stating that the
Supreme Court of Virginia has inherent power to regulate the practice of law in Virginia) (citing
Button v. Day, 132 S.E.2d 292 (1963)); see also Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281
(1957) (stating that state and federal courts have autonomous control over the lawyers practicing
before them); Saier v. State Bar of Mich., 293 F.2d 756, 759 (6th Cir. 1961) (stating that the
licensing and regulation of the practice of law is a matter within an individual state's province).
See generally Rollins, supra note 16.
271. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,293 (1980) ("In the
Commerce Clause, [the Framers] provided that the Nation was to be a common market, a 'free
trade unit' in which the States are debarred from acting as separable economic entities. But the
Framers also intended that the States retain many essential attributes of sovereignty, including,
in particular, the sovereign power to try causes in their courts.").
272. See Broun & Capra 2006 Memo, supra note 103, at 22 ("Perhaps one could argue that
in many contexts the psychotherapist-patient privilege has some effect on commerce, although
the concept stretches one's imagination.").
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privileges has nothing to do with any commerce between the attorney and client
or the doctor and patient. It is not dependent upon, nor subject to, a
commercial relationship. Even where a commercial relationship once existed,
the privilege persists after the commercial relationship is long over.
The Reporter for the Advisory Committee acknowledged that "[t]here may
also be situations in which state proceedings are so localized that they do not
affect interstate commerce, and in those cases a 'federalized' waiver rule may
be problematic., 273 The Committee "chose, however, not to carve out those
proceedings in the rule, for at least two reasons: 1) They may not exist; you
don't have to go far to affect interstate commerce in a litigation; and 2) if they
do exist, they are hard to describe."2 74 It is not too hard to imagine such a
circumstance. For example, consider the case of gender-motivated violence-a
stalker, a sexual assault or even a rape-that results in one party seeking a
temporary restraining order against another party in a civil action. Or consider
in that same circumstance a plaintiff who pursues damages in a civil action.
The Supreme Court found that a federal civil remedy for victims of gender-
motivated violence was unconstitutional because it exceeded Congress's
authority under the Commerce Clause.275 The availability of economic
damages for civil lawsuits brought pursuant to state law causes of action did not
make this "economic activity" that substantially affects interstate commerce.276
273. Id. at 23, reporter's cmt.
274. Id.; see also N.Y. STATE BAR ASs'N, COMMERCIAL& FED. LmG. SECTION, REPORTON
PROPOSED FEDERAL RuLE OF EVIDENCE 502, at 26 (Feb. 13, 2007), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/EV%20Comments%202006/06-EV-069.pdf ("The proposed
Rule depends upon the application of interstate commerce authority. There maybe cases where
such authority is thin, resulting (at the very least) in motion practice to determine whether the
federal rule can be applied (and conceivably in rejection of application of the federal rule).").
275. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601 (2000) (declaring that Congress
lacked the constitutional authority under the Commerce Clause to provide a civil remedy for
victims of gender motivated violence). As noted above, the argument that state court litigation
is "commerce" and therefore Congress can regulate activity that gives rise to a state law cause of
action is bootstrapping. If true, Congress could regulate all of tort law because of the
"commerce" generated by state courts allowing lawyers to practice there and the Court would
have upheld the Violence Against Women Act at issue in Morrison.
276. In its Supreme Court brief in Morrison, the Government argued that the provision of
the Violence Against Women Act that created a private right of action for victims of gender-
motivated violence was a permissible exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause powers because
it was:
[D]esigned to remedy not only gender-motivated violence itself but also the
inadequate existing mechanisms to compensate the victims of such violence for
their economic injuries, such as lost earnings, medical expenses, and relocation
costs. See, e.g., 1991 S. Rep. 44 (concluding that the fact that "less than 1 percent
of all victims have collected damages" against their assailants "belie[s] claims that
State laws provide 'adequate' remedies for the victims of these crimes").
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In short, the "commerce" that occurs within the litigation process does not turn
the subject matter of the dispute into an area of"economic activity." This same
reasoning applies to Congressional regulation of state courts under Rule 502(d).
Neither the availability of damages in a civil action nor the fees paid to
attorneys in some (but not all) cases permits Congress to regulate state courts'
adjudication of disputes that arise under state law.
5. Rule 502(d) Regulates Activity that Is Not Part of a Larger Commercial
Activity that Is Regulated by Congress but Instead Is Traditionally
Subject to State Regulation
Rule 502(d) is likely an impermissible exercise of Congress's Commerce
Clause powers because it regulates noneconomic, intrastate activity that is
traditionally subject to exclusive state regulation.277 Congress may regulate
noneconomic activity only if it is necessary to support the regulation of some
larger class of commercial activity that is regulated by Congress.278 But for
Rule 502(d), there is no larger commercial activity that is regulated by
Congress. Congress does not regulate the practice of lawyers before state
courts. 279 For example, one can become a member of a state bar and never
practice before (or seek admission to) a federal court. Congress also does not
regulate the attorney-client privilege, attorney work product protection or
waiver thereof in state courts on state law causes of action.
As noted above, Professor Glynn has written and testified that it would be
permissible for Congress to federalize the law of attorney-client privilege
pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers. But that is a different issue. With
Accordingly, even if Congress were limited after Lopez to regulating intrastate
activity that has some economic component, Section 13981 would come within that
limitation.
Brief for the United States, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29),
1999 WL 1037259, at *32. If it is permissible for Congress to legislate based on the
"commerce" involved in litigating a state law cause of action, then the Supreme Court should
have held that the provision of the VAWA at issue in Morrison was constitutional. It did not.
277. See, e.g., supra note 177 and accompanying text (discussing Lopez's holding that
Congress has limited Commerce Clause authority to regulate noneconomic, intrastate activity).
278. See supra note 205 and accompanying text (stating that Raich determined that if a
class of economic activities is within the reach of Congress's Commerce Clause power,
Congress's reach also may extend to noneconomic activity that is intrastate in nature if it is an
essential part of the larger regulatory scheme).
279. See Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 789-90 (1975) (observing that the
Supreme Court of Virginia bears responsibility for regulating the practice of law); see also Saier
v. State Bar of Mich., 293 F.2d 756, 759 (6th Cir. 1961) (noting that the regulation of the
practice of law is a state matter).
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Rule 502, Congress did not act to regulate the relationship between attorney
and client-which is arguably "economic in nature." Rule 502 only regulates
waiver of privilege by disclosure in a federal proceeding, which is not
economic activity; it is activity occurring during litigation. If Congress chose to
regulate the larger attorney-client relationship, then it could regulate the lesser,
noneconomic activity covered by Rule 502. Because Congress has chosen not
to regulate the larger commercial activity, it cannot choose to regulate only the
lesser, noneconomic activity affected by Rule 502.
Professor Glynn also argues that the aggregate impact of activity to protect
against privilege waiver substantially affects interstate commerce: "The
provision of legal services is usually in exchange for compensation; indeed, the
nation's legal industry does a huge amount of business. The attorney-client
privilege protects communications upon which the industry's article of
commerce-the provision of legal services-depends., 280 Virtually the same
argument was considered and rejected by the Court in Lopez and in Morrison.
In Lopez, the Government argued that possession of a firearm in a local school
zone substantially affects interstate commerce because:
[P]ossession of a firearm in a school zone may result in violent crime and
that violent crime can be expected to affect the functioning of the national
economy in two ways. First, the costs of violent crime are substantial, and,
through the mechanism of insurance, those costs are spread throughout the
population. Second, violent crime reduces the willingness of individuals to
travel to areas within the country that are perceived to be unsafe. The
Government also argues that the presence of guns in schools poses a
substantial threat to the educational process by threatening the learning
environment. A handicapped educational process, in turn, will result in a
less productive citizenry. That, in turn, would have an adverse effect on the
Nation's economic well-being.
281
The Court rejected the Government's reasoning because, if followed to its
fullest extent, it would have allowed the Government to regulate activities that
affect only "individual citizens" and to regulate "any activity. 2 82 This position
particularly concerned the Court because it would permit the exercise of federal
280. Hearing on Proposal 502, supra note 68, at 71.
281. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563-64 (1995) (citations omitted).
282. See id. at 564 ("[U]nder [the] 'costs of crime' reasoning.... Congress could
regulate... all activities that might lead to violent crime, regardless of how tenuously they
relate to interstate commerce. Similarly, under the... 'national productivity' reasoning,
Congress could regulate any activity... related to the economic productivity of individual
citizens .... ") (citations omitted).
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power "even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where
States historically have been sovereign. 283
Education, after all, is economic or commercial in much the same way
litigation is. Students or their families often pay tuition. Much education is
narrowly designed to transmit and develop commercially valuable skills.
Schools employ teachers and large staffs. By any measure, education is big
business. And yet the Court made clear that a federal regulation of school
curriculum would not be deemed a regulation of economic activity for
purposes of Commerce Clause analysis. If the Commerce Clause "does not
include the authority to regulate each and every aspect of local schools,"
nor would it seem to include the authority to regulate each and every aspect
of state court litigation.2 4
In Morrison, the Court rejected Congress's reasoning that gender-
motivated violence deters people from traveling interstate and from doing
business interstate, which thus "'diminish[es] national productivity, increase[es]
medical and other costs, and decreas[es] the supply of and demand for interstate
products.', 285  Following such reasoning, the Court said, "would allow
Congress to regulate any crime as long as the nationwide, aggregated impact of
that crime has substantial effects on employment, production, transit, or
consumption. 2 86 Further, it would permit Congress to invade other areas
traditionally subject to state regulation exclusively.287 The Supreme Court has
made clear that such reasoning-which can only be reached based on a "remote
chain of inferences"-is inconsistent with the concept of dual sovereignty and a
federal government of limited powers.288 It would significantly frustrate the
283. See id. (discussing the implications of the Government's arguments).
284. Berman, supra note 140, at 1505-06 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566).
285. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000) (discussing Congress's
findings supporting its conclusion that gender-motivated violence impacts interstate commerce
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1803, 1853)).
286. Id.
287. See id. at 615-16 ("Petitioners' reasoning, moreover, will not limit Congress to
regulating violence but may, as we suggested in Lopez, be applied equally as well to family law
and other areas of traditional state regulation since the aggregate effect of marriage, divorce, and
childrearing on the national economy is undoubtedly significant."). Professor Mitchell Berman
posits that "Lopez and Morrison establish that when Congress regulates intrastate activities with
the aim or purpose of somehow affecting (as by increasing) interstate commerce, whether such
activities are economic in character and whether the regulation intrudes upon traditional areas of
state sovereignty are considerations of central, perhaps decisive, significance." Berman, supra
note 140, at 1502.
288. See Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 34 (2005) (declaring that the Court has rejected
the argument that Congress can regulate noneconomic activity based exclusively on an
attenuated inferential impact on interstate commerce).
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ability of state courts to determine what rights the state has created and how
they may be vindicated.289
Rule 502(d) raises special issues of constitutional concern and is subject to
increased scrutiny because it represents a direct loss of state control over the
operation of the state courts. An initial draft of Rule 502 that would have
governed privilege for information initially disclosed in a state proceeding
raised concerns that such a rule "would have constituted a substantial limitation
on the authority of state courts to govern their own proceedings. '2 90 Even after
the Evidence Rules Committee revised Rule 502 to limit its application to
information initially disclosed in a federal proceeding, however, it did not
negate all federalism concerns. The Judicial Conference's Federal-State
Jurisdiction Committee did not take a position of support for Rule 502.291
Some members of the Federal-State Jurisdiction Committee remained
concerned that "requiring all states to adhere to a uniform rule based upon the
treatment of disclosures in the course of federal litigation may undermine the
traditional control that state courts have exercised over the application of
waiver rules.,
292
By enacting Rule 502, Congress unilaterally abrogated state law on
privilege issues (at least as regards waiver). This new Federal Rule of Evidence
"deprives state courts of the authority to determine what is privileged and how a
privilege might be waived., 293 The classic justification and reason why we
privilege certain information is that the information springs from a relationship
(for example, the attorney-client, the doctor-patient, or the husband-wife
relationship) that is so highly valued by society that the state determines that we
must do all that we can to foster and protect that relationship-including
maintaining the confidentiality of information that is otherwise relevant and
may be necessary to resolve the truth of a matter in dispute.294 Judge Becker
289. See TiE FEDERALISTNO. 80, at 535 (Alexander Hamilton) (Heritage Press ed., 1973)
(stating that it is a just principle that every government ought to possess the means of executing
its own provisions by its own authority) (emphasis omitted).
290. Draft of Cover Letter to Congress on Proposed Rule 502 at 3 (attachment to MAY
2007 EVIDENCE RULES COMM. REPORT, supra note 95); see also 2006 DRAFT RULES COMM.
MEETING MI[NUTES, supra note 103, at 53 (discussing this same concern).
291. See Draft of Cover Letter to Congress on Proposed Rule 502 at 3 (attachment to MAY
2007 EVIDENCE RULES COMM. REPORT, supra note 95).
292. Id. Some members of the Committee "took the position that state courts should be
free to determine what constitutes a waiver, even when the waiver occurred in an earlier federal
proceeding." Id.
293. Hearing on Proposal 502, supra note 68, at 29 (testimony of Stephen Susman).
294. See 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2285 (3d ed. 1940) (listing the four findamental
conditions that are necessary to establish a privilege against disclosure); see also Upjohn Co. v.
United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (stating that the purpose of the attorney-client privilege
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incorporated and relied on this justification for the privilege when setting forth
the test for determining whether a privilege exists in federal court:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be
disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought
to be sedulouslyfostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the
correct disposal of litigation.
295
Thus, the state makes a value judgment about the proper balance between
ensuring that necessary evidence is available to the finder of fact and protecting
these privileged relationships.296 The state makes a similar value judgment as
to when that balance is disrupted-for example, by disclosure of the
information. Rule 502 displaces states' policy choices because it applies to
prevent the admission of relevant evidence even in those states that have chosen
to find a privilege waiver once the privileged information is disclosed.297
Rule 502(d) also intrudes upon the operation and administration ofjustice
in state courts. In some instances, it will govern the admission of evidence in
actions filed in state court involving only residents of the forum state who
litigate purely state law causes of action.2 98 This is a "traditional governmental
is to "encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby
promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice");
Tramel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980) (deciding that the purpose of the spousal
privilege is to "further[] the important public interest in marital harmony").
295. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 383-84 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing
WIGMORE, supra note 294).
296. Arthur J. Goldberg, The Supreme Court, Congress, and Rules of Evidence, 5 SETON
HALL L. REv. 667, 683-84 (1974) (noting that the rules of privilege do nothing to facilitate the
fact-finding process but are instead designed to protect communications that society deems
vitally important).
297. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995) ("'Our national government
is one of delegated powers alone. Under our federal system the administration of criminal
justice rests with the States except as Congress, acting within the scope of those delegated
powers, has created offenses against the United States"' (quoting Screws v. United States, 325
U.S. 91, 109 (1945) (plurality opinion))).
298. See Baker, supra note 140, at 738 (noting that the Federal Rules of Evidence can be
applied to state court proceedings involving purely state law causes of action).
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function" that is historically considered an aspect of state sovereignty.299 It is
regulation of noneconomic, intrastate activity. It is not, however, regulation
that is necessary to support a larger regulatory scheme adopted by Congress.
C. Tenth Amendment Issues
Even if one assumes that Rule 502(d) is a regulation of commerce, it may
still be unconstitutional if the Tenth Amendment reserves the power to regulate
state court procedures of this type to the States.300 The Tenth Amendment
provides that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people."0'0 The Supreme Court views the Tenth
Amendment as surplusage-simply restating that Congress has only those
powers set forth in the Constitution.
The Tenth Amendment... restrains the power of Congress, but this limit is
not derived from the text of the Tenth Amendment itself, which.., is
essentially a tautology. Instead, the Tenth Amendment confirms that the
power of the Federal Government is subject to limits that may, in a given
instance, reserve power to the States. The Tenth Amendment thus directs
us to determine... whether an incident of state sovereignty is protected by
a limit on an Article I power.
30
2
Thus, if Congress regulates activity pursuant to a grant of power in the
Constitution, it does not impermissibly invade state sovereignty.
30 3
299. Id. at 737 (noting rules of evidence to be applied in state court proceedings involving
state law causes of action are "integral areas of historical state sovereignty").
300. See Bellia, supra note 130, at 964 ("The threshold question is whether a regulation of
court procedures is a regulation of commerce at all. If it is, the next question is whether the
Tenth Amendment reserves the power to regulate state court procedures to the states."); see also
Spencer, supra note 130, at 272 ("Congress's misuse of the Commerce Clause to regulate state
courts directly is a clear violation of the Tenth Amendment.").
301. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
302. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156-57 (1992).
303. See Spencer, supra note 130, at 273 (discussing the Tenth Amendment's limitation on
the federal government's ability to regulate the states); see also supra Part III.B (noting that
Congress sought to enact Rule 502 as a regulation of activity that substantially affects interstate
commerce); infra Part IV (assessing Congress's authority to enact Rule 502(d) pursuant to its
Article III power). As Professor Bellia points out, this issue would be far different if Rule
502(d) applied to actions in state courts only when the underlying cause of action was a federal
question. Bellia, supra note 130, at 959-63. Congress may require state courts to follow
federal procedural rules and federal evidentiary rules where they are "part and parcel" of a
federal right of action or where application of the state rules would impose an unnecessary
burden on a federal right. Id.
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In certain circumstances, Congressional regulation of activity that
substantially affects interstate commerce will nevertheless violate the Tenth
Amendment.30 4 In New York v. United States, °5 and Printz v. United States, °6
the Supreme Court held that Congress lacks power to commandeer state
legislatures and state executive officials to implement federal law.3 °7 It is not
clear whether the Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress from commandeering
state judiciaries.30 8 This Article, however, concludes that Rule 502(d) does not
commandeer the state judiciaries or require the states to enact legislation.30 9 It
only requires them to respect an order of the federal courts.310
Separately, it might be argued that Congress lacks authority to enact Rule
502(d) because it regulates state court procedures. Professor Bellia has argued
"that Congress has no authority to regulate state court procedures in state law
cases because 'procedural law' derives exclusively from state authority. 3 1' But
I do not maintain that Rule 502(d) regulates purely state court procedure.
There is ample support for the position that Rule 502(d) is a law governing
substance because the law of privileges affects substantive state policy. 312 This
304. See New York, 505 U.S. at 160 ("[Tlhe Tenth Amendment limits the power of
Congress to regulate in the way it has chosen.").
305. See id. at 188 (striking down a federal law that required each state to arrange for the
disposal of all radioactive waste produced in that state).
306. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (striking down a federal law
that required local law enforcement officials to conduct background checks on individuals who
sought to purchase a handgun).
307. See New York, 505 U.S. at 178 ("No matter how powerful the federal interest
involved, the Constitution simply does not give Congress the authority to require the States to
regulate."); see also Printz, 521 U.S. at 926 ("'The Federal Government,' we held, 'may not
compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program."' (quoting New York, 505
U.S. at 188)).
308. See Bellia, supra note 130, at 951 ("Federal regulation of the procedures by which
state courts enforce not federal but state rights of action raises distinct constitutional
problems.").
309. See Glynn, supra note 38, at 168 ("[T]he federal privilege neither requires states to
enact legislation nor commandeers state executive officials to assist in the enforcement of
federal law.").
310. See Broun & Capra 2006 Memo, supra note 103, at 240 ("Even without a rule, a
federal court probably has the power to bind state courts with regard to waiver or nonwaiver of
an evidentiary privilege.").
311. Bellia, supra note 130, at 972; see also Jinks v. Richland County, S.C., 538 U.S. 456,
464-65 (2003) (acknowledging the argument that "Congress may not, consistent with the
Constitution, prescribe procedural rules for state courts' adjudication of purely state law claims"
but finding it unnecessary to address that argument because the statute in question was
substantive).
312. See, e.g., IMWINKELRIED, supra note 26, at 45 (noting that the committee that helped
draft the federal rules of evidence classified evidentiary doctrines as substantive in character);
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view is furthered by the fact that Rule 502 was not enacted through the usual
rulemaking process and instead was enacted by an act of Congress.313
IV. Article 11I Power
As suggested above, Congress and the various Judicial Conference
committees acted upon the belief that Congress's authority to enact Rule 502
arises, if at all, pursuant to its Commerce Clause power.314 During the
rulemaking process, however, it was suggested that Congress also may have
power to enact Federal Rule of Evidence 502 pursuant to its Article III power
to ordain and establish the "inferior courts.
3 15
Article III of the Constitution gives Congress power to regulate some
disputes that are based entirely on state law causes of action.316 Where parties
are diverse, and the minimum amount in controversy is met, the action may be
filed directly in federal court or it may be removed to federal court if it is first
filed in state court.317 Congress recently enacted the Class Action Fairness Act
Glynn, supra note 38, at 165 ("The substantive character of privileges is one of the key reasons
why Article V of the Proposed Rules of Evidence failed. .. ."); Mitchell, supra note 257, at 737
("[L]egislation requiring the enforcement of selective waiver agreements would likely create a
'substantive' right independent of the privilege.").
313. See supra Part lI.F (discussing the passage of Rule 502 by the House and Senate); see
also Goldberg, supra note 296, at 682-83 ("The reason rules of privilege are substantive ... is
that they are designed to protect independent substantive interests that the state has regarded as
more significant than the free flow of information. Thus, their intrinsic objective is to protect
communications that the state deems inviolate.").
314. See supra Part II (discussing the legislative history of Rule 502); see also Broun &
Capra 2006 Memo, supra note 103, at 17 (stating that "in order to be binding in both federal and
state courts, the Rule would have to be enacted by Congress using both its powers to legislate in
aid of the federal courts under Article III of the Constitution and its commerce clause powers
under Article I").
315. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Professor Rick Marcus, consultant to the Civil Rules
Committee, suggested that "there might be enough authority for the rule in Congress's power to
regulate federal courts." Broun & Capra 2006 Memo, supra note 103, at 34. But see Hearing
on Proposal 502, supra note 68, at 69-70 (providing testimony of Professor Timothy Glynn that
Congress's Article III power is not, alone, sufficient). Professors Spencer and Bellia have each
written that Congress's authority to regulate the operation of state courts must derive, if at all,
from the Commerce Clause. See Bellia, supra note 130, at 951 (noting that Congress has tried
to justify its regulation of state courts by invoking "its power to regulate commerce"); Spencer,
supra note 130, at 265-73 (discussing the various ways in which Congress oversteps its
authority in regulating the procedures of state courts).
316. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("The judicial power shall extend to all cases ... between
citizens of different States. .. ").
317. See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441 (2006).
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of 2005,318 which gives federal courts jurisdiction over class actions in which
the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000 and any one
member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a state different from any one
defendant. 319 But federal courts have power over these cases because there is
an express grant of such authority in Article III, which provides that federal
judicial power extends to all case in which the parties are citizens of different
states. 320 There is no equivalent grant of authority in Article III or elsewhere in
the Constitution that gives Congress or the federal courts power over state court
resolution of disputes between citizens of the forum state based on state law
causes of action.
One might point to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 321 as another
example of federal legislation that regulates state court litigation. In many
ways, the line of Supreme Court decisions assessing Congress's ability to
impose arbitration on states was an opportunity and invitation for the Supreme
Court to approve Congress's ability to regulate the state court system without
limits, based on its Article III powers. Instead, the Court has determined that
the Act is limited in its reach by the limits on Congress's power under the
Commerce Clause.322
In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co. ,323 the court
rejected an invitation to justify the FAA based on Congress's Article III power
318. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, §§ 2(a)(2), 2(a)(4), 119
Stat. 9 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006)) (finding that abuses of the class action device
have "adversely affected interstate commerce" and undermined "the free flow of
interstate commerce").
319. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2006). The federal court may (and in some cases, must) decline
to exercise its jurisdiction depending upon whether the action involves "matters of national or
interstate interest ... ." Id.
320. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
321. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2006) (making valid and enforceable any written agreements
for arbitration of disputes arising out of contracts, maritime transactions, or interstate
commerce). The Federal Arbitration Act was originally enacted in 1925 and known as the U.S.
Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925).
322. See Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 522 56 (2003) ("We have interpreted the
term 'involving commerce' in the [Federal Arbitration Act] as the function equivalent of the
more familiar term 'affecting commerce'-words of art that ordinarily signal the broadest
permissible exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause power."); see also Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11 (1983) ("The Federal Arbitration Act rests on the authority of Congress
to enact substantive rules under the Commerce Clause."); id. at 28 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
("Plainly, a power derived from Congress' Art. III control over federal-court jurisdiction would
not by any flight of fancy permit Congress to control proceedings in state courts.").
323. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 405 (1967)
(declining, implicitly, to base the FAA on Congress's Article III power by basing it instead on
Congress's power to regulate commerce).
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over federal courts124 and instead held that: "[I]t is clear beyond dispute that
the federal arbitration statute is based upon and confined to the incontestable
foundations of 'control over interstate commerce and over admiralty.9' 3 25 It
reached this conclusion despite the fact that there is significant legislative
history to indicate that Congress enacted the FAA pursuant to its Article HI
power over federal courts not pursuant to its power under the Commerce
Clause.326
The Supreme Court's 2003 decision in Jinks v. Richland County
327
provides the strongest support for the position that Congress has the power to
enact Rule 502 pursuant to its Article III power, supported by its Article I
power to enact laws that are "necessary and proper for carrying into Execution"
its Article III power. In Jinks, the Supreme Court held that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(d)-which requires that state courts toll the state statute of limitation on
a state law claim that is in federal court based on supplemental jurisdiction
while the supplemental claim is pending in federal court and for 30 days
afterward-is constitutional. 328  The plaintiff filed a federal-court action
claiming that defendant Richland County and two of its employees violated 42
U.S.C. § 1983 in connection with her husband's death. 329 The plaintiff also
alleged supplemental state law claims for wrongful death and survival.330 The
324. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 271-72 (1995)
(describing the Court's reasoning for justifying the FAA on Congress's Article III power instead
of its power over interstate commerce); see also Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 14 ("Congress
would need to call on the Commerce Clause if it intended the [FAA] to apply in state courts.
Yet at the same time, its reach would be limited to transactions involving interstate
commerce.").
325. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 405 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924); S. REP. No.
68-536, at 3 (1924)); see also Benrhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 200-02
(1956) (finding that the FAA did not apply to a contract between New York residents performed
in Vermont because it was not a "transaction involving commerce" and because "Congress does
not have the constitutional authority to make the law that is applicable to controversies in
diversity of citizenship cases").
326. See Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 21-36 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
FAA was enacted pursuant to Congress's Article III powers and therefore was procedural; thus
it could not be applied to the states); see also David H. Taylor & Sarah M. Cliffe, Civil
Procedure by Contract: A Convoluted Confluence ofPrivate Contract andPublic Procedure in
Need of Congressional Control, 35 RjCHMvOND L. REv. 1085, 1140-47 (2002) (analyzing the
legislative history of the FAA and concluding that Congress intended the FAA to rely on Article
III power).
327. See Jinks v. Richland County, 538 U.S. 456, 465 (2003) (upholding 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(d) as constitutional).
328. Id.
329. Id. at 460.
330. Id.
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District Court granted defendants' summary judgment motion on the § 1983
claim and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law
claims.331 Plaintiff then filed the state-law claims in state court and won an
$80,000 judgment on the wrongful-death claim.332 The South Carolina
Supreme Court reversed, finding the state-law claims time barred.333 Although
they would not have been barred under § 1367(d)'s tolling rule, the court held
§ 1367(d) unconstitutional as applied to claims brought in state court against a
state's political subdivisions.
334
The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed and held that "§ 1367(d) is necessary
and proper for carrying into execution Congress's power '[t]o constitute
Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court,' U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 9, and to
assure that those tribunals may fairly and efficiently exercise '[t]he judicial
Power of the United States,' Art. III, § 1.035 The Court found that § 1367(d)'s
tolling provision was "conducive to the administration of justice" in federal
courts (and therefore a proper exercise of Congress's Article III power) because
it "unquestionably promotes the fair and efficient operation of the federal
courts.
3 3 6 The Court reaffirmed its position that such a law was "necessary"
even though "the federal courts can assuredly exist and function in the absence
of § 1367(d) .... , The Necessary and Proper Clause does not require that
an act of Congress be "'absolutely necessary' to the exercise of an enumerated
power. 0 38 It is enough that the act of Congress is "'conducive to the due
administration of justice' in federal court, and is 'plainly adapted' to that
end.
3 39
Rule 502 may be a permissible exercise of Congress's Article Ill power to
establish and ordain the lower federal courts. Rule 502 promotes the fair and
efficient operation of the federal courts by allowing parties to produce





335. Id. at 462.
336. Id. at 462-63. The Court further rejected the argument that § 1367(d) was improper
regulation by Congress of state court "procedure" and that "Congress may not, consistent with
the Constitution, prescribe procedural rules for state courts' adjudication of purely state-law
claims." Id. at 464-65. The Court found that the tolling of the statute of limitation was
"substantive." Id.
337. Id. at 462-63.
338. Id. (quoting M'Culloch v. State, 17 U.S. 316, 414-15 (1819)).
339. Id. (quoting M'Culloch v. State, 17 U.S. 316, 417 (1819)).
340. As discussed in Part VI, infra, Congress's assumptions are questionable.
FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 502
assumptions are correct, Rule 502(d) will reduce or eliminate the cost and
burden of reviewing those documents for privilege. Like the tolling of the
statute of limitation at issue in Jinks, federal courts could exist and function
even if a Rule 502(d) order did not bind parties and courts in state court
actions. The Rule would, however, be significantly less effective. Disclosure
in a federal action would not waive the privilege in that action, but the Rule
502(d) order would not protect against waiver of privilege or work product
protection in parallel or follow on actions in state court.34 1 Thus, Rule 502 is
arguably conducive to the administration of justice in state courts and plainly
adapted to that end.
On the other hand, Rule 502(d) is distinguishable because 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(d) affects only the parties to an action that is dismissed from a federal
court whereas a Rule 502(d) order purportedly binds nonparties and state courts
who may have no knowledge of the federal court action in which the order was
entered. Thus, § 1367(d) is necessary to the federal courts' management and
control of the parties that are before the federal court. As discussed in Part V,
Rule 502(d) is necessary to the federal courts' management and control of
nonparties and state courts.
In addition, Rule 502(d) is distinguishable because Rule 502(d) frustrates
the intent and goal of state law of privilege whereas § 1367(d) supports the
intent and goal of state law on statutes of limitations. When a federal court
issues a Rule 502(d) order, it contradicts and overrides state law on privilege:
The case will be handled differently and the disclosure of privileged
information will result in a different outcome than if the case had been litigated
in state court. When a federal court exercises its discretion to decline
jurisdiction over state law claims, pursuant to § 1367 by contrast, the court is
acting consistent with state law on statutes of limitation. The state law claims
could have been filed in state court, but instead were brought in federal court
within the period of limitation. The federal court offered a surrogate forum. If
the state law claims proceed, the federal court will handle them and the result is
supposed to be the same as if the case had been filed in state court. When the
federal court exercises discretion to dismiss the state law claims, § 1367(d)
provides a thirty day grace period so the plaintiff can refile the claims in state
court and they are treated the same as if they had first been filed in state court.
If Article III ultimately provides a constitutional source of power for the
enactment of Rule 502(d), then there will be few, if any, limitations on
Congress's power to control state courts. Any litigation difference (substantive
or procedural) between the federal practice and a state practice will justify
341. SEPTEMBER 2007 RULES COMMIITEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 34.
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Congress acting to normalize the procedure in favor of the federal practice.
This interpretation of Article III goes far beyond a simple extension of
Congress's power to ordain and establish the federal courts, but it is arguably
consistent with Jinks.
V. Due Process Issues
Entry of a Rule 502(d) order raises a significant question whether it
violates the Due Process rights of persons and entities who are not parties to the
federal court litigation because the rule purports to make an order of a federal
court binding on all persons and entities in all federal or state proceedings,
whether or not they were parties to the litigation and regardless of whether the
nonparties are subject to the jurisdiction of the issuing court.342 The Fifth
Amendment provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law.343 "For more than a century the central
meaning of procedural due process has been clear: 'Parties whose rights are to
be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right
they must first be notified.' 
34
In enacting Rule 502, Congress assumed that a nonwaiver agreement that
is entered as an order of the federal court is binding against persons and entities
(including state courts) not party to the original federal court action.3 45 This
assumption is contrary to the well-established rule that an order is ordinarily
342. See FED. R. EvID. 502(d) ("[T]he disclosure is also not a waiver in any other federal or
state proceeding."); see also id. advisory committee's note ("The rule provides that when a
confidentiality order governing the consequences of disclosure in that case is entered in a
federal proceeding, its terms are enforceable against non-parties in any federal or state
proceeding."); JUNE 11-12 RULES COMMITTEE MINUTES, supra note 10, at 44 (recording the
statement of Professor Daniel Capra, Reporter for the Evidence Rules Committee, that "a federal
court's order holding that a privilege or protection has not been waived in the litigation before it
will be binding on all persons and entities in all other proceedings-federal or state-whether or
not they were parties to the federal litigation"). Rule 502(d) originally stated explicitly that such
an "order binds all persons and entities in all federal or state proceedings, whether or not they
were parties to the litigation." MAY 2007 EVIDENCE RULES COMM. REPORT, supra note 95, at 10.
The rule was revised to its present form, presumably to reflect changes suggested to the
language by the Style Subcommittee. JUNE 11-12 RULES COMM1TrEE MINUTES, supra note 10,
at 43.
343. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
344. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (quoting Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1
Wall.) 223, 233 (1863)).
345. FED. R. EvID. 502 advisory committee's note (stating that a confidentiality order
governing the consequences of disclosure made in a federal proceeding is "enforceable against
non-parties in any federal or state proceeding").
736
FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 502
only binding on parties to the litigation. 3 Judge Learned Hand wrote for
the Second Circuit more than seventy-five years ago that "no court can make
a decree which will bind any one but a party .... ," 7 The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure embody this principle that a court order does not bind other
courts unless it is made enforceable against them by the same process
required to enforce an order against a party.348 For example, a temporary
restraining order (TRO) may be issued against a party and its officers, agents,
servants, employees, attorney and other nonparties "who are in active concert
or participation with [the party]. 3 49 The TRO may be issued without notice
if circumstances dictate, but it is: (a) temporary, (b) effective only after the
moving party posts sufficient security to compensate by one who is
wrongfully enjoined, and (c) binds only those nonparties "who receive actual
notice of it by personal service or otherwise .... 050
In Baker v. General Motors,351 the Supreme Court held that a Michigan
state court could not enjoin a witness in a Michigan proceeding (who
happened to be a former General Motors employee) from testifying in a
separate action against General Motors that was pending in Missouri state
court.352 The Court stated that the injunction entered in the Michigan case
"cannot determine evidentiary issues in a lawsuit brought by parties who
346. See Mitchell v. Exide Techs., No. 04-2303-GTV-DJW, 2004 WL 2823230, at *1 (D.
Kan. Dec. 8, 2004) (refusing to enter stipulated protective order and noting that "the parties are
reminded that orders of a court are binding on parties to the pending cause and cannot bind non-
parties; thus, any provision within a proposed protective order stating otherwise is inaccurate");
Navajo Nation v. Peabody Holding Co., 209 F. Supp. 2d 269,280-88 (D.D.C. 2002) (waiving
attorney work product protection where documents were disclosed to adversaries in prior
litigation notwithstanding that such documents were subject to a confidentiality and protective
order in prior litigation that provided that the production of documents would not constitute a
waiver of any privilege or protection); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Guide Corp., 206 F.R.D. 249,
250 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (refusing to enter parties' stipulated protective order that purported to
protect against waiver of privilege because parties could not bind third parties nor restrict their
ability to challenge the terms of the order); see also CIVIL RuLEs ADVISORY COMMITrEE FALL
1999 MEETING AGENDA MATERIALS, appearing in 2003 Marcus Memo, supra note 66, at 42-43
("The law is presently murky on whether such agreements do the job, and whether a court order
makes a difference in effectuating such agreements.").
347. Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832, 832 (2d Cir. 1930).
348. See FED. R. Civ. P. 71 ("When an order... may be enforced against a nonparty, the
procedure for enforcing the order is the same as for a party.").
349. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2)(c).
350. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2).
351. See Baker v. Gen. Motors, 522 U.S. 222,240 (1998) ("Michigan has no authority to
shield a witness from another jurisdiction's subpoena power in a case involving persons and
causes outside Michigan's governance.").
352. Id. at 240-41.
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were not subject to the jurisdiction of the Michigan court." '353 The Court
stated that "[m]ost essentially, Michigan lacks authority to control courts
elsewhere by precluding them, in actions brought by strangers to the
Michigan litigation, from determining for themselves what witnesses are
competent to testify and what evidence is relevant and admissible in their
search for truth.
3 54
Rule 502's impact on third parties, and the question whether an order
can bind such persons, is certain to arise. 355 A Rule 502(d) order will have
the result of obfuscating the truth finding process (if enforceable) in other
litigation conducted by other parties in state courts because it will prevent
them from having access to relevant-and, in some cases, crucial-evidence
that has been voluntarily (and even intentionally) disclosed in a prior
proceeding.356 The new rule raises the question whether the court must hold
a hearing before issuing a 502(d) order. If the order is to be binding against
the whole world, must the court give notice to the whole world? If there are
interested identifiable nonparties (for example, litigants in a parallel state
court action), must the court give them notice and an opportunity to object?
Nonparties have standing to intervene in an existing litigation to seek
modification or dissolution of a protective order so that they may obtain
353. Id. at 239; see id. at 235 ("Orders commanding action or inaction have been denied
enforcement in a sister State when they purported to accomplish an official act within the
exclusive province of that other State or interfered with litigation over which the ordering State
had no authority."). The Baker case involved the effect of a state court injunction on a sister
state's court rather than the effect on a state court of a Rule 502(d) order issued by a federal
court. In the Baker case, however, the Michigan court's decree was a permanent injunction that
was entered as part of the judgment in the action. Id. at 226. Rule 502(d) contemplates the
simple entry of an order that does not necessarily become part of ajudgment. See FED. R. EVID.
502(d) (pertaining simply to a federal court order).
354. Baker, 522 U.S. at 238.
355. District Court Judge Paul Grimm testified before the Evidence Rules Committee that
there are numerous classes of litigation in federal court that "involve the potential for parallel or
subsequent state litigation, they would include employment discrimination, other
nonemployment-related discrimination cases, toxic tort and mass tort litigation, class action
litigation, products liability litigation, commercial litigation, and intellectual property litigation."
Hearing on Proposal 502, supra note 68, at 11. He also testified that discovery targeting the
disclosures made in the federal proceedings is imminent:
I have not seen yet, but know it's coming, the interrogatory or document production
request [to] identify [sic] all records previously disclosed in any other litigation
involving the subject matter of this dispute that were produced in accordance with a
non-waiver agreement, and for each such case identify the caption and the court in
which pending. That is coming.
Id. at 11-12.
356. See id. at 47-53 (testimony of David Stellings).
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access to information disclosed in that proceeding.357 Even if the 502(d)
order is entered and the federal action reaches judgment or is dismissed, a
nonparty may seek to modify or dissolve the protective order.358
A Rule 502(d) order that is good against all of the world goes far beyond
the scope of an agreement or order that binds only the parties to the federal
proceeding. And its effects go far beyond as well. Then federal Magistrate
Judge Ronald J. Hedges asked why it should matter that the court has blessed
what is essentially a private agreement:
What protection should an order give to parties vis-6-vis third-parties as
opposed to between themselves? Presumably, the only reason for parties to
secure a case management order which incorporates a quick peek or claw
back agreement is to secure a judicial imprimatur to that agreement.
Should a "so ordered" to an otherwise private agreement insulate parties
from claims of waiver by third parties who never consented to that
agreement, most likely never knew of the agreement beforehand, and did
not have an opportunity to challenge the entry of the order?
359
One response to this problem is that the right to due process only arises
when there is a property (or liberty) interest at stake, and here there may not be
a cognizable property interest in the (as yet) undisclosed evidence. 360 The
357. See 6 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.106[2] (3d ed. 2008) ("The
correct procedure for a nonparty to challenge a protective order is a motion to intervene in the
action in which the protective order was issued."). A Rule 502(d) order is a form of protective
order. See FED. R. EvlD 502 advisory committee's note ("Under [Rule 502(d)], a confidentiality
order is enforceable whether or not it memorializes an agreement among the parties to the
litigation.").
358. See 6 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.106[ 1] (3d ed. 2008) ("As
long as a protective order remains in effect, the court that entered the order retains the power to
modify it, even if the underlying suit has been dismissed.").
359. Ronald J. Hedges, A View From the Bench and Trenches: A Critical Appraisal of
Some Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 227 F.R.D. 123, 134
(2005). Other commentators have observed:
But the stipulation or order approach is inconsistent with classical waiver doctrine,
which holds that any disclosure to an outsider destroys the attomey-client privilege.
The fact that the parties have agreed in advance that disclosure should not have that
effect, with or without the court's blessing, has no bearing on that conclusion.
Even if such an agreement estops the recipient of the material from claiming
waiver, it would have no effect on a nonparty's right to claim the disclosure
established waiver. Yet the courts choose to disregard this theoretical glitch,
presumably because the concrete reality of protracted discovery is more immediate
than the abstract operation of classical waiver doctrine.
Richard L. Marcus, The Perils of Privilege: Waiver and the Litigator, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1605,
1612 (1986).
360. Reaching the constitutional issue of due process still ignores the conflict between Rule
502(d) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 71, which states "[w]hen an order grants relief for a
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Supreme Court has held that a property interest in a benefit is protected by due
process only if one has a "legitimate claim of entitlement to it."36' What
constitutes a cognizable property interest is neither defined by the Constitution
nor created by the Constitution.362 Instead, it is created and defined by
"existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as
state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support
claims of entitlement to those benefits."
363
State law sets out certain causes of action. A state law cause of action is a
cognizable property right that is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause.3 4 Most (maybe all) states provide that litigants have a right to
discovery and that the scope of discovery includes relevant, nonprivileged
information. 365 The Supreme Court has stated that a litigant has a right to
evidence that is material to the litigant's case, absent a valid exception such as a
claim of privilege.366
In California, the attorney-client privilege does not cover information that
has been disclosed to a third person.367 Even where information is privileged,
the privilege is waived if the holder of the privilege discloses, or consents to
nonparty or may be enforced against a nonparty, the procedure for enforcing the order is the
same as for a party." FED. R. Civ. P. 71.
361. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
362. See id. ("Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution.").
363. Id.; see Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422,430 (1982) ("The hallmark of
property, the Court has emphasized, is an individual entitlement grounded in state law, which
cannot be removed except 'for cause."').
364. See Logan, 455 U.S. at 428-29 (noting that the issue was "affirmatively settled by the
Mullane case itself, where the Court held that a cause of action is a species of property protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause"); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (recognizing implicitly that a cause of action is a type of
property).
365. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2017.010 (West 2008) (describing the persons that
are entitled to discovery and the matters that are discoverable). The statute reads:
Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with this title, any
party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to
the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any
motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
Id.
366. See Exparte Uppercu, 239 U.S. 435,439-40 (1915) (describing the litigant's right to
discovery); id. at 440 ("The necessities of litigation and the requirements ofjustice found a new
right of a wholly different kind. So long as the object physically exists, anyone needing it as
evidence at a trial has a right to call for it, unless some exception is shown to the general rule.").
367. See CAL. EviD. CODE § 952 (West 2008) (noting that the attomey-client privilege only
covers information disclosed to a third party when that third party is reasonably necessary for
the information to occur between the attorney and the client).
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disclosure of, a significant part of the communication. 368 Waiver occurs even
where the recipient of the privileged information agrees to keep the information
confidential. 369 Thus, a disclosure made in a federal proceeding prior to entry
of a Rule 502(d) waives the privilege under California state law. If the federal
court subsequently entered a Rule 502(d) order, that order would prevent a
California state court litigant from obtaining relevant, nonprivileged
information to which the litigant has a right. This restriction would violate the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause unless the state court litigant
received appropriate notice and opportunity to be heard, or other process to
challenge the court order.
Professor Glynn suggested that this problem could be avoided altogether
by revising Rule 502 to eliminate the need for an order and to provide that
disclosure of privileged information "does not constitute a waiver. That is a
legal proposition. 3 70 Congress did not, however, act on this suggestion. Rule
502 is not a generally applicable rule that in all cases protects the parties against
waiver of the privilege for documents produced in discovery. If it were, this
would be the equivalent of the court simply applying the law to a factual
situation (there was a disclosure) and reaching a result dictated by federal law
(there has been no waiver). Instead, the federal court has discretion to enter a
502(d) order.37' Once the court enters a Rule 502(d) order, does it become
established law that there can be no finding of waiver? Consider the state
court's perspective. It must decide what effect, if any, to give to an order of
another court. This is akin to the effect given a protective order entered in one
court by a court in a subsequent (or simultaneous) proceeding.3 7 2 "[C]ourts
asked to modify another court's protective order are constrained by principles
of comity, courtesy, and, when a court is asked to take action with regard to a
368. See CAL. Evit. CODE § 912(a) (describing how privilege can be waived through
disclosure). "Consent to disclosure is manifested by any statement or other conduct of the
holder of the privilege indicating consent to the disclosure, including failure to claim the
privilege in any proceeding in which the holder has the legal standing and opportunity to claim
the privilege." Id. The protection for attorney work product also is waived where the interest is
disclosed to an adversary. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Super. Ct., 990 P.2d 591, 599-600
(Cal. 2000) (observing that while the documents disclosed to the adversary are waived, that
waiver does not extend to nondisclosed documents).
369. See Mckesson HBOC, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 115 Cal. App. 4th 1229, 1235-38 (2004)
(waiving the privilege where the recipient both pledged confidentiality and shared a common
purpose with the recipient).
370. Hearing on Proposal 502, supra note 68, at 68 (testimony of Professor Timothy
Glynn).
371. See infra Part VI.C.
372. Broun & Capra 2006 Memo, supra note 103, at 17-18; see also supra notes 351-54
and accompanying text.
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previously issued state court protective order, federalism. . ... ,37 But if the
State court chooses to ignore the federal court's order, may it do so? What if
the state court violates the 502(d) order unwittingly (after all, it had no notice of
the order)? Is the state court in contempt of the federal court order? What if
the federal action has concluded? Does the federal court's order last in
perpetuity? Does the federal court retain jurisdiction over the dispute and
parties even after it has become final?
VI Unresolved Issues ofApplication
Application of Rule 502 in practice raises a number of significant
questions and specific problems that are not resolved by the existing language
of the Rule or reference to the Advisory Committee Notes, the rulemaking
history, or the legislative history surrounding the Rule. Primary among those
issues is the extent to which Rule 502 preempts state rules of professional
responsibility that govern the obligations of the Producing Party's attorney to
review a client's documents and protect client confidences and the obligations
of the Receiving Party's attorney who receives privileged or protected
documents produced pursuant to a 502(d) order.
A. Preemption of State Law of Privilege and Professional Responsibility
Application of Rule 502(d) will require courts to determine the scope of
preemption of two areas of law that are traditionally subject to state regulation:
The law of privilege and the regulation of attorney conduct through rules of
professional responsibility.374 The supreme courts of each state have inherent
power to regulate the practice of law in that State. 375 Likewise, state law of
373. 6 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.106[1] note 5.2 (3d
ed. 2008) (citing Tucker v. Ohtsu Tire & Rubber Co., 191 F.R.D. 495, 501 (D. Md. 2000)).
374. State law of privilege governs actions brought in state court. In actions brought in
federal court in which the federal court sits in diversity jurisdiction, the federal court applies
substantive state law including state law of privilege. FED. R. EVlD. 501.
375. See Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 789-90 (1975) (noting that Virginia
authorized its highest court to regulate the practice of law); see also Saier v. State Bar of Mich.,
293 F.2d 756, 759-60 (6th Cir. 1961) (observing that the regulation of the practice of law is a
state matter). State courts and federal courts have autonomous control over the lawyers
practicing before them. See Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957) ("The two
judicial systems of courts, the state judicatures and the federal judiciary, have autonomous
control over the conduct of their officers, among whom, in the present context, lawyers are
included."). There is no generally applicable federal bar examination and there are no generally
applicable federal rules of professional conduct.
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privilege governs actions brought in state court. Even where an action is
brought in federal court based on diversity jurisdiction, the federal court applies
state substantive law, including state law of privilege.376 Thus, there is likely a
presumption that the state rules of privilege and professional responsibility are
not preempted by Rule 502 unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.377 This presumption against preemption may be heightened because
the effect of Rule 502 is to increase and bolster the protection afforded to
privileged information, thus impairing the parties' ability to discover and utilize
relevant evidence in the search for truth.378 As detailed below, however, Rule
502(d) will be ineffective in reducing the costs of document review in
numerous instances if it does not preempt state law of privilege and
professional responsibility.
379
1. The Professional Responsibility Obligations of the Producing Party's
Attorney
Rule 502 is intended to relieve attorneys of the burden of reviewing
documents for privileged or work product protected information and thereby
save clients the expense of paying for such review.380 In order to be effective,
however, Rule 502 must preempt state rules of professional responsibility that
impose duties on lawyers to zealously protect their clients' confidential
information and to conduct this review before turning over the client's
documents to a litigation adversary during discovery.
In general, an attorney may not disclose a client's confidential
information-including but not limited to attorney-client privileged
information-absent the client's informed consent. 381 This duty to protect the
376. FED. R. Evm. 501.
377. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 18 (1983) (Stephens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("The exercise of State authority in a field traditionally occupied by
State law will not be deemed preempted by a federal statute unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress.") (citing Ray v. At. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978)).
378. See Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 144-45 (2003) ("We have often
recognized that statutes establishing evidentiary privileges must be construed narrowly because
privileges impede the search for the truth.") (citing Baldridge v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345, 360
(1982)).
379. In addition, a diligent attorney will continue to review documents to ensure that only
those documents within the scope of discovery are produced. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
380. See S. REP. No. 110-264, at 1-2 (2008) ("[T]hough most documents produced during
discovery have little value, lawyers must nevertheless conduct exhaustive reviews to prevent the
inadvertent disclosure of privileged material.").
381. See ABA MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2006) ("A lawyer shall not reveal
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client's confidential information "involves public policies of paramount
importance 3 82 and is "fundamental to our legal system." 383 In California, for
example, it is an attorney's duty "[t]o maintain inviolate the confidence, and at
every peril to himself or herself to preserve the secrets, of his or her client. 
"384
information relating to the representation of the client unless the client gives informed consent,
[or] the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation.. . ."); id.
cmt. 16 (providing that a lawyer "must act competently to safeguard information relating to the
representation of a client against inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure by the lawyer or other
persons who are participating in the representation of the client .... "); id. cmt. 3 ("The
confidentiality rule, for example, applies not only to matters communicated in confidence by the
client but also to all information relating to the representation, whatever its source. A lawyer
may not disclose such information except as authorized or required by the Rules of Professional
Conduct or other law."); ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1.6(a) (2006) (stating that unless
otherwise permitted or required, "a lawyer shall not, during or after termination of the
professional relationship with the client, use or reveal a confidence or secret of the client known
to the lawyer unless the client consents after disclosure"); N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY
EC 4-4 (2002) ("The attorney-client privilege is more limited than the ethical obligation of a
lawyer to guard the confidences and secrets of the client. This ethical precept, unlike the
evidentiary privilege, exists without regard to the nature or source of information or the fact that
others share the knowledge."); N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 ("[A] lawyer
shall not knowingly: Reveal a confidence or secret of a client .....
382. In re Jordan, 526 P.2d 523, 526 (Cal. 1974).
383. People ex rel. Dep't of Corps. v. SpeeDee Oil Change Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 371, 378
(Cal. 1999); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. [2] (2006) (noting that the
duty to preserve confidential information is a "fundamental principle in the client-lawyer
relationship"); N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 ("Both the fiduciary relationship
existing between lawyer and client and the proper functioning of the legal system require the
preservation by the lawyer of confidences and secrets of one who has employed or sought to
employ the lawyer.").
384. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e)(1) (West 2008). In New York, the duty of
confidentiality is described as the "most important rule" of professional conduct and the
"cornerstone for the majority of other disciplinary rules." 29 CONNORS, PRACTICE
COMMENTARIES, McKINNEY'S CONS. LAWS OF N.Y., DR 4-101 (quoted in Helie v. McDermott,
Will & Emery, 852 N.Y.S.2d 701,707 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007)). "A number ofjurisdictions have
concluded that the attorney for the Producing Party must act competently to avoid revealing a
client's Confidential Information .... This requires a [Producing Party's attorney] to use
reasonable care to ensure that metadata that contain Confidential Information are not disclosed
to a third party." Colo. Bar Ass'n, Ethics Comm., Formal Ethics Op. 119 (2008); see also D.C.
Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 341 (2007) ("The Sending Lawyer... [must] tak[e] care to
avoid providing electronic documents that inadvertently contain accessible information that is
either a confidence or a secret and to employ reasonably available technical means to remove
such metadata before sending the document."); Md. State Bar Ass'n, Formal Ethics Op. 2007-09
(2007) ("[T]he sending attorney has an ethical obligation to take reasonable measures to avoid
the disclosure of confidential or work product materials imbedded in the electronic discovery.");
State Bar of Ariz., Ethics Op. 07-03 (2007) (same); Ala. State Bar, Office of General Counsel,
Ethics Op. RO-2007-02 (2007) (same); Fla. Bar, Ethics Op. 06-2 (2006) (same); N.Y. State Bar
Ass'n, Comm. on Prof I Ethics, Ethics Op. 782 (2004) (same).
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Violation of this duty constitutes cause for disbarment or suspension of the
attorney's license to practice.38 5 It also may give rise to civil liability for legal
malpractice, breach of confidence or other similar tort.386 Unless, of course,
Rule 502(d) preempts state law in each of these areas.
In a case that is covered by Rule 502, the federal court would order, for
example, that defendant's production of attomey-client privileged information
and work product protected information waives neither the privilege nor the
protection for such information. But the attorney for the Producing Party
would still be obligated to review all of the documents prior to disclosing them
to ensure that the disclosure would not reveal the client's confidences and
secrets.38 7 As an alternative to conducting this extensive privilege review, the
attorney could seek the client's informed consent to disclosure of such
information.388 Informed consent, however, requires the attorney to fully and
effectively explain to the client the risks and consequences of disclosing
privileged and protected information.389 What is disclosed cannot be unlearned
385. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6103 (West 2008) (providing that any willful violation
of a court order related to ethical duties can result in disbarment or suspension).
386. See, e.g., Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp., No. 96-T-5582, 1998 WL 156997, at *4
(Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 27, 1998) (recognizing breach of confidence action by a patient against his
treating physician); McCormick v. England, 494 S.E.2d 431, 435-37 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997)
(gathering cases from jurisdictions recognizing a cause of action for breach of confidence).
California also recognizes the tort of breach of confidence. See Tele-count Eng'rs, Inc. v. Pac.
Tel. & Telegr. Co., 214 Cal. Rptr. 276, 279 (Ct. App. 1985) (describing the plaintiff's burden
necessary to recover for breach of confidence). The tort is not limited to physicians but instead
applies whenever "'an idea, whether or not protectable, is offered to another in confidence, and
is voluntarily received by the offeree in confidence with the understanding that it is not to be
disclosed to others, and it is not to be used by the offeree for purposes beyond the limits of the
confidence without the offeror's permission."' Id. at 279 (quoting
Faris v. Enberg, 158 Cal. Rptr. 704, 712 (Ct. App. 1979)).
387. See Kindall C. James, Comment, Electronic Discovery: Substantially Increasing the
Risk of Inadvertent Disclosure and the Costs of Privilege Review-Do the Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Help?, 52 LOYOLA L. REv. 839, 860-61
(2006) (addressing 2006 e-discovery amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
noting that inadvertent disclosure of privileged information is a violation of ethical obligations
to the client).
388. See, e.g., CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-100(A) (2008), available at http://
www.calbar.ca.gov/state/calbargeneric.jsp?cid = 101 58&id=3422 ("A member shall not reveal
information protected from disclosure by Business and Professions Code section 6068,
subdivision (e)(1) without the informed consent of the client .... ").
389. See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2008) ("A lawyer shall not
reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed
consent .... "); ABA. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(e) ("'Informed consent' denotes
the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated
adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available
alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.").
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by an adverse party, even if it cannot be used as formal evidence in that
proceeding.
Rule 502 does not address what happens when one party refuses to
provide informed consent, despite the entry of a Rule 502(d) order. Can that
party refuse to waive its right (duty?) to conduct a full review of the documents
prior to turning them over in discovery? Assume that the parties do not reach
agreement on the need for a Rule 502(d) order-one party wants the court to
enter an order, the other party wants to conduct a full document-by-document
review for privilege-but the court nevertheless enters a 502(d) order. 390 The
court also orders that production of documents occur on a very rapid
schedule-such that it is physically impossible for the Producing Party to both
conduct a full privilege review and also comply with the court's ordered
deadline.39' If a party wants to conduct a complete privilege review, is that a
legitimate excuse for not complying with the court's order? 392 May parties be
"compelled to surrender the right to conduct privilege reviews on realistic
schedules so that a case management order can provide expedited and
inexpensive review"? 393 Does the court's order require the attorney to violate
the state rules of professional responsibility despite the client's objection?
Does the court's order preempt the state rules of professional responsibility? If
390. The proposed rule was modified to specify that enforceability of federal court
confidentiality orders is not dependent upon agreement of the parties. MAY 2007 EVIDENCE
RULES COMM. REPORT, supra note 95, at 15; cf MAY 2006 EVIDENCE RULES COMM. REPORT,
supra note 97, at 3 (failing to discuss a requirement that the parties agree to a confidentiality
agreement before a Rule 502(d) order becomes effective). In fact, Rule 502(d) was "designed to
enable a court to enter an order, whether on motion of one or more parties or on its own
motion.... ." 154 CONG. REc. H7819 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2008).
391. See CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE FALL 1999 MEETING AGENDA MATERIALS,
appearing in 2003 Marcus Memo, supra note 66, at 41 ("[I]t would seem odd for the court to be
able to tell an unwilling party that it could not do as thorough a review as it wanted to do
because the court was in a hurry. So the consent of both is required under the proposal.");
Hearing on Evidence, Judicial Conference of the United States Advisory Committee on
Evidence Rules 9 (Jan. 12, 2007) (testimony of Thomas Y Allman, Partner, Mayer, Brown,
Rowe & Maw, L.L.P.), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/EV_HearingTranscript
01 1207.pdf ("I am terribly worried about the temptation of a busy judge to force an accelerated-
privilege review on parties who haven't agreed to do it that way. I don't want 'quick peek' to
be mandatory in all federal cases .... ).
392. See Hearing on Proposal 502, supra note 68, at 77 (testimony of Professor Richard
Marcus) (stating that corporate counsel had repeatedly voiced concern that "federal judges who
were in a hurry would insist that [corporation parties] produce material on a schedule that would
not permit the review that they felt was necessary before production" and that [it was]
"extremely urgent to those lawyers that a rule provide that a judge can do this only upon
agreement of the parties").
393. MAY 2007 EVIDENCE RULES COMM. REPORT, supra note 95, at 18 (summary of
testimony of Thomas Y. Allman).
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the Producing Party would otherwise be entitled to recover the fees and costs of
such a review, can the judge deny or refuse to shift the costs of doing such a
privilege review?
Even if one assumes that Rule 502(d) preempts state rules of professional
responsibility that require an attorney to protect a client's attorney client
privileged and work product protected information, the new rule pointedly does
not protect the Producing Party from the risks of disclosing several other types
of information. First, Rule 502(d) does not protect against waiver of any other
recognized privilege such as the doctor-patient privilege, the spousal privilege
and the clergy privilege. Second, Rule 502(d) does not protect against the risks
of disclosing a client's nonprivileged (and even nonresponsive, irrelevant)
information that is nevertheless very damaging.
By choosing to protect only the attorney-client privilege, courts should
conclude that Congress has now set up a hierarchy for privileges and has
determined that the attorney-client relationship is more important than these
other privileged relationships--even if the states consider all of these
relationships to be deserving of an equivalent amount of protection. Likewise,
Rule 502 protects against waiver of the attorney work product protection,394 but
does not protect against waiver of protection for any other protected category of
confidential information such as trade secrets or private personal and financial
information.395 Courts, therefore, should conclude that Congress intentionally
chose to respect existing law on waiver of these other less-favored privileges
and protections.
In addition to upsetting the value judgments made by the states regarding
these categories of privileged and protected information, Rule 502 will not
protect attorneys and their clients against liability and negative consequences
from disclosure of such information. 396 Nor will it protect attorneys from the
wrath of their clients and the other negative consequences of disclosing
damning evidence in the case at hand.397 Congress has left attorneys in a
position where they still must review all potentially discoverable information to
protect against disclosure of these "less important" categories of privileged and
protected information and to ensure that the documents produced are
relevant.398 For example, New York's Disciplinary Rules specify that a lawyer
has a duty to maintain the confidentiality of both a client's "confidence" (which
394. Id.
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means attorney-client privileged communications) and a client's "secret." 99 A
"'secret' refers to other information gained in the professional relationship that
the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be
embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client.' 400 Although
most rules of professional conduct permit an attorney to disclose a client's
confidential information to comply with a court order,40 ' entry of a Rule 502(d)
order will not trigger this exception. A 502(d) order does not compel the
Producing Party to disclose privileged or protected or irrelevant information; it
simply provides that disclosure does not constitute waiver. A 502(d) order
cannot compel disclosure of such information (at least for privileged and
irrelevant information) because such information is beyond the scope of
permissible discovery.402
Rule 502 also does not relieve an attorney of the obligation to review
potentially responsive documents to determine whether they are discoverable
because they are relevant to the claims and defenses raised or relevant to the
subject matter of the action.40 3 The review of documents for relevant
399. N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101.A (2002).
400. Id. Federal Rule of Evidence 502 defines "attorney-client privilege" to mean "the
protection that applicable law provides for confidential attorney-client communications" and
"work-product protection" to mean "the protection that applicable law provides for tangible
material (or its intangible equivalent) prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial." FED. R.
EVID. 502(g). Do these two definitions encompass all types of information that are covered by
the state's various iterations of what information an attorney is bound to keep confidential?
Like "secrets" under New York's Disciplinary Rules?
401. See, e.g., ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) ("A lawyer may reveal
information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary... to comply with other law or court order."); N.Y. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT 1.6(b) (2008) ("A lawyer may reveal or use confidential information to the extent the
lawyer reasonably believes necessary... to comply with other law or court order."). Even
where the court has ordered an attorney to disclose confidential information, the attorney may
be required to resist the order, argue it is ineffective and consult with the client regarding an
appeal of the order, before complying with the order. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 1.6 cmt. 13.
402. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
403. See id. ("Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is
relevant to any party's claim or defense .... For good cause, the court may order discovery of
any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action."). One can imagine the
Producing Party simply turning over the proverbial "document dump" that contains mostly
nonresponsive material because the Producing Party has not reviewed the material. At this
point the Receiving Party might object that the Producing Party has violated its obligation to
respond to the specific discovery requests at issue and has produced too much-the proverbial
"document dump." See, e.g., Oklahoma ex rel. Edmondson, No. 05-CV-329-GKF-SAJ, 2007
WL 1498973, at *4 (N.D. Okla. May 17, 2007) (concluding that once documents are removed
from their ordinary files, "only responsive documents [should] be placed in the boxes and that
"[i]nclusion of nonresponsive documents clearly violates the letter and spirit of the rule").
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information requires a review of the same documents as those inspected by
attorneys conducting a document-by-document privilege review.40 Once these
irrelevant and nonresponsive documents are produced, they can be used against
the Producing Party and the rules of privilege provide no protection. If the
documents are nonresponsive, but relevant, they can be used in the ongoing
litigation. If they are nonresponsive and irrelevant, but damaging, they can be
used by a plaintiff's attorney to initiate a separate lawsuit. Even where the
documents that are produced are privileged (and the Rule 502(d) order
preserves the privilege), the Receiving Party can use the documents in
numerous ways to which the Producing Party cannot object.
Although Rule 502(d) protects against waiver of only two categories of
information-attorney-client privileged and attorney work product protected-
it must preempt state rules of professional responsibility governing far broader
categories of information or it will provide little benefit to an attorney or their
clients. Even if it does preempt state rules regarding protection and waiver of
these other categories of information, however, it provides the clearest benefit
to attorneys, not clients. Rule 502(d) offers an unappealing choice to the
client-spend money to review documents or save money by approving
document production with little or no review of the documents but risk all
adverse consequences of the disclosure (other than waiver). By contrast, there
is little downside for the attorney once a 502(d) order is entered but it provides
a good deal of protection for the attorneys. A Rule 502 order will significantly
limit the exposure and risk for attorneys who produce their clients' privileged
or protected documents.
2. The Professional Responsibility Obligations of the Receiving
Party's Attorney
With enactment of Rule 502, it is now certain that attorneys who request
production of documents in a case in which the judge has entered a 502(d)
order will receive attorney-client privileged and attorney work product
protected documents on a fairly regular basis. The Rule does not contemplate
what courts and clients will do once a party's secret information is disclosed
and used against them. The Rule also does not contemplate what the Receiving
404. See Hearing of the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules 82-85 (Jan. 29, 2007)
(testimony of Patrick Oot, Director of Electronic Discovery and Senior Counsel, Verizon),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/2007-01-29-Evidence-Minutes-Transcript.pdf
(stating that privilege review in a document intensive case required 115 attorneys while
relevance review in the same case required 110 attorneys).
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Party's attorney will do once it receives privileged or work product protected
information. Neither the Federal Rules nor federal law requires the Receiving
Party's attorney to notify the Producing Party or to stop reading the documents
or to refrain from using them. What should the Receiving Party's attorney do?
What must the Receiving Party's attorney do?
Following enactment of the e-discovery amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, the obligations of a Receiving Party who receives privileged
documents and receives notice from the Producing Party are clear:
After being notified, a party must promptly return, sequester, or destroy the
specified information and any copies it has; must not use or disclose the
information until the claim is resolved; must take reasonable steps to
retrieve the information if the party disclosed it before being notified; and
may promptly present the information to the court under seal for a
determination of the claim. The producing party must preserve the
information until the claim is resolved.405
While Rule 26(b)(5)(B) provides some guidance on the Receiving Party's
conduct, the requirements of the rule kick in only after the Producing Party
provides notice to the Receiving Party that privileged documents have been
disclosed. It does not obligate the Receiving Party's attorney to provide notice
of receipt of privileged documents, nor does it provide guidance on lots of
knotty ethical issues.4 °6 Must the Receiving Party's attorney notify the
Producing Party of the disclosure of privileged or protected information? May
the Receiving Party's attorney read them? And take notes? May the Receiving
Party's attorney use the documents until notice is received?
A 1992 ABA ethics opinion and a number ofjudicial opinions mandated
that an attorney who received an inadvertently produced document must "take
three steps: to refrain from reviewing it; promptly to notify the sender; and to
abide the producing party's instructions. ''40 7 In 2005, the ABA Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility issued Formal Ethics
Opinion 05-437408 that supersedes the 1992 opinion and requires only that the
"lawyer who receives a document relating to the representation of the lawyer's
405. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(B).
406. There are, of course, many practical issues, such as at what point can the Producing
Party no longer object to use of "privileged" documents? If the Producing Party requests the
return of "privileged" documents, who pays the Receiving Party's costs incurred in retrieving
them? In using them to develop a litigation strategy or tactical use by the disclosing party of the
"notice" and request to return documents? Noyes, supra note 84, at 647-49.
407. J. Nick Badgerow, Rules vs. Rules: A Conflict on Inadvertent Production, 77-JAN. J.
KAN. B.A. 19, 19 (2008) (citing ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op.
92-368 (1992)).
408. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 05-437 (2005).
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client and knows or reasonably should know that the document was
inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender., 40 9 The 2005 opinion is
intentionally silent on the question whether or not the lawyer may review the
inadvertently produced privileged document. If the lawyer abides by the
ABA Ethics opinion, she will notify the Producing Party of the privileged
document, but she might review it and commit it to memory.4 1
The Maryland State Bar has gone even further. It recently issued a formal
opinion concluding that the Receiving Party may review and make use of
privileged information and that "the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct
do not require the receiving attorney to notify the sending attorney that there
may have been an inadvertent transmittal of privileged (or, for that matter, work
product) materials."
412
On the other hand, some states require the Receiving Party's attorney to
follow the withdrawn 1992 Ethics opinion's three-step mandate to (1) refrain
from viewing, (2) promptly notify the sender, and (3) abide the Producing
Party's instructions.4 3 For example, in a 2007 decision, the California
Supreme Court held that a lawyer who received inadvertently produced work
product protected documents was subject to disqualification.4 4 The California
Supreme Court affirmed the rule that that a California attorney who receives
409. Id. (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2008)).
410. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 05-437 (2005); see also
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-442 (2006) (concluding that
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct permit a Receiving Party to review and use
information embedded in metadata); Steven C. Bennett, Ethics and Inadvertent Disclosure 1
(2006), http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/ccd8426e-8154-4477-ba3a-3d9aOeO3d2ad/
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/add4dal0-54e2-4aOc-8c68-4a61 le45439f/Ethics%20
ArticleSteven%20C.%2OBennett.pdf (noting that under the ABA, a Receiving Party may read
privileged documents disclosed inadvertently and is obliged to notify the Sending Attorney of
the error).
411. See supra note 410 (discussing the ABA ethics opinion); see also Fla. Bar Ass'n Op.
93-3 (Feb. 7, 1994) (noting that once the Receiving Attorney notifies the Producing Party, "it is
then up to the sender to take any further action").
412. Md. State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Ethics, Op. 2007-09 (2007). See also Colo. Bar
Ass'n, Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 119 (2008), which provides:
[W]here the Receiving Lawyer has no prior notice [of an inadvertent production],
the Receiving Lawyer's only duty upon viewing confidential metadata is to notify
the Sending Lawyer. See RPC 4.4(b). There is no rule that prohibits the Receiving
Lawyer from continuing to review the electronic document or file and its associated
metadata in that circumstance.
413. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-368 (1992).
414. See Rico v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 171 P.3d 1092, 1094 (Cal. 2007) (concluding
that an attorney who receives a privileged document "may not read a document any more closely
than is necessary to ascertain that it is privileged" and has an obligation to notify opposing
counsel of the situation).
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inadvertently produced privileged documents must stop reviewing the
documents as soon as the reviewer is able to ascertain that the documents are
privileged and must immediately notify the Producing Party that he or she
possesses apparently privileged documents.415
A number of ethics opinions concur and require the Receiving Attorney to
refrain from reviewing or using privileged information that is inadvertently
transmitted documents.41 6 All of these ethics opinions generally apply to
inadvertent disclosure in one of two forms: (1) a transmission that is intended
for a client goes to opposing counsel or (2) when an unauthorized person
intentionally transmits privileged information to an opposing party.4 17 These
ethics opinions distinguish (either explicitly or implicitly) between inadvertent
disclosures and production of documents in civil discovery.4 8 There is
arguably no duty on the part of the Receiving Attorney to refrain from
reviewing or using the privileged information that is received in response to a
discovery request. Such information is not produced "inadvertently."
One way to solve this problem is for the parties to reach agreement in
advance that the Receiving Party will follow the three-step mandate and request
that the court include this agreement as part of its Rule 502(d) order. 419 But
even entry of a Rule 502(d) order that incorporates a three-step mandate will
not force the Receiving Party to forget the privileged information.
In many ways, Rule 502 does not eliminate the cost of conducting a
privilege review; it simply shifts that cost and burden to the requesting party.
In actions in which the district court enters a Rule 502(d) order, the Producing
Party's attorney may choose to intentionally produce documents without
reviewing them, knowing with near certainty that they will contain some
privileged documents. Presumably, the Receiving Party must do all the work of
415. Id. at 1098-99.
416. See Ala. State Bar, Office of Gen. Counsel, Op. No. RO-2007-02 (2007); see also
Andrew M. Perlman, Untangling Ethics Theory from Attorney Conduct Rules: The Case of
Inadvertent Disclosures, 13 GEO. MASON L. REv. 767, 783-85 (2005) (surveying state bar
opinions and state court opinions). For a 2006 update of this survey of the different states'
approaches to inadvertent disclosure, see http://legalethicsforum.typepad.com/blog/2006/
06/50_state survey.html.
417. See David Hricik, Mining for Embedded Data: Is It Ethical To Take Intentional
Advantage of Other People's Failures?, 8 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 231, 235-36 (2007) (describing
the two most common forms of inadvertent disclosure).
418. See generally D.C. Bar Ethics Opinion 341; Fla. Bar Op. 06-2 (2006); Ala. State Bar,
Office of Gen. Counsel Op. No. RO-2007-02 (2007).
419. See Bennett, supra note 410, at 2 (discussing agreements addressing inadvertently
produced documents); David E. Springer & Su Ji Lee, Finders Weepers: The Ethical
Obligation of an Attorney Who Receives Inadvertently Produced Documents, 5 EMP. & LABOR
RELATIONS L. 1, 7 (2006) (discussing up front inadvertent disclosure agreements).
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reviewing the documents, identifying potentially privileged documents,
determining whether they are privileged, and, if so, giving notice to the
Producing Party each time a privileged document is located. The Receiving
Party must then decide whether to refrain from reviewing the documents and
using them. Even if the Receiving Party is subject to a court order
incorporating the three-step mandate, the Receiving Party's attorney still faces
an ethical dilemma if it identifies documents that are possibly (but not clearly)
privileged.
Once the Receiving Party has sorted out the documents and notified the
Producing Party of any issues, the Producing Party may then request the return
of the documents.420 If the Receiving Party then wishes to review and use the
documents, it must "promptly present the information to the court under seal for
a determination of the claim.",421 And then the Receiving Party's attorney gets
to bill the client for all of this work.
B. Use of Information Produced Pursuant to a Rule 502(d) Order
Entry of a Rule 502(d) order precludes a claim that disclosure of
documents in a federal proceeding waives the attorney-client privilege or
attorney work product protection for information contained in those documents.
Thus, the Producing Party may continue to assert the privilege or protection to
prevent the Receiving Party (or a nonparty) from admitting the disclosed
information into evidence in that federal proceeding or in any other federal or
state proceeding. Rule 502(d) does not (and cannot) prevent the Receiving
Party from using the privileged or work product protected information:
For example, the adversary may formulate questions or trial strategies that
are based on or informed by privileged or protected documents. In that
event, objecting may be either impossible or pointless. Similarly, if the
adversary has fact or expert witnesses review and rely on privileged or
protected documents (of course, before the claims are asserted and
sustained), it will be impossible to have those witnesses "unlearn" that
information and difficult to excise the resulting knowledge from their
testimony or opinions.422
420. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(B).
421. Id.
422. Posting of David B. Alden to Drug and Device Law, New Federal Rule of Evidence
502-A Modest Improvement? (Sept. 23, 2008), http://druganddevicelaw.biogspot.com/2008/
09/new-federal-rule-of-evidence-502-modest.htm (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
66 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 673 (2009)
Also, the privileged document may provide reasonable grounds to impeach a
witness-directly or indirectly. Finally, the threat of disclosure of the
information contained in the privileged document may put a dark cloud over
the Producing Party's handling of the case and force a quick settlement.
Once privileged or work product protected information is reviewed by the
Receiving Party, it will provide a virtual roadmap to follow up discovery to
learn the underlying facts or data that are not protected by the privilege. The
Receiving Party will quickly conduct their own interviews and depositions of
relevant witnesses and they will propound additional document requests. Use
of interrogatories and requests for admission will be particularly important
because these discovery devices are not limited to facts but, instead, may go to
matters of opinion and to matters that require application of law to fact.423
Finally, Rule 502(d) provides no restriction on the use and admission into
evidence of (1) other (non attorney-client) privileged information, (2) other
(non attorney work product) protected information, and (3) a client's
nonprivileged, nonprotected but very damaging information. Such information
may be used and admitted into evidence in the federal proceeding and any other
federal or state proceeding where it is relevant and otherwise admissible.
C. Routine Entry of 502(d) Orders: Factors Guiding District Courts in the
Exercise of Their Discretion to Issue a 502(d) Order
Rule 502(d) gives federal courts discretion to enter an order protecting a
party against waiving the attorney-client privilege or work-product protection
when a party makes a knowing and voluntary disclosure of such information as
long as the disclosure is "connected with the litigation pending before the
court."4 24 Congress did not pass a law mandating that "this type of evidence is
automatically off limit" as in Guillen v. Pierce County. 5 Instead, the federal
423. See FED. R. Crv. P. 33(a)(2) ("An interrogatory is not objectionable merely because it
asks for an opinion or contention that relates to fact or the application of law to fact.. . .");see
also FED R. CIv. P. 36(a)(1)(A) ("A party may serve on any other party a written request to
admit... the truth of any matters... relating to... facts, the application of law to fact, or
opinions about either .... ").
424. FED. R. EvID. 502(d). By contrast, Rule 502(b) protects the holder of the privilege
against waiver from an inadvertent disclosure only if the holder took reasonable steps to protect
against disclosure in the first instance and then "promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the
error, including (if applicable) following Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B)." FED. R.
EvID. 502(b).
425. See Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 146-47 (2003) (upholding, as a proper
exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause authority, a federal statute that protected certain
highway safety information from evidentiary discovery and admission). Guillen is discussed
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judge has discretion to make it off limits. Neither the rule nor the
accompanying Committee Notes, however, provides any factors to guide the
district courts in the exercise of their discretion.426 What showing must a party
(or parties) who seeks a 502(d) order make? If one party requests a Rule
502(d) order and the other party objects, what factors should the court consider
in making its decision whether to issue such an order?
The federal court also may enter a Rule 502(d) order despite the
protestation of one of the parties to the federal proceeding.427 If this occurs,
does the aggrieved party have a right to challenge the court's exercise of
discretion? What constitutes an abuse of discretion? Does a nonparty or state
court have the right to challenge the original (federal) court's discretionary
decision to issue an order?428 Assuming that the nonparties who will be bound
by the order somehow learn about the proposed order, are they entitled to
appear and challenge it?
The Advisory Committee Notes refer to a Rule 502(d) order as a
"confidentiality order. ,429 Ordinarily, confidentiality and protective orders will
not be entered absent specific findings and a showing of good cause.43°
Although any party may move for a protective order to limit public access to
the court records,43' there is no guarantee that the motion will be granted. To
supra Part III.A.
426. See generally FED. R. EVID. 502(d).
427. Id. As first proposed, the Rule required agreement of the parties before a federal court
could enter a 502(d) order. This requirement was removed from the rule. See FRE 502
Memorandum from Dan Capra, Reporter, and Ken Broun, Consultant, to the Advisory
Committee on Evidence Rules dated October 15, 2006, Re: Proposed Rule 502, Released For
Public Comment 19, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Agenda%20Books/ EV2006-
11 .pdf (noting that FRE 502(d), as originally proposed, required that the parties agree on the
confidentiality order before it can be issued and recommending the removal of such
requirement). This requirement was removed from the rule. FED. R. EVID. 502(d).
428. Professor Capra, the primary drafter of Rule 502, and Magistrate Judge Paul W.
Grimm, author of the Hopson and Victor Stanley opinions discussed herein, both indicate yes.
The Sedona Conference Web Seminar, Limitations on Privilege Waiver Under New Federal
Rule of Evidence 502 (Nov. 25, 2008), available at http://www.sedonaconference.org/
conferences/wgsa/20081125 (on file with author).
429. FED. R. EvID 502 advisory committee's note ("Under [Rule 502(d)], a confidentiality
order is enforceable whether or not it memorializes an agreement among the parties to the
litigation.").
430. See, e.g., Rollscree Co. v. Pella Products of St. Louis, Inc., 145 F.R.D. 92, 96 (S.D.
Iowa 1992) (stating that a party seeking a protective order must make a "good cause" showing
that disclosure of the information would be harmful, and that the requesting party "must make a
specific demonstration of facts in support of the request"); J.T. Baker, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 135 F.R.D. 86, 90 (D.N.J. 1989) (same).
431. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). Rule 26(c) provides in part:
The Court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from
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rebut the presumption of public access to court records, the moving party has
the burden of establishing good cause, which must be based on "a particular
and specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished from stereotyped and
conclusory statements."4 32 If the parties stipulate to the need for a protective
order and make a joint motion, the court still may refuse to grant the order and,
even if granted, the order must be narrowly tailored.433
It seems likely that courts will be inclined to enter a Rule 502(d) order in
most commercial litigation cases and that documents will routinely be produced
under the guise of this "confidentiality order., 434 The voluntary and intentional
disclosure of privileged documents will become common practice, possibly
pursuant to standing orders that include a Rule 502(d) order.435 But this defeats
the long-standing requirement that a confidentiality agreement must be specific
and limited and may be granted only on a showing of good cause. Instead, it
would be used as a substitute for the kind of careful work and review that must
be done to get a protective order. The availability of a 502(d) order also may
provide justification for a court in compelling production of a broader scope of
information, despite the Producing Party's objection. Rule 502(d) will
diminish the importance of maintaining the confidential nature of a client's
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one
or more of the following: ... (D) forbidding inquiring into certain matters,...
(E) designating the persons who may be present while the discovery is conducted;
(F) requiring that a deposition be sealed and opened only by the court; [and]
(G) requiring that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or
commercial information not be revealed or be revealed only in a designated way.
Id.
432. Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 102 n.16 (1981) (quoting In re Halkins, 598
F.2d 176, 193 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
433. See, e.g., N.D. CAL. Civ. L. R. 79-5(a) (2008) ("[O]rder may issue only upon a request
that establishes that the document, or portions thereof, is privileged or protectable as a trade
secret or otherwise entitled to protection under the law, [hereinafter referred to as "sealable"].
The request must be narrowly tailored to seek sealing only of sealable material."); N.D. CAL.
Civ. L. R. 79-5(f) (declaring that all documents are presumptively available to the public ten
years from the date the case is closed).
434. Professor Daniel Capra, Reporter for the Evidence Rules Committee and Primary
drafter of Rule 502, has stated that the Rule does not set forth any factors guiding the court's
exercise of discretion and that "the assumption really was that many courts will enter orders
straightforwardly upon a showing that it basically is an electronic discovery case, that there's a
lot of information there and it makes sense to limit costs." The Sedona Conference Web
Seminar, Limitations on Privilege Waiver Under New Federal Rule of Evidence 502 (Nov. 25,
2008) (on file with author), available at http://www.sedonaconference.org/conferences/
wgsa/20081125.
435. The Sedona Conference Web Seminar, Limitations on Privilege Waiver Under New
Federal Rule of Evidence 502, at 23:15 (Nov. 25, 2008), available at http://www.sedona
conference.org/conferences/wgsa/20081125 (on file with author).
756
FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 502
information and will increase the routine disclosure of such information. Thus,
Rule 502(d) may ultimately undermine the attorney-client privilege and the
attorney work product doctrine and expand the scope of discovery at the same
time.436
D. Retroactive Application: Federal Court Power to Put the Waiver Genie
Back in the Privilege Bottle
Rule 502 does not address whether a federal court may enter a Rule 502(d)
order that "undoes" the effect of an earlier-in-time disclosure that constitutes a
waiver of the privilege or protection.437 Assume, for example, that an action is
brought in federal court on a state law cause of action based on diversity
jurisdiction. The parties to this federal court action enter into a nonwaiver
agreement pursuant to Rule 502(e). The agreement "is binding on the parties to
the agreement, unless it is incorporated into a court order., 438 The parties then
exchange documents and find that the exchange includes many attorney-client
privileged documents. The applicable state law deems the privilege to have
been waived in that circumstance. At that point, the parties request the federal
court to enter a Rule 502(d) order. The federal court enters such an order and
includes language in the order to the effect that the "order binds all persons and
entities in all federal or state proceedings, whether or not they were parties to
the litigation.
4 39
Does the federal court order retroactively restore the privilege, putting the
waiver genie back in the bottle? The text of Rule 502(d) was clarified to
indicate that the protections of Rule 502 apply in all cases in federal court,
including cases in which state law provides the rule of decision.440 In this
hypothetical diversity action, state law of privilege determines whether specific
436. As noted by one commentator, "[rioutine disclosures of privileged and protected
communications to adversaries as FRE 502(d) contemplates could, as expectations of
confidentiality disappear, discourage employees from confiding in the company's attorneys and
make attorneys reluctant to provide frank legal advice or engage in zealous advocacy." David
B. Alden & Ted S. Hiser, New Federal Rule of Evidence 502 and Possible Litigation Document
Review Cost Savings, Jones Day Commentaries (Sept. 2008), available at
http://www.jonesday.com/pubs/pubs-detail.aspx?publD=S5487) (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329
U.S. 495, 511 (1947) ("Were [work product] materials open to opposing counsel on mere
demand, much of what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten.")).
437. FED. R. Evtn. 502(d).
438. FED. R. EviD. 502(e).
439. FED. R. EvD. 502(d).
440. FED. R. EviD. 502(f).
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information is attorney-client privileged. 4 1 Does state law also determine
whether the privilege was waived by disclosure that occurred before the federal
court entered a Rule 502(d) order? The Evidence Rules Committee stated that
Rule 502 "applies in state court to determine whether a disclosure previously
made at the federal level constitutes a waiver--despite any indication to the
contrary that might be found in the language of Rules 101 and 1101 .,42 Thus,
it seems that entry of a Rule 502(d) order may supersede state law.
Now change our hypothetical diversity action to include the following:
The parties do not enter a Rule 502(e) nonwaiver agreement. Discovery
commences and the parties exchange documents. The Receiving Party's
attorney identifies attorney-client privileged documents, reviews them, and uses
them to formulate litigation strategy. Several months later, the Producing
Party's attorney also recognizes that the documents include privileged
information and requests that the court enter a 502(d) order. The Receiving
Party objects and argues that there has been a waiver of the privilege. The
court nevertheless enters a Rule 502(d) order. Is it binding on the party who
received the documents? Is it binding on a nonparty who later argues during
discovery in a subsequent lawsuit that there was a waiver? As part of the rule-
making process, the rule was amended to remove the requirement of the
parties' agreement, so arguably it should apply to these two circumstances and
put the waiver genie back in the privilege bottle." 3
Rule 502(d) also does not address a disclosure that is made in an otherwise
public portion of the proceeding. Rule 502(d) applies by its terms to any
disclosure that is "connected with the litigation pending before the court."44
Rule 502(d) arguably applies to protect against waiver of privilege for
documents that are disclosed and used in a deposition, 445 that are submitted to
441. See FED. R. EvID. 501 ("However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an
element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of
a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in
accordance with State law.").
442. MAY 2007 EVIDENCE RULES CoMM. REPORT, supra note 95, at 14.
443. See Memorandum from Dan Capra, Reporter and Ken Broun, Consultant, to Advisory
Comm. on Evidence Rules 19, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Agenda%20Books/
EV2006-11 .pdf (noting that Rule 502(d), as originally proposed, required that the parties agree
on the confidentiality order before it can be issued and recommending the removal of such
requirement).
444. FED. R. EvID. 502(d).
445. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(B) 2006 advisory committee's note (indicating that
resolution of a claim of privilege is dependent upon the Producing Party giving notice to the
Receiving Party, which may "include the assertion of the claim during a deposition").
FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 502
the court in a motion for summary judgment,446 and that are offered at trial, as
long as the Producing Party objects and the federal court enters a 502(d) order.
Neither Rule 502 nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure set forth a time
line or deadline for the Producing Party to object to use of privileged
information by the Receiving Party. For example, assume that the document
containing privileged information is used at a deposition and the Producing
Party fails to object to the use of privileged information. Has the privilege been
waived, even if the court previously entered a 502(d) order? What if the
Receiving Party asks the deponent about privileged information without
revealing that the subject matter of the question was derived from a document
produced pursuant to a Rule 502(d) order? The Producing Party's attorney:
[W]ill need to become expert at quickly spotting privileged and protected
documents as the adversary uses them in any deposition or at trial and then
objecting and defending the basis for those claims "on the fly." Counsel's
inability to quickly raise and support the claims that Rule 502(d) preserved
may mean that they are simply waived through different conduct.
447
To head off these late-developing privilege disputes, federal courts "may set
deadlines for privilege-holders to assert claims of privilege or protection in
produced documents, either before depositions begin or before trial, which may
significantly reduce any cost savings."
448
VII. Conclusion
Rule 502 is the first step in the federalization of state privilege law and,
unintentionally, the first step in federalizing state rules of professional
responsibility. Congress's concern for the rising cost of reviewing documents
for privileged information overcame its respect for the autonomy of the states
and their respective court systems. Rule 502(d) allows federal courts to
446. Even if a protective order is issued in a particular case protecting certain documents
from disclosure, documents that are used for a dispositive summary judgment motion are subject
to a higher scrutiny. See, e.g., Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122,1136-37
(9th Cir. 2003) (noting that absent compelling circumstances that warrant confidentiality, a
presumption of access applies to documents attached to dispositive motions). Because entry of
summary judgment serves as a substitute for trial, a higher showing is required to deny public
access to the court's summary judgment records than the "good cause" standard for issuance of a
protective order. Id. at 1135-36. In such cases, the moving party bears the burden of
establishing "compelling reasons" to seal the record. Id. at 1136 (requiring the moving party to
meet this higher standard even though documents were filed under seal pursuant to general
"protective order" governing materials produced in discovery).
447. Alden, supra note 422.
448. Id.
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intervene in this delicate state law balance and issue orders that bind state
courts. In some instances, the federal court will issue a Rule 502(d) order while
sitting in diversity jurisdiction when applying state law on a cause of action
involving a resident of that forum state. In such a case, the federal court will
look to state law to determine whether a particular confidential communication
is attorney-client privileged, but the federal court will nevertheless issue an
order perfecting and protecting the privilege despite the disclosure of such
information that would destroy the privilege under that very same state law. It
is doubtful whether Congress has the power to tread this dubious path.
Assuming Congress has the power to federalize state privilege law, maybe
it is not such a bad thing. Professor Timothy Glynn, among others, has
suggested that privilege law should be formally federalized. 449 He recommends
that Congress should enact preemptive privilege legislation that provides
uniform privilege protection applicable in proceedings in both state and federal
court, as well as in arbitrations, administrative proceedings, and legislative
proceedings. 450 But Congress did not do that here. Rather than taking over the
entirety of state privilege law and making it uniform, Rule 502 gives federal
courts the power to issue discretionary orders that bind anyone and everyone in
the world, including state courts, and that interfere with state courts' ability to
implement state law of privilege.
The result of this "baby step" may well be a sea change in our attitude
toward the security and safeguarding of a client's confidential information.
Entry of a 502(d) order may become the norm, even part of the "Local Rules"
of some courts. District courts will order production of a broader scope of
information during discovery, comforted by the fact that the "disclosed"
information is nevertheless protected by the 502(d) order. It will then become
standard practice for attorneys to voluntarily produce privileged and protected
documents rather than reviewing them because it is cheaper and easier to do so.
Although the purpose of Rule 502 was to "reaffirm and reinforce" the attorney-
client privilege and the work product protection, Rule 502(d) may ultimately
dilute and weaken the importance of the various state laws that protect the
relationship between attorney and client.
449. Glynn, supra note 38, at 133; see also Hearing on Evidence Before the Judicial Conf
of the U.S. Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules 5 (Jan. 12,2007) (testimony of George L. Paul),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/EVHearing_ Transcript 01 1207.pdf (noting that
the vast majority of litigation in the United States occurs in state courts and that the effect of the
new rule is severely limited because it is not a "nationwide" rule that applies to disclosures first
made in state courts).
450. Id.
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APPENDIX
Rule 502. Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product; Limitations on
Waiver
The following provisions apply, in the circumstances set out, to disclosure
of a communication or information covered by the attorney-client privilege or
work-product protection.
(a) Disclosure made in a federal proceeding or to a federal office or
agency; scope of a waiver. When the disclosure is made in a federal
proceeding or to a federal office or agency and waives the attorney-client
privilege or work-product protection, the waiver extends to an undisclosed
communication or information in a federal or state proceeding only if: (1) the
waiver is intentional; (2) the disclosed and undisclosed communications or
information concern the same subject matter; and (3) they ought in fairness to
be considered together.
(b) Inadvertent disclosure. When made in a federal proceeding or to a
federal office or agency, the disclosure does not operate as a waiver in a federal
or state proceeding if: (1) the disclosure is inadvertent; (2) the holder of the
privilege or protection took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure; and (3) the
holder promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the error, including (if
applicable) following Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(B).
(c) Disclosure made in a state proceeding. When the disclosure is made in
a state proceeding and is not the subject of a state-court order concerning
waiver, the disclosure does not operate as a waiver in a federal proceeding if
the disclosure: (1) would not be a waiver under this rule if it had been made in
a federal proceeding; or (2) is not a waiver under the law of the state where the
disclosure occurred.
(d) Controlling effect of a court order. A federal court may order that the
privilege or protection is not waived by disclosure connected with the litigation
pending before the court-in which event the disclosure is also not a waiver in
any other federal or state proceeding.
(e) Controlling effect of a party agreement. An agreement on the effect of
disclosure in a federal proceeding is binding only on the parties to the
agreement, unless it is incorporated into a court order.
(f) Controlling effect of this rule. Notwithstanding Rules 101 and 1101,
this rule applies to state proceedings and to federal court-annexed and federal
court-mandated arbitration proceedings, in the circumstances set out in the rule.
And notwithstanding Rule 501, this rule applies even if state law provides the
rule of decision.
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(g) Definitions. In this rule: (1) "attorney-client privilege" means the
protection that applicable law provides for confidential attorney-client
communications; and (2) "work-product protection" means the protection that
applicable law provides for tangible material (or its intangible equivalent)
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial.
